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ABSTRACT
Since the end o f the Cold War era in the 1990s and the subsequent intensification o f the
globalization phenomenon, regionalism has become an important development strategy
for both the developing and the developed countries. This thesis adopts a comparative
approach to examine the role o f the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA) in the promotion of socio-economic and political development in Eastern and
Southern Africa. The thesis begins by providing a theoretical background to the concept
of regionalism. It then traces the emergence o f regionalism within the political economy
of the international system, beginning from the era o f mercantilism to the era of
globalization. It then provides a critical overview o f the European Union (the EU), the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Common Market o f the Southern
Cone (MERCOSUR) and the Association o f South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and
analyses the achievements o f these regional integration arrangements in so far as meeting
the socio-economic and political development needs of their respective regions is
concerned and builds the framework within which COMESA is compared vis-a-vis these
regional integration arrangements. Based on the outcome o f this comparative analysis and
the broader literature on regionalism, the thesis identifies some o f COM ESA’s main
challenges and makes some recommendations on how COMESA could overcome these
challenges so as to improve its prospects for playing a more effective development role
for the Southern and Eastern Africa region. Finally, the thesis concludes that although
COMESA’s gains from regionalism so far remain minimal— compared to those o f the
other regional integration arrangements in this study— it remains a better vehicle for the
development o f Eastern and Southern Africa—more so, in this era o f post-Cold War
regionalism and globalization.
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Background

Regionalism is increasingly becoming a major force in world politics1. Since the end of
the Cold War, the major economic regions o f the world— i.e. the mega-economies o f
North America and Europe and the emerging economies o f East Asia— have given
regionalism a prominent seat in their body-politic in order to accomplish two related
objectives: first, so that they may be in a better position to mitigate the uncertainties o f
globalization and second, so that they may be in a better position to consolidate new
socio-economic and political gains from an increasingly globalizing world2.
If these three mega-economic regions o f the world have adopted regionalism as
one o f the main strategies through which to wither the vagaries o f globalization, the lesspowerful economic regions o f the world— i.e. Latin America, the Caribbean, South East
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa— have similarly taken a keen interest in regionalism as a
development strategy in this era o f globalization. The renewed interest in regionalism in
the developing world is clearly manifested by the formation o f new regional integration
arrangements or the rekindled commitment to already existing regional integration
arrangements in these parts o f the world. Like the powerful economies o f the North, the
less powerful economies o f the South have opted for regionalism as a strategy through
which they hope to, among other things: cope with the uncertainties o f globalization, stem
their continued marginalization from the world economy and finally, develop a
development strategy that will see them gainfully integrate into the emerging global
economy3.
Existing, newly-formed or reinvigorated regional integration arrangements such as
the Association o f South East Asian Nations (henceforth, ASEAN), the European Union
(henceforth, the EU), the Common Market o f the Southern Cone (henceforth,
MERCOSUR), the North American Free Trade Agreement (henceforth, NAFTA), and the
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (henceforth, COMESA) are some o f
the organizational vehicles through which states in different regions o f the world are
pursuing the strategy o f regionalism in the post Cold War era.

Increasingly, regional

integration arrangements are becoming a prominent feature in the post Cold War
international political system. While the international political system has in the past

1

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

undergone transformation due to such forces as imperialism, colonialism and the politics
of the Cold War among others, globalization is currently the main transformative force in
the international political arena4. Every time each o f these global transformative forces
came to dominate the international political system, they prompted different and unique
strategic responses and reactions from the key political actors and or players in the
international system. For example, imperialism and colonialism were marked by an
expansionist strategy that led to the era o f empire building via overseas territorial
acquisitions by the leading European imperial and colonial powers5. The resistance and
the eventual attainment o f independence also marked this global transformative period by
those who were under imperial or colonial domination6. As the main transformative force
in international politics since the late 1940s to the early 1990s, super-power rivalry
between the US and the USSR marked the Cold War era7. Some o f the political strategies
adopted by the superpowers during the Cold War era period included: building spheres of
influence in different regions o f the world via satellite states, building alliances with
ideologically similar-minded political actors or seeking to win over political allies along
ideological lines. Similarly, during this period, some o f the less powerful political
actors— especially the newly independent states in Africa, Latin America and Asia—
chose to cope with the uncertainties o f the Cold War era by declaring themselves “nonaligned” to neither the Western Bloc nor the Eastern bloc8.
With the end o f the Cold War era in the early 1990s, globalization rose in
prominence and currently, it is the main transformative agent in the international political
system. Globalization is rapidly altering the hitherto existing Cold War international
socio-economic and political order. Due to the ubiquitous nature o f globalization and due
to its unpredictable impact in global affairs, nation-states (the principal actors in the
international political system since the peace o f Westphalia in 1648) are increasingly
finding it imperative to come up with new ways o f both maintaining political stability and
ensuring the socio-econ om ic developm ent o f their citizenry. Regionalism has become one

of the main strategies through which different political actors, particularly nation-states,
are responding to and or coping with the transformative forces o f globalization. Given its
rising prominence in world politics, regionalism is now regarded as an important strategy
in the socio-economic and political development efforts o f both the North and the South.

2
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What is more, an increasing number o f scholars are now acknowledging that given the
uncertainties o f the current era o f globalization, regionalism is an important factor in the
development strategies o f both the developing and the developed countries9.
In fact, linking the concept o f regionalism to development has become so
important in this era that scholars like John Sloan would prefer to aptly refer to
regionalism as “developmental regionalism” 10 . Having taken cognizance of the
multifaceted nature o f globalization and the broad range o f issues that it encompasses,
these scholars have similarly broadened the mandate o f regionalism. Hence, according to
Sloan, unlike the past instances o f regionalism that mostly limited themselves to
economic concerns, under globalization, the current revival o f regionalism is not only
about economic growth (a position supported in this thesis) but rather a broader concept
that encompasses the social and political dimensions o f development as w ell11. Sloan
further contends that limiting regionalism to economic issues— as has been mainly the
case in past studies on regionalism— is imprecise, static and irrelevant to the broader
19
developmental spectrum within which regionalism currently operates .
•

However, it must be noted that while regionalism has been widely embraced as
one of the most viable post Cold War development strategies, its success as a tool for
development has been uneven. For example, while the developmental gains of
regionalism have been impressive in Europe, fairly successful in North America and
increasingly promising in both South East Asia and Latin America, the same cannot be
said about the gains o f developmental regionalism in Africa where so far, such gains
remain m inim al13. This thesis seeks both to identity some o f the main barriers to
successful developmental regionalism in Africa and to make some recommendations on
how these barriers could be overcome so as to make regionalism a more effective
development strategy in Africa. Hence, despite the minimal gains that have so far accrued
from regionalism in Africa, in this thesis, while paying special attention to the case o f the
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (CO M ESA), I argue that regional

integration arrangements still offer one o f the most viable development strategies through
which the African continent can improve its socio-economic and political conditions. It is
my contention that successful developmental regionalism in Africa will propel the
continent into a position where it will be able to generate the resources needed to

3
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effectively deal with its development challenges such as the elimination o f absolute
poverty, the combating and or treatment o f such preventable and treatable diseases like
diarrhoea and malaria and the improvement o f basic survival skills through the provision
o f basic education to all14.
In defending regionalism as a viable development strategy for Africa, I am aware
o f the fact that a number o f contentious issues arise in so far as the efficacy o f
regionalism as a paradigm for Africa’s development is concerned15. These issues are even
more poignant, especially given the fact that the numerous regional integration
arrangements that have existed in the continent since the 1960s have so far only made a
miniscule contribution towards meeting Africa’s development needs16. However, it is my
strong believe that African policy-makers and other scholars o f African development are
now in a much better position than they were in the past both to analyse the limitations of
past regional integration arrangements in Africa and to formulate new and more
appropriate regional integration strategies that will be relevant to Africa’s development
efforts17. In this thesis, I seek to make a contribution to this end. Additionally, it is fair to
say that given the failure o f past development theories (I discuss some o f these theories in
detail below) and the adoption o f regionalism as a way o f promoting the socio-economic
and political well-being o f people in different regions o f the world (including the
developed world), the African continent has fewer options to development that can match
the immense potential o f regionalism as a development strategy for A frica18. What is
more, for Africa—just like it is the case for the other regions o f the world— regionalism
carries with it the dual advantage o f both tempering the negative forces o f globalization
on the continent while at the same time, acting as a medium through which Africa may
pursue its development aspirations.
Regionalism offers better prospects o f bringing about political stability as well as
setting in place the necessary socio-economic structures capable o f bringing about intraregional and trans-regional developm ent in A frica19. H ow ever, it must be noted that

regionalism can only bring about socio-economic and political development to the
African continent if and only if the new (or the re-invigorated) regional integration
arrangements seek to overcome the internal and the external obstacles to successful

4
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regionalism in Africa at the following four levels: the commitment level, the strategic
level, the sustainability level and the geopolitical level.
First, at the commitment level, the main political actors ( in this case, the African
political leaders) must be willing to make some concrete political commitment to the
success of their respective regional integration arrangements, even if this means ceding
part of their juridical sovereignty in order to achieve this goal20. In the past, lack o f
political will has been one o f the major hindrances to successful regionalism in Africa21.
However, I believe that this obstacle can be overcome if African leaders learn to
appreciate the fact that successful regionalism in other parts o f the world has only
occurred partly because o f the firm political commitment to regional integration
arrangements by the leaders in these parts o f the world22.
Second, at the strategic level, regional integration arrangements in Africa must
seek to develop the necessary infrastructure that will enable them gain the skills needed
(both at the organizational and national levels) to face up to the present socio-economic
and political development challenges in the continent . It must be noted that the inability
to establish, fund or staff regional integration arrangements in Africa with high-calibre
personnel (capable o f effectively and efficiently running the day to day affairs o f regional
initiatives in Africa) has been one o f the main obstacles to successful regionalism in the
continent24. At the national level, it is instructive to point out that the individual countries
within the different regional integration arrangements have not put in place sufficient
socio-economic and political infrastructure for successful regionalism to take place25.
These obstacles must be overcome first before successful, development-oriented
regionalism can occur in Africa.
Third, African countries must realize that since they first got their independence in
the 1960s and set-up regional integration arrangements as a means to harnessing their
wealth and promoting development,

their efforts have been, to say the least, less

rewarding. One o f the explanations for this is that for the most part, these regional

integration arrangements were nothing more than non-sustainable initiatives, backed by
high sounding political statements that had little or no chance o f succeeding. A cursory
look at the current regional integration arrangements in Africa reveals that most o f them
are still heavy on grand rhetoric and less committed to a light, clear-focused agenda that

5
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will ensure both their sustainability and growth26. In this thesis it is my contention that if
regionalism is to succeed in Africa, then it must start small, focus on a few socio
economic and political sectors (such as the promotion o f a culture o f good governance,
investment in health and education, investment in transport and telecommunication
services and the relaxation or reduction o f barriers to intra-regional economic growth)
that are crucial to the initial stages o f regionalism before expanding out. If this approach
is not adopted, regional integration arrangements are likely to continue being photo-op
sessions for African leaders with no real chance o f promoting socio-economic and
political development in Africa. What is more, African countries will continue becoming
less and less competitive in the global economy and therefore incapable o f seizing the
new socio-economic opportunities that have emerged under globalization27.
Fourth and finally, the other powerful regional integration arrangements must seek
to be altruistic and therefore willing to both help and allow fragile regional integration
arrangements like COMESA take root. Regional integration arrangements in Africa, and
indeed those in other parts o f the third world, must collectively lobby against such
practises like the EU ’s agricultural policies that make it difficult for them to effectively
compete in those areas where they possess the so-called comparative advantage . What is
more, African leaders must come to terms with the fact that with the end o f the Cold War,
their ability to play both the West and the East for political gain has been severely
diminished. Therefore, they must seek to make regionalism work, since it is the only
effective strategy through which the weak African states can still remain geopolitically
-)Q

relevant in the post Cold War era and therefore ensure their political survival .
From the foregoing, it can be clearly seen that before COMESA, and indeed the
other regional integration arrangements in Africa, can start playing a meaningful
development role in Eastern and Southern Africa, it must take a two-pronged approach.
First, it must seek to overcome the internal and external obstacles to developmental
regionalism identified at the above given levels. Then second, it must seek to promote

the internal and external development opportunities made possible under globalization.
But how can COMESA overcome these internal and external obstacles to successful
developmental regionalism and in what ways can it promote the internal and external
opportunities that developmental regionalism has to offer in a highly globalizing world?

6
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In this thesis, I seek to offer some insights into how COMESA could attain these two
seemingly diametrically opposed goals.

Objectives and Methodology of this study
Objectives
This study focuses on the EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, MERCOSUR and COMESA
and seeks both to establish the socio-economic and political trends and characteristics o f
successful

regional

integration

arrangements

and,

based

on

these

trends

and

characteristics, draw generalizations on the efficacy o f regionalism— in this case
COMESA— as a strategy that is best suited to meeting A frica’s socio-economic and
political development needs, especially in this era o f globalization. In order to realize
these objectives, the study critically examines and analyses the following issues:
>

The Challenges o f development in Africa and some o f the theoretical and
political explanations and solutions that have been offered to address the
issue o f Africa’s socio-economic and political under-development,
particularly since the 1950s to the present.

>

The reasons for the failure o f some o f the ‘theoretical and political
development doses’ administered to Africa in the first phase ( 1950s to
1980s) and the second phase ( 1980s to the 1990s) o f attempts at Africa’s
development.

>

The role o f regional integration arrangements as a paradigm for Africa’s
development in this era o f globalization.

>

The internal and external context o f COMESA’s dual approach to
development in Eastern and Southern Africa: First, the challenges that
COMESA must overcome so as to evolve into an effective regional
integration arrangement and second, the opportunities that it must seize so
as to increase its prospects o f offering an effective strategy for Eastern
and

Southern

Africa’s

socio-economic

and political

development

aspirations.

7
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Methodology
This is a qualitative study that is based on an in-depth analysis o f COMESA as
well as a comparative analysis o f COMESA and other regional integration arrangements
in Europe (the EU), in South East Asia (ASEAN), in North America (NAFTA) and in
Latin America (MERCOSUR). Owing to resource and other logistical constrains, I could
not travel to the field to conduct interviews, surveys and or make personal observations
on the functioning o f regional integration arrangements in Africa and the other regions—
Europe, Asia, Latin America and North America—that I have analyzed in the study.
However, through a careful analysis o f the secondary data that included scholarly texts
and other related materials like journals, published government statistics and institutional
databases o f the regional initiatives in this study as well as the institutional databases o f
other reputable organizations, I was able to establish fairly predictable socio-economic
and political trends and patterns o f countries that are likely to be successful at
developmental regionalism. Based on these trends and patterns, I was able to analyse the
efficacy o f regionalism in COMESA and therefore draw general conclusions on why,
compared to other development strategies o f the past and in spite o f its currently limited
gains, regionalism offers better prospects for Africa’s development.
For comparative purposes, and so as to develop a clear picture o f the status o f
COMESA

vis-a-vis

other

regional

integration

arrangements,

four

regional

organizations— each from a different geographic region o f the world— are incorporated
into this study. These regional organizations are: the European Union (the EU) for the
European region, the Common Market o f the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR) for Latin
America, the Association o f South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) for Asia and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for North America. These regional
organizations represent both the developed (the EU and NAFTA) and the developing
(ASEAN and MERCOSUR) world and are therefore likely to offer a more balanced view
on the general trends and patterns o f successful developmental regionalism. Since
regional integration arrangements in Africa are still locked up in the battle o f confronting
political, economic and institutional difficulties, I believe that a comparative analysis o f
regional integration arrangements in Europe, Asia, North America and Latin America will
offer COMESA vital lessons on how to both confront and overcome or reduce the degree
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o f some o f the institutional, political and economic obstacles that have thus far hindered
COMESA’s development efforts in Eastern and Southern Africa.
In this study, I used both the interpretive and the critical approaches to conduct a
comparative analysis o f COMESA and the other regional integration arrangements
^n
identified above . I adopted these approaches for two main reasons. First, since
COMESA, and by extension all the other regional integration arrangements in this study,
is in the constant process o f becoming, the interpretive approach— with its clear emphasis
on the fact that human beings are always in a process o f becoming and that this process of
becoming entails being influenced by how they see themselves, by how others see them
and by what they want to become— offers an apt portrayal o f some o f the assumptions
made in this study in so far as developmental regionalism in Africa is concerned31. One o f
these assumptions is that although the development gains from COMESA are currently
minimal, over time and with the right set o f policies choices and goals, COMESA will
evolve into an effective tool for socio-economic and political development in Eastern and
Southern Africa.
Second, since it places an obligatory role on social scientists that requires them to
act as advocates o f change and social justice to all in society, the critical approach is
important in this study, especially given the fact that the current socio-economic and
political development status quo in Africa cannot be sustained32. The current status quo
in Africa is one o f intolerable socio-economic deprivation anchored on non-viable
political systems and practices . Indeed, owing to this status quo, there is an urgent need
for political scientists to candidly confront both the internal and the external causes o f
socio-economic and political under-development in Africa through illuminating research
that highlights the crisis o f development in Africa under the current status quo and how
this crisis could be resolved34. This candour requires that political scientists be forthright
in

condemning

certain

values

like

corruption

(manifested

through

economic

mismanagement), political repression and violence or unfair trade practices— all o f which
have made development in Africa almost impossible— while extolling others, such as
democracy, the rule o f law and fair trade practices that are urgently needed to make
development in Africa possible35.

9
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Based on the interpretive and the critical approaches, I make two key arguments in
this thesis. First, at the interpretive approach level, I argue that although COMESA has
not so far made substantial inroads into meeting the socio-economic and development
needs of the Eastern and Southern Africa region, it would be improper to dismiss its
potential in meeting these needs. This is because COMESA is still in the process of
becoming and this process may as well be a long one. However, as long as COMESA is
willing to take stock o f its performance (something to which it seems to be currently
resolutely committed to)36 and as long as it is willing to capitalize on its gains, learn from
its failures and reasonably emulate the successes o f other regional integration
arrangements, then there can be no denying the fact that it stands a better chance o f
evolving into a formidable development avenue for Eastern and Southern Africa.
Second, at the critical approach level, I argue that poor political leadership in
Africa, wrong resource allocation priorities at the national socio-economic level and
unfair economic and political practices at the international level— particularly by the rich
Northern countries— are some o f the main reasons that explain the dismal performance o f
regional integration arrangements in Africa. Based on this argument, I contend that
COMESA, and indeed other regional integration arrangements in Africa, can only
become effective development models if and only if they abandon wrong values (e.g. a
staunch commitment to juridical sovereignty, political repression and economic
mismanagement) that have impeded regionalism in Africa since the 1960s and embrace
correct values (like the willingness to cede some o f their juridical sovereignty, the
promotion of democratic governance and commitment to sound economic management)
i i

that are needed for successful developmental regionalism to take place . Similarly, I
argue that COMESA will improve its socio-economic and political development record if
and only if the other powerful international players abandon the pursuit o f anti
regionalism values, like subsidies to their farmers and other unfair economic and political
practices, and instead embrace values that w ill assure their ow n advancem ent w h ile at the

•
38
same time giving other less powerful players like COMESA some room to thrive .
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-Chapter One—

(i)

Introduction

An extensive amount o f literature has been written concerning development in the third
world39. The bulk o f this literature generally dwells on two related issues: the crisis o f
third world development and the factors causing this crisis40. The literature is replete with
both the explanations on the causes o f third world under-development and the possible
diagnosis to this under-development41. While “development” and “third world country”
remain contested concepts with no precise or concise definitions, there exists a general
consensus on some o f the features and characteristics that distinguish the third world (also
known as the developing world) from the first world (also known as the developed world).
Here, I adopt Handelman’s categorization o f these features and characteristics and seek to
discuss the concept o f developmental regionalism in Sub-Saharan Africa within the
following

three

distinguishing

categories

of

under-development:

Economic

Underdevelopment, Social Underdevelopment and Political U nderdevelopm ent42 .
Together, these features and characteristics make up what can be referred to as ‘the
commonalities o f third world under-development’ and help in identifying some o f the
reasons why the gains from developmental regionalism remain low in Africa compared to
other regions o f the world43.
A number o f development theories and strategies have been formulated to address
the issue o f third-world under-development. However, these theories have so far failed to
adequately address the question o f under-development in the third world. Given the
failures o f these past theories, perhaps it is about time that a new strategy and approach to
confronting third world under-development were adopted. This thesis focuses on under
development in the African continent and seeks to examine the role o f regionalism in both
overcoming the challenges o f and improving the prospects for development in Africa. In
this thesis, I examine the case o f the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA) and argue that, compared to the different theories o f development or the
different structural reform approaches that have so far failed to effectively address
Africa’s crisis o f development, regional integration among the countries in this regional
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initiative offers a better strategic approach to development in Eastern and Southern
Africa44.
Regionalism ( in this case, as envisaged in COMESA) is a better strategy for
development in Eastern and Southern Africa in particular and to Africa in general because
o f its capacity to directly and locally intervene in the development process at both the
political and the socio-economic level45. First, at the political level, unlike modernization
theories which are generally seen as a form o f external ideological imposition on the
African continent, regional integration arrangements are generally seen as decidedly
home-grown political initiatives among independent African states out to improve the
socio-economic and political conditions o f their p eo p le46. What is more, unlike
modernization theories, regional integration arrangements do not normally carry the
overtly condescending message o f “us, the modern and developed west from whom you
must learn versus you, the traditional and under-developed African continent who had
better leam from us or else

” that is a central plank o f the modernization theory. On the

contrary, COMESA—just like the other regional initiatives in other regions o f the
world— is a product o f political negotiation and compromise among a group o f willing
and equal political actors— in this case those independent states in Eastern and Southern
Africa— who have joined this regional initiative.
As a product o f negotiation and compromise, COMESA stands a better chance of
nurturing a culture o f political dialogue and confidence building in the Eastern and
Southern region o f Africa. A culture o f political dialogue and confidence building is
particularly crucial for Africa where political conflict continues to hamper the prospects
of sustained development47. Therefore, regional integration arrangements are one o f the
possible avenues through which political stability could both be established and
maintained on the African continent. It is not difficult to determine that the constant
instances o f political conflict that have dogged the African continent over the last four
and a half decades have had a devastating impact on the prospects o f development in the
continent48. For example, as a result o f these conflicts, vital human and material resources
have been wasted in wanton acts o f destruction that have turned some countries in Africa
into socio-economic and political wastelands, despite the fact that some o f these countries
are endowed with immense natural wealth49. The current political conflict in the great
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lakes region among the Democratic Republic o f Congo, Uganda and Rwanda and the
accompanying socio-economic and political misery that this conflict has visited on the
peoples o f these countries is a prime example o f the negative impact o f political conflict
on Africa’s development50.
Although the Democratic Republic o f Congo, Uganda and Rwanda are all
members of COMESA, they have intermittently engaged in acts o f political conflict since
the horrors o f the genocide in Rwanda hit the great lakes region in 1994. However, the
fact that these COMESA members are locked up in political conflict should not be
construed as a failure o f regional integration in Africa. On the contrary, this should be
construed as part o f the institutional limitations that COMESA must overcome before it
can broaden its role in the development o f Eastern and Southern Africa.

What is more,

the continuing conflict among some COMESA member-states in the great lakes region is
a clear indication that regional integration arrangements in Africa have not yet developed
the necessary socio-economic and political mechanisms to effectively deal with political
conflict among their member states. The foregoing contention is supported by the
existence o f compelling evidence in the literature that in other regions— such as the EU in
Europe and MERCOSUR in Latin America— where such mechanisms have been
developed, regional integration arrangements have succeeded in securing the necessary
political stability needed for sustainable development51. It is encouraging to note that
•

•

•

•

52

there are clear indications that COMESA is striving to establish these mechanisms .
Therefore, it is not far-fetched to say that once these mechanisms have been established,
COMESA will acquire the capability needed to secure the much needed political stability
that is crucial for sustained development in this region o f the world.
Second, at the socio-economic level, regional integration arrangements are an
important tool for development since, unlike the dependency theories that advocate for
the development o f Sub-Saharan Africa outside the mainstream global economy, their
development agenda is formulated within the context of improving their over socio
economic development within the global economy53. Furthermore, unlike the arrogant,
“one-size-fits-all” prescriptive development approach advocated for by structuralinstitutional reformists, regionalism— as already noted above— advocates for negotiation
and compromise as opposed to prescription and order-taking as the basis upon which
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sustainable development is built. Therefore, since COMESA’s approach to the
development o f Eastern and Southern Africa is based on negotiation and compromise, it
is likely to promote a better understanding o f the socio-economic and political
development challenges in this region through such cooperative efforts like the pooling o f
knowledge, experience and resources54. I will discuss the merits o f regionalism as a
development strategy for Eastern and Southern Africa in detail in the subsequent chapters
o f this thesis. In the meantime, let us examine some o f the leading development theories
before embarking on a substantive analysis o f the role o f regionalism in Africa’s
development within the framework o f these theories.
While most o f the development challenges currently confronting most African
countries can be traced back to the eras o f imperialism and colonialism, the literature on
both the causes o f Africa’s under-development and the suggestions o f the possible
solutions to this under-development is relatively new (dating mainly from the 1950s) in
the political economy o f international development. Here, I divide this literature into the
following three main chronological phases: the theoretical-developmentalism phase,
marked by various theories o f development;

the structural-institutional reform phase,

marked by the structural adjustment programs;

and the strategic-regionalism phase,

marked by the rise o f regional integration arrangements. I examine these phases in turn.

(ii) The Theoretical-developmentalism Phase
The theoretical-developmentalism phase was prominent from the 1950s to the late
1970s55. This phase was marked by a number o f competing theoretical explanations and
suggestions on the causes o f and the possible solutions to third-world under
development56. I do not intend to delve into a detailed analysis o f these theories here.
However, since the application o f most o f these theories largely failed to bring about
development in Africa, a brief synopsis stating what kind o f development strategy they
stood for, how they failed to bring about the desired development and why there exists a
need to critique them within a new strategy o f development (in this case regionalism), is
in order.

Different scholars have grouped the development theories into various

conceptual categories57. Here, I discuss them within two broad categories: Modernization
theories and the Dependency theories.
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•

Modernization theories
The concept o f a traditional society is central to this school o f thought58.

According to modernization theorists, the essence o f a traditional society is that it is
stagnant and unchanging59. It is this stagnant and unchanging nature o f the traditional
society setting that is inimical to development. The following are some o f the hallmarks
o f a traditional society: people lead fairly routine lives, they do not strive after profit in
their daily work but for subsistence, they are not innovative and finally, people make no
attempts to better their lot60. Since the modernization theorists explain socio-economic
and political development in terms o f the processes and institutional changes that society
undergoes— in this case, from the traditional society to the modem society— they argue
that no development can occur in the stagnant and unchanging world that is the traditional
society61. The modernization theorists would characterise most o f the Sub-Saharan
African countries as being traditional. Therefore, according to modernization theorists,
the biggest challenge that must be overcome before development can take place in SubSaharan Africa is the breaking up o f the firmly entrenched traditional mind-set among the
states and peoples o f this region.
In contrast to the traditional societies, the modem societies are associated with the
following:

organizational

sophistication

(manifested

through

specialization,

differentiation o f roles and functions in organizations and government), technological
improvement (manifested through an increase in the means o f producing goods and
services) and attitudinal differences (manifested through “modem” attitudes that are
characterized by increased knowledge, rationality, secular values and individualism)62.
According to modernization theorists, the foregoing features are the key ingredients to
development and only those societies that seek to acquire these features and therefore
strive after modernity, have any reasonable chance for socio-economic and political
development63. The modernization theorists would characterize Western states/countries
as being modem64. The modernization school o f thought is based on the idea that SubSaharan African countries (and indeed all the developing countries o f the third world)
will have to follow the same path that Western states did if they wish to modernize, nay,
attain desirable levels o f socio-economic and political development65. But how do we
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establish the rationale (and therefore the legitimacy) for this Western-oriented path to
development? I attempt to answer this question next.
Historians in the modernization school o f thought point out to the fact that about
five hundred years ago, most people in the world were poor, mostly living in traditional
societies66. Although the literature is mixed on whether the standard o f living was the
same in different regions o f the world at this time, there can no denying the fact that most
people everywhere in the world lived at very low standards compared to the norms in
today’s wealthier countries67. Then, sparks o f scientific discovery occurred in widely
scattered parts o f the world (i.e. in the Middle East, China, Africa, Europe and South
America) . However, due to various historical reasons, scientific inquiry led to consistent
technological innovation mainly in Western Europe and not the other parts o f the World69.
Coupled with the entrepreneurial spirit o f capitalism, this technological innovation
provided the push that led to Western Europe’s evolution from the traditional society to
the modem society. Walt Rostow captured the process o f this evolution through a fivephase airplane take-off metaphor70.
According to Rostow’s development metaphor, Britain was the first airplane to
take off from tradition to modernity in the late nineteenth century71. It was then followed
over the next century by France, Germany and other European countries and by the
• 77

United States, Canada and Australia . The twentieth century saw the take-off o f Russia,
•

1"X

Japan and several smaller Asian countries . Since then, the planes in different parts o f the
third world have made little progress or no attempt at flying at all74. Simply put, the fleet
o f the majority o f third world countries is still at the airport, their airplanes grounded. As
a result, these countries are still stagnant and still traditional as they have been for
centuries75. Therefore, the main development task for these countries is to make sure that
their fleet is propelled into motion and that they are set on the runway, ready to start the
takeoff journey that will launch them into the high skies o f development. What is more,
the m odernization theorists argue that unlike the pioneer countries that had to plunge into

the development runway without any role models to emulate, the countries o f SubSaharan Africa have numerous examples o f success stories (mainly from the W est) that
they can emulate in their journey to socio-economic and political development76. In fact,
owing to this line o f thinking, in the 1950s and the 1960s, most o f the development
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programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa were inspired by the modernization theories and
heavily supported by the West77.
However, the modernization theory o f development suffers a number of
limitations. Here, I identify three.

First, based on Rostow’s airplane metaphor, what

happens if the planes on the ground choose not to snag onto the hooks offered them by
the planes that are already in flight? This could happen for example if they fail to (and
many o f them have failed to) develop the preconditions for takeoff, i.e. the right kind of
education, the right kind o f legal system, the right kind o f political systems ( right kind in
this case being western-based) or the necessary levels o f sectoral mobility needed for
70

development takeoff . Second, what happens if the planes that are already flying are
slowed down, and therefore made to lose the power that they need in order to lift the
grounded planes into flight79? If this were to happen (and it happened for example during
the global recession o f the 1980s), one o f the fundamental tenets o f the modernization
theory will not hold. According to this tenet, the already developed countries must
continue to develop and grow if they are to assist the poor. Modernization theorists argue
that without growth in the developed countries, there will be no new capital for
investment in Africa and the rest o f the third world and markets in the developed world
will not expand to stimulate export growth in Africa and the rest o f the third world80.
Finally, drawing a dichotomy between what is traditional and therefore under
developed and what is modem and therefore developed is not a simple and straight
forward task as the modernization theorists would want to have us believe. In fact, the
reality is that the cultures o f the world are greatly varied. Hence, they are both traditional
and dependent81.

Accordingly, even at the heart o f the so-called modern societies of

Western Europe, one can still find a lot that can still be regarded as traditional. For
example, the religious forms o f the rich countries— i.e. the many variant forms of
Christianity and Judaism— have ancient origins and yet are still vital cultural heritages for
many82. These traditional cultural beliefs show no signs o f disappearing. On the contrary,

some forms o f these practices, such as charismatic and fundamentalist Christianity, are
growing stronger as people in the West turns to them to make sense out the constant
•

83

changes and dislocations in their society .
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16th century93. As a result, capitalists from Europe began to seek profits from all over the
globe94. Slowly, the pre-sixteenth century socio-economic and political order began to be
transformed by these European capitalists. The search for profits through the production
o f agricultural goods for sale became the dominant force in the world economic system.
Gradually, Europeans seeking profits came to control the rest o f the world. This control
was exerted either formally and administratively through colonial empires or informally
and commercially through European economic might and Europe’s capacity to strike
unequal bargains with the other less powerful political entities in different parts o f the
world95.
With the accumulation o f wealth and the expansion o f their socio-economic and
political power across the globe, the Europeans established a capitalist market system that
has dominated the world since the sixteenth century to the present96. The dependency
theorists argue that the problem with this capitalist process o f development is that while
the process has, on one hand, led to the emergence o f a core o f rich, mainly Western
capitalist countries, it has, on the other, led to the emergence o f a periphery o f poor,
mainly third-world countries that have been drawn into the world economy in a manner
that makes them dependent on the industrial countries o f the W est97. For example, as a
result o f this dependency, the workers o f the poor third countries are often drawn into
doing the socio-economic and political bidding o f the west. Hence, they produce raw
material for export to the rich countries; they work for foreign companies and they are
normally caught up in the geopolitical power struggles o f the economically advanced
countries; and finally, they are culturally and economically dominated since they are
required to speak the language o f the ex-colonial powers and use their currencies

98

.

Therefore, according to dependency theorists, it is not that the poor countries are in some
sort o f primitive, unchanged state as the modernization theorists would want to have us
believe99. On the contrary and for better or worse, these countries have been changed by
centuries o f contact with the rich countries100.
Dependency theorists also see a host o f other problems with the capitalist
economic system. Here, I list four. First, dependency theorists are critical o f the role of
western multinational firms in the socio-economic and political affairs o f m ost third
world countries. According to them, some o f these multinationals have dominated weak
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third world countries in ways that, for example, distort the structure o f the domestic
economy o f their host countries through policies that create vast income gaps or seek to
pursue self-serving economic priorities that have rendered genuine development in the
third world impossible. Second, the dependency theorists criticize the tariff policies in the
rich countries by arguing that these policies dictate the sorts o f industrial patterns that the
poor countries can choose while at the same time stifling the competitive capacity of
these countries101. Third, dependency theorists argue that the major banks o f the rich
countries are conduits for the siphoning-off o f resources from the third world102. In the
same vein, they fault international economic agencies such as the World Bank and the
IMF for imposing policies that are favourable to the rich countries and detrimental to the
poor ones

. Fourth and finally, dependency theorists argue that the problems o f under

development in the third world are caused by unequal exchange, which is manifested in
the declining terms o f trade for the third world104. Due to the declining terms o f trade, the
relative prices o f third world country exports have been falling over time while the prices
of their imports from the industrialized world have been rising105.
The dependency theorists argue that as a result o f the declining terms o f trade, the
third world countries have been caught up in a circular trap. This circular trap functions as
follows:
Export prices are low because wages in the third world are low, and prices of
industrial goods are rising because wages in the rich countries are high and rising.
In turn, wages in the third world are low because the terms o f trade are moving
against the third world, and wages in the industrial world are high because the rich
countries have been able to exploit the poor. Exploitation creates poverty, which
permits more exploitation, and the circle goes around106.
Therefore, while modernization theorists sees the capitalist system as offering the socio
economic and political salvation for the poor countries, the dependency theorists see
capitalism as the main culprit behind the socio-economic and political damnation o f the
poor countries107. So what option(s) do dependency theorists offer for the third world’s

socio-economic and political development? We shall now turn our attention to some o f
these options.
The dependency theorists offer a number o f possible strategies for third world
development. First, there are those in this school who argue that the best course o f action
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for the third world in so far as development is concerned is to fight fire with fire108.
According to this strand o f dependency theorists, the third world can consciously seek to
transform capitalism from an enemy to a saviour109. In order to support their contention,
these scholars point to the capitalist success stories o f Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea
and Malaysia, all o f which have adopted capitalism to unleash creative entrepreneurship
in the manufacturing sector and acquired levels o f success that are challenging those of
the rich Western countries110. However, this strategy has not been widely embraced by
the dependency theorists. For example, some argue that while the capitalist strategy has
brought about success in scattered parts o f the third world, it has also reproduced the
tensions and inequities found in the economically advanced countries.
The second strategy for socio-economic and political development in the third
world is offered by the liberal wing o f the dependency theorists111. According to liberal
school o f thought, capitalism should be the main philosophy guiding development in the
i i

third world

. However, these theorists argue that capitalism should be subject to strong

state guidance so as to ensure that it serves the real needs o f the people and not the
external demand o f foreign markets113. Proponents of this view support such protectionist
economic policies like: import substitution industrialization, the erection o f tariff barriers
against foreign imports, the implementation o f effective government economic plans and
the establishment o f public financial institutions that favour some sectors (considered
crucial to national development) over others114. As a result o f the views o f this school, a
number o f third world countries like Sri-Lanka and Kenya sought to develop their
economies along import substitution industrialization policies but for these and other
countries that adopted a similar strategy, the development record has not been
impressive115.
However, most dependency theorists regard the first two strategies as half-hearted,
if not outright naive116. The bulk o f these theorists fall within the radical school o f
dependency theory and call for full socialist revolutions in the third world that includes
the expropriation o f private enterprises (both foreign and domestic owned), so that the
people as a whole, acting together through their governments, can combat the destructive
forces o f capitalism 117. While this school o f thought continues to inspire the socio
economic and political development policies o f such countries like Cuba, it has greatly
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lost its appeal, especially since the demise o f the Soviet Union118. What is more, some of
the third world countries that sought to pursue their development along strictly socialist
lines (e.g. Tanzania under Ujamaa) failed to bring about the desired levels o f socio
economic and political development to their citizens119. So what are some limitations of
the dependency theory and why did the dependency approach fail to bring about the
desired levels o f development in Sub-Saharan Africa and indeed in the majority o f other
third world countries? While numerous reasons have been advanced to explain the
limitations o f the dependency theory, for the purposes o f this thesis, the following three
will suffice.
First, one o f the biggest limitations o f the dependency theory is that its advocates
tend to exclude the internal dynamics o f the state from their analysis120. In fact, the
dependency theorists often portray the third-world states/countries both as innocent and
helpless victims o f vicious Western capitalist countries121. However, such a portrayal is
far from the reality. While the Western capitalist countries have had a tremendous (and
sometimes a negative one ) impact on the socio-economic and political aspirations o f the
third world countries, it will be dishonest not to acknowledge the fact that some o f the
problems o f third-world under-development are solely attributable to

the internal

dynamics in these countries. For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, internal ethnic tensions
have been largely responsible for such anti-development outcomes as the 1967 civil war
in Nigeria and the horrors o f the 1994 genocide in Rwanda122.

Additionally, continued

practices o f poor political governance and economic mismanagement have seen such
resource-rich countries like the Democratic Republic o f Congo and Angola reduced to
levels o f abject poverty

A'J'i

.

Second, the dependency theorists assume that the state o f dependency is an
unalterable fact o f third world existence124. These theorists homogenize the experience of
all third world countries into one preconceived pattern arising out o f colonialism
However, it is important to note that though m ost third world countries w ere under

colonial domination at one point o f time or another, it is difficult to say that all o f them
had similar colonial experiences. For example, while the countries o f Asia and Latin
America received substantial levels o f investment during the colonial era, those in Africa
barely received any

126

. Even in Africa, the colonial experience was varied. Hence, while
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independence was preceded by violent clashes between the British and the Mau Mau in
Kenya, the French and the Algerians in Algeria, and the Boers and the anti-apartheid
forces in South Africa, independence was generally conflict-free in places like Ghana,
Uganda and Tanzania127.
Third and finally, dependency theorists do not explain why states in the third
world differ so greatly in their socio-economic and political development policy choices
and outcomes

1O H

•

•

. Some third world countries (especially the so-called Asian Tigers) have

been able to make impressive development strides while others (especially those in SubSaharan Africa) have made negligible progress129. While the dependency theorists
maintain, at least at the ideological level, that the only way for third world countries to
attain development is by breaking free from the global capitalist system, they are hard put
to explain the fact that the Asian Tigers have not attained their impressive development
record by breaking with the global capitalist system but rather, by productively
integrating their economies into this system. So, between the modernization and the
dependency theories, which theory best captures the challenges o f development in SubSaharan Africa and which theory offers viable solutions to the crisis o f development in
Sub-Saharan Africa?
There is no simple and straightforward response to the foregoing question. For
example, the explanations behind development are so numerous and varied that it is not
possible to pin down one explanation as the source or basis o f development in any given
state or region o f the world. In fact, some scholars even go to the extent o f questioning
whether the mainstream development (modernization and dependency) theories discussed
above have any role at all in the development o f the third world. Take the case o f the
Asian Tigers for example. While the modernization theorists would be quick to take
credit for the impressive economic growth in these countries, the mainstream
development theory sceptics would argue that these countries have made tremendous
strides in the economic development front not so much as result o f modernization theories
but largely due to other development strategies (in this case, the developmental state
strategy) that are hardly recommended by the modernization theorists130. Hence, although
most African countries attempted to bring about development to their citizens based on
these theories, it is important to point out that while most o f them did not succeed in
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doing so, the development successes in other regions o f the third world are not
necessarily as result o f these development theories.
Another important point to note is that both the dependency and the modernization
theories were normally shaped and defined within the realities o f the bi-polar (Western
capitalism under the leadership o f the US and Eastern communism under the leadership
of the USSR) world that dominated the international political order since the late 1940s to
the early 1990s. The modernization theory clearly fell within the Western capitalist
ideology while the dependency theory, even though its main theorists sought to
distinguish it from the US-USSR rivalry, was mainly based on an Eastern-leaning
communist ideology. Therefore, even when it became clear that these theories were ill
suited in meeting the development needs o f the third world, they continued to be pursued,
mainly as a result o f other geopolitical reasons.
However, it is important to acknowledge the fact that these theories have made—
and indeed continue to make— an important contribution to our understanding o f the
development challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is because, while the modernization
and the dependency theories suffer from various conceptual limitations in their respective
bid to define the concept “development” and how development can be realized, they
nonetheless offer some explanations which, if but partially, sharpen our general
understanding development concept and what it is and how it can be attained131. Be that
as it may, it is equally important to note that while these theories were meant provide a
basis upon which “development” in Africa could be pursued and therefore realized, most
o f them failed to bring about the desired development to this continent132.
Hence, by the beginning o f the 1980s, it was becoming increasingly clear that a
new mode of thinking was necessary if African countries were to make any meaningful
socio-economic and political development strides. So, where did this new mode o f
thinking, especially in so far as resolving the problems o f A frica’s under-development,
come from? Unlike the first phase o f development theory that had been mainly dominated
by development theorists and scholars backed by respective super-power legitimacy, the
second phase of dealing with Africa’s under-development (beginning in the 1980s) was
not based on a concrete and rigorous theoretical foundation.

Instead, structural-

institutional reforms as carried out under the policy recommendations o f Western-leaning
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international institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, in the context of waning
Soviet influence, marked the main approach to development in this phase133. The IMF
and the World Bank have been at the forefront o f pushing for A frica’s development under
the Structural Adjustment Programs (S.A.Ps)134.
Since the 1980s, theoretical-developmentalism has increasingly given way to the
structural-institutional reform phase o f development strategies for Sub-Saharan Africa
and the rest the third world135. As already noted above, this phase has not been so much
driven by a concrete theoretical argument as it has been by an ideological— free market
neo-liberalism— one.

Under structural-institutional reform, the free-market neo-liberal

ideology has provided the main approach to socio-economic and political development.
So far, the so-called Washington Consensus has provided the intellectual legitimacy for
free market neo-liberalism and given a stamp o f approval to the IMF, the World Bank
and the G8 (excluding Russia) to pursue a neo-liberal, free-market development agenda in
the third world136.
However, just like the theories under the first phase had failed to bring about
development to Africa, the second phase theories (though still being championed to
varying degrees by the IMF and the World Bank as the magic dose for Africa’s
development malaise) have so far failed to bring about development in Africa137. In fact,
the application o f the structural-institutional reform strategies to Africa’s development
has only exacerbated the crisis o f development, especially since this approach has led to
the collapse o f such vital development input sectors like education and health138. What
then are the other options for African countries in their quest to attain meaningful levels
of sustainable development, especially given their dismal failure to attain development in
the first phase o f theoretical-developmentalism and the non-impressive development
record o f the second phase o f structural-institutional reform? Additionally, given the fact
that most African countries continue to face the threat of a greater degree o f socio
economic and political marginalization, more so in this era o f globalization, what
development strategy can Africa adopt in order to stem this continued marginalization
and to bolster its chances o f meaningfully integrating into the new global economy? In
response to these questions, I argue that regional integration arrangements offer the most
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viable option both for overcoming the development challenges in Africa and for laying
the foundation for sustained socio-economic and political development in the continent.
However, as I have already pointed above, before regional integration
arrangements can become effective mechanisms o f development in Africa, the main
challenges hindering their effectiveness must both be identified and addressed. In this
thesis, I analyze the case o f COMESA in a comparative context and examine both the
challenges and prospects facing this regional integration arrangement in its bid to bring
about sustained socio-economic and political development in Eastern and Southern Africa.
I analyse COM ESA’s challenges and prospects for development in Eastern and Southern
Africa within a broad conceptual framework set out in the context o f the following four
questions:
(i)

What are the main theoretical contentions on regionalism and why have
regional

integration arrangements become

a prominent factor in the

international political system, especially since the beginning o f the 1980s?
(ii)

What are some o f the socio-economic and political characteristics o f
successful regional integration arrangements and what role do these
characteristics play in the promotion o f developmental regionalism in different
regions o f the world?

(iii)

Given the comparative study o f COMESA vis-a-vis the EU, NAFTA,
MERCOSUR and ASEAN, what lessons can COMESA learn from these
regional bodies in so far as the establishment o f successful regionalism is
concerned?

(iv)

What challenges must COMESA overcome and what opportunities must it
seize if it has to evolve into a vehicle through which sustained socio-economic
and political development could be attained in Eastern and Southern Africa?

This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter one is the introduction. In this
chapter, I discuss some o f the leading development theories— modernization and
dependency— and strategies (structural-institutional reform) and point out why these
theories and strategies have failed to bring about socio-economic and political
development in Africa and why they should be replaced by developmental regionalism.
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Chapter two is a theoretical discussion o f regionalism. Here, I provide an in-depth
analysis o f the various theories on regionalism and attempt to discuss COMESA and the
other regional integration arrangements identified in this study through various theoretical
perspectives. In chapter three, I look at regional integration arrangements within the
political economy o f the international political system. Chapter four provides a general
overview o f the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA in terms o f their
objectives, institutional structures and operations and their contribution to the socio
economic and political development o f their respective regions. Chapter five focuses on a
comparative analysis o f COMESA versus the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN.
In this chapter, I establish important trends and patterns for successful regionalism and
then discuss the challenges that COMESA faces before making some recommendations
on how COMESA can improve its role as a central institution for Eastern and Southern
Africa’s development. I then look at COMESA’s prospects o f bringing about socio
economic and political development in Eastern and Southern Africa before drawing a
general conclusion that overall, COMESA has better prospects for promoting
development in Eastern and Southern Africa compared the other theories and or strategies
of development that have been previously promoted in the region.
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--Chapter Two—

(i)

Regional Integration Arrangements: A Theoretical Perspective

In this study, a theoretical perspective on regional integration arrangements is imperative
for a number o f reasons139. Here, I list four central reasons, which though formulated
within the general context o f the importance o f theory in political science, are specifically
relevant to role o f theory in regionalism. First, theory is central to the creation o f
definitions, concepts and categories around which the analysis o f regional integration
arrangements is conducted. Second, theory exposes the assumptions that remain explicit
and unquestioned in descriptive or historical regionalism. Third, a theoretical perspective
o f regional integration arrangements sharpens our understanding o f the main explanatory
variables and causal mechanisms in the study o f regionalism. Fourth and finally, regional
integration theory provides us with a coherent framework for systematically comparing
regional integration arrangements in different parts o f the world140.
While the theoretical literature on regionalism is enormous, it is at the same time
uneven and fragmented141. Most o f the theoretical work on regional integration has been
formulated within the context o f European integration, specifically, the European Union
integration142. In this section, I first begin by focusing on the theoretical work that has
emerged out o f the European integration process and the debate this work has generated
on whether European integration theories can offer replicable generalizations to the
integration process o f other regional integration arrangements in different regions o f the
world143. Then second, I proceed to examine integration theory within a broader extra-EU
conceptual context. However, before embarking on an examination o f the European
Union integration theories and their relevance to other regional integration arrangements,
it is perhaps important to try and develop an understanding as to why Europe is such a
strong focal point o f integration theory. I embark on this task next.
Two main sets o f events help explain why Europe is the dominant minefield o f
integration theory144. First, events taking place in Europe in the 1950s and the 1960s (a
period which coincided with the formative years o f integration theory) helped propel
Europe into the forefront o f integration theory. This was a period o f profound
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Europe into the forefront o f integration theory. This was a period o f profound
transformation in Europe’s socio-economic and political landscape in which established
patterns o f political authority were being radically re-ordered. For example, Europe had
just emerged out o f a devastating war — World War II— that had seen the hitherto
existing balance o f power tilt in favour o f two ideologically-opposed camps. These camps
pitted Western Europe against Eastern Europe and effectively divided Europe into an
Eastern Bloc (under the USSR tutelage) and a Western Bloc (under the US tutelage)145.
Second, apart form the new geopolitical alliances, the European nation-states had been
politically diminished and economically destroyed by the war. As a result, Europe was
engaged in a dual process o f both trying to find a way o f regaining its lost political
authority while at the same time re-building its ruined economic base146.
For Western Europe, forging closer socio-economic and political co-operation
among the states o f the region was one o f the ways through which economic and political
power could be regained147. What is more, the emerging Cold W ar rivalry between the
USSR and the US saw the latter actively encourage regional integration among western
European states in its bid to create a strong economic and political bulwark against
apparent Soviet expansionism

1AQ

.

Hence, it can be argued that the onset o f a new geo

political order (marked by the Cold W ar rivalry between the USSR and the US) played an
important role in fostering the emergence o f a new political order in Europe149. One o f the
manifestations o f this new political order was a Western Europe that made attempts to re
organise its socio-economic and political structures in a manner that necessarily followed
an underlying logic that anticipated a new sort o f a politically and economically stronger
state-form that was “above” the nation-state that had existed prior to the Cold W ar150. The
other manifestation o f this order was an Eastern Europe that was under the tight grip and
control o f the USSR, with its keen ambition to expand its socio-economic and political
frontiers151.
In Western Europe, the desire to forge a new political and economic entity that
was “above the nation-state” laid the foundation o f European integration theory since it
triggered theoretical discussions on what this new supranational entity was likely to look
like or whether it was even likely to emerge at all from the ashes o f post World War II
1^9
and therefore replace the hitherto existing European nation-states . For example, neo-
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functionalist and inter-govemmentalist theories emerged around this period153. These
theories offer competing explanations for the emergence o f regional integration in
E urope154. According to neo-functionalism, the key actors in regional integration
arrangements are the supranational institutions— like the European Commission— who
make and implement important integration policy decisions155. Inter-govemmentalists
disagree. Unlike the neo-functionalists, inter-govemmentalists argue that the key actors in
regional integration arrangements are the national executives who determine the policy
directions and outcomes o f the integration process156. Hence, while neo-functionalism is a
theory of national change and transformation, inter-govemmentalism is a theory that
emphasises the supremacy o f the nation-state and therefore international political anarchy
as usual157. From the formative years o f integration, the focus o f the theoreticians was
either the collective international and trans-national institutions and the emergence (for
neo-functionalists) or the non-emergence (for inter-govemmentalists) o f significant non1
state actors in the world polity
The early theoretical tradition (mainly dominant in the 1950s and the 1960s) on
European integration was deeply anchored in the vocabulary o f the discipline of
international relations159. For example, the alleged relationship between the nation-state
system and war on one hand and the role o f post-national forms o f organization and peace
on the other that informed the debate on international politics during this period had an
impact on the theoretical formulations o f integration theory 160. However, before
explaining how this debate influenced integration theory, a brief summary o f the main
theories that informed these earlier debates is in order.
The main political debates o f the 1920s and the 1950s focused on war and peace
as envisioned by either realism or liberalism. After World War I, Liberalism earned a lot
of theoretical clout among the intellectuals and politicians o f the first part o f the twentieth
century161. According to these intellectuals and politicians, humanity needed to turn itself
•

to the avoidance o f war

1f t " )

«

. The desire among the post World War I and inter-war era

liberal intellectuals and politicians was to steer the world away from war towards
peaceful international cooperation and co-existence163. However, while the liberals sought
to create a world o f peaceful cooperation and co-existence, the realists argued that
conflict among states, and not cooperation, was the modus operandi o f international
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politics164. The realists’ position rose in prominence especially after the outbreak of
World War II cast serious aspersions on the liberalists’ efforts at promoting international
cooperation and peaceful co-existence among states165. It is this early realist and liberalist
debates on the nature o f international politics that laid the foundation o f integration theory
and because o f these debates, two diametrically opposed theoretical views on regional
integration emerged
The first category o f theorists— those who believed in the role o f post-national
forms of organization in the post World War II era (i.e. the neo-functionalists) — thought
that they could lead creative policy-makers into designing rational institutions to secure
better forms o f governance (and hence the avoidance o f war) in a modem, interdependent
world166. The second category o f theorists— those who believed in the supremacy of the
nation-state in the post World War II era (i.e. the inter-govemmentalists)— argued that the
emergence o f regional integration in Western Europe was not a reflection o f a new post
national global order but rather, a reflection o f the actions o f national executives and the
•

t

•

respective international power-dynamics o f the time

1f\l

.

While these debates hold decidedly divergent views on Western European
integration, it is important to note that the transformative events taking place in postWorld War II Europe, especially those ignited by post-national activities like the Treaty
of Paris (1951)— which brought together six European nations into some form o f trans
national economic cooperation— ignited a theoretical debate that firmly established
•

Western Europe as the centre o f integration theory

1 AS

•

. This debate continues to form part

of the broader contemporary literature on integration theory. And just like the original
debates, the current debates on European integration have generated more points o f
contention that have led to or little no consensus in so far as integration theory is
concerned169. I will now turn to a brief discussion o f some o f the theoretical debates that
are currently dominant in the European integration theory with particular reference to the
European Union (the EU).
The EU integration theory can be examined within the following four theoretical
domains:
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1. The EU as an International Organization
International Organizations (IOs) are inter-governmental bodies designed in the
explicit context o f converging state preferences or common interests170. From this
perception o f international organizations, an examination o f the EU quickly makes it is
clear that the EU is more than a straightforward instance o f an international organization.
Unlike most international organizations, the EU has peculiar institutions and a unique
configuration o f internal forces that makes it difficult to analyze it in the same manner as
171
other international organizations
. Therefore, the EU cannot be seen as a mere
International Organization and hence, this domain is not adequate in developing our
understanding o f the EU in particular and integration theory in general since it fails to
offer a convincing explanatory theory for EU integration and by extension, other regional
integration arrangements in other regions o f the world.

2. The EU as an instance of regionalism in the global political economy
The aim o f this theoretical domain is to offer reflections and possible
generalizations about the tendency o f groups o f territorially adjacent states to cluster
together in blocs

172

. In exploring this tendency, a number o f guiding questions can be

posed. For example, is it possible to make meaningful comparisons between the EU and
other regional groupings such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
the Association o f South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Common Market o f the
Southern Cone (MERCOSUR) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA) among other comparisons? Or, do instances of regionalism arise in similar
sorts of circumstances regardless o f time or place? Or, do global economic and political
pressures force and or enable the creation o f regional integration arrangements? Or, how
do variations in levels o f institutionalization in regional integration arrangements affect
the interests and preferences o f actors? Or, does the emergence o f regional integration
arrangements have implications for the construction o f new identities and the
deconstruction o f established ones, especially at both the elite and the popular mass levels?
Or,

do

regional

integration

arrangements

accelerate or retard

free trade

and

multilateralism? Or, finally, do regional integration arrangements pose a uniform threat to
the nation-state and the international system o f states?
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The foregoing questions are important in helping us formulate a theoretical understanding
o f the EU as an instance o f global regionalism. In fact, these questions are important in
sparking off debate on such important theoretical issues as to whether the EU integration
theories can be replicable in other regional integration arrangements. I discuss this issue
further below. Here, it is only important to note that in order to formulate an EU
integration theory within a global context, a broad array o f questions covering various
socio-economic and political facets o f integration must be asked and a rigorous
theoretical paradigm established to answer them.

3.

The EU as a useful site for the study of policy-making dynamics
Another theoretical domain contends that the EU is a complex policy-making

system whose perspectives on policy-making procedures— developed in the context of
national polities— can be put to the test and further developed as a model for other
regional integration initiatives to emulate

17T

.

In this theoretical domain, attention is

turned to the interaction o f interested actors and the processes o f agenda setting, policy
formulation, legislation, interest intermediation and policy implementation. The analysis
of the actions o f different players and their impact on different processes offers useful
integration insights on such issues as the loci o f power within the EU and the relationship
between formal and informal policy processes174. From this theoretical vantage-point,
one can assess policy networks and the role o f institutions during such novel moments as
when national (old) and supranational (new) politics overlap175. While a number of
different regional integration arrangements have paid heed to this theoretical domain and
attempted to replicate the EU experience within their respective integration initiatives,
some theoreticians have argued that the EU is a unique entity that cannot be replicated
elsewhere.

4.

The EU as a unique entity unto itself
Some theoreticians, like William Wallace, have argued that the EU is a sui generis

i.e. there is only one EU and hence EU integration cannot offer a theoretical testing site
from whence broader regional integration generalizations can be drawn176. According to
these theoreticians, rather than treat the EU as a theoretical paradigm for other regional
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integration arrangements, the EU should be treated as a historically rooted phenomenon
arising in specific conditions and therefore without meaningful historical or contemporary
parallel

177

. Wallace has succinctly declared the uniqueness o f the EU in the following

terms:
The experience o f deep integration within Western Europe does not provide a
model for others to follow. Its historical development was rooted in the stage of
economic development and a security framework that have now disappeared. The
institutional structures that West European governments agreed to under those
past circumstances have managed to respond to the very challenges posed by
economic and industrial transformation in the 1970s and the 1980s. Political,
economic and security motivations have been entangled in the evolution o f West
European regional integration from the 1940s to the 1990s178.
The view that the EU is a unique entity whose experience cannot be generalized to other
regional integration arrangements has not only been confined to scholars o f European
integration theory

170

. In fact, some scholars o f the newer regional integration

arrangements— especially in Asia-Pacific— support this position when they contend that
the EU is a bad example, which should not be followed by other aspiring regional
integration initiatives180.
Be that as it may, the theoretical approach that seeks to view the EU integration as
a unique historical development that cannot be generalized to other regional integration
arrangements has been strongly criticized for promoting crude empiricism181. According
to critics o f this theory, this approach tends to chronicle the EU without offering a broader
insight into the theoretical issues or the normative questions about the “real” problems
187
facing Europe and its citizens . Additionally, these critics contend that viewing the EU
as a unique integration experience whose dynamics cannot be generalized to other
regional integration arrangements is a direct affront to the work o f numerous integration
theoreticians who have developed theories (with the European Union in mind) with the
intention o f having these theories generalized to other integration initiatives183. Hence, in
their retaliatory response, those scholars who hold the view that the EU is a model of
integration theory for emulation by other up-coming regional initiatives defend their
position by arguing that two phenomena do not have to be exactly identical in order to be
compared effectively184.
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This thesis relies on a comparative analysis o f five different regional integration
arrangements to make generalizations on the challenges and prospects o f COMESA as a
viable development strategy for Eastern and Southern Africa. Therefore, I support the
view that it is possible to make effective comparisons between the EU and other regional
integration arrangements, even when these— as is clearly the case with COMESA and the
other regional integration arrangements in this thesis— are not identical to the EU.
However, while the EU integration theory offers some invaluable and useful insights into
the study o f regionalism, it is important to note that other integration theoreticians have
sought to develop a theoretical understanding o f integration outside the ubiquitous grip of
the EU integration theory. My thesis draws from these other non-EU focused integration
theories as well. Hence, an analysis o f these non-EU focused theories is in order.
Most o f the contemporary debates on integration theory take as their starting point,
the contentious issue of definition185. The theoreticians who pay attention to the issue of
definition aver that a proper theoretical formulation o f regional integration theory cannot
be attained unless a “clear definition o f the term integration” or what integration entails is
provided186. However, focusing on the definitional aspect o f regionalism poses other
significant problems. For example, what does a “clear” definition o f regional integration
entail? Or put another way; is it really possible to come up with a firm and concise
definition of such an amorphous and indeed dynamic concept as regional integration?
The complexity o f defining regional integration is reflected in the fact that attempts to
define this concept have so far generated more questions and fewer answers

1R7

. For

example, is regional integration an economic phenomenon or a political one? Does
economics influence regional integration or is regional integration influenced by politics?
Or, how does the interaction between economics and politics (political economy)
influence regional integration? Alternatively, is regional integration a process or an
outcome? The list o f questions seems to be endless or can indeed be made endless.
However, since the focus o f my thesis is largely on how the process o f regional
integration could be used as a paradigm o f development in Africa, I limit m yself to
examining regional integration within the definitional context o f process and outcome.
Taken as a process, Ernest Haas offers two insightful definitions o f regional
integration. First, Haas defines integration as the voluntary creation o f larger political
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units involving the self-conscious eschewal o f force in relations between participating
•

institutions

1RR

. Second, in a fairly elaborate definition, Haas contends that integration is:

the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are
persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new
centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing
national states. The end result o f a process o f political integration is a new
political community superimposed over the pre-existing ones189.
From the definitions above, it can be seen that Haas views integration as both a process
and an outcome o f conscious political actions.
However, other theoreticians like William Wallace, while defining integration
within the context o f process and outcome, are keen to alert the students o f integration to
the relationship between economics and politics in integration theory. Wallace seeks to
tease out this relationship by making a distinction between integration as a process and
integration as an outcome190. He particularly distinguishes between formal and informal
aspects of integration191. On one hand, formal integration consists o f outcomes such as
institutions, policies or legislative change that have been brought about as a consequence
i

of deliberate political sanction

. On the other hand, informal integration involves

processes that have effective economic consequences without formal authoritative
1cn
intervention . Richard Higgott offers a more or less similar definition of regionalism
that favourably compares to that o f Wallace, especially when he makes a distinction
between de fa cto structural regionalism and de ju re institutional economic cooperation194.
Another important aspect to note about Wallace and Higgott’s approach to
integration is that both o f them predicate their definition o f regional integration within the
context o f political economy, especially since they attempt to draw connections between
the political and economic forces that shape the emergence o f regional integration
arrangements195. Defining regional integration arrangements within this context has dual
pronged merits. On one hand, defining regional integration within the context o f political
economy is beneficial because it offers ample room that allow s for several theoretical
permutations to be m ade196. First adopting a political economy approach to regionalism
could, for example, lead to the following conclusion: changes in the informal economic
domain, manifested through heightened capital mobility, increasing volumes o f crossborder trade, alterations in the production process and shifting corporate strategies
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decisively structure and constrain the agenda o f authoritative political actors197. Second
and as Rosamond contends, within the political economy context and faced with no
options in the face o f the changes emanating from the informal processes in the regional
economic domain, governments seek closer cooperation through the construction of
regional political institutions designed to capture and control the emergent informal
economic processes

1QR

. In this case, the political dimension o f regional integration is

brought about as a consequence o f the intensity o f the agglomeration effects o f regional
economic activity199. Third, under the political economy approach, it can be argued that
formal political actions involving deliberate government sanction help the creation of
regional integration arrangements. In this case, economic and political integration can
only happen if states enact policies that, for example, promote regional economic or
political activity or both200.
Therefore, it can be seen that a political economy theoretical approach to regional
integration draws our attention to the fact that the creation o f regional integration
arrangements is determined by different economic and political dynamics. This may in
turn mean that different periods o f integration may require different theoretical
perspectives and different strategies for establishing regional integration arrangements201.
Hence, for example, in regions where there are minimal chances o f creating regional
integration arrangements through economic agglomeration effects (and this is clearly the
case for COMESA and other regional integration arrangements in Africa), direct political
involvement may be the most appropriate way o f establishing a regional group. In other
regions (especially those that already have high prior regional economic linkages like
North America and Western Europe), political involvement may only be needed to co
ordinate a well-developed regional network o f social and economic activities.
So far, the theoretical views that I have examined above sought to develop our
theoretical understanding o f regional integration initiatives by attempting to define the
concept of “regional integration” as both a process and an outcome within the context of
political economy. While this approach is illuminating, it is not necessarily exhaustive.
Therefore, instead o f attempting to develop a regional integration theory by focusing on
political economy, other theorists have sought to formulate their theories by developing a
set of features and characteristics that broadly defines the concept “regionalism” 202. The
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early theoreticians (the late 1960s and the early 1970s) who adopted this approach
analysed the concept “regionalism” in terms o f the following four features and
characteristics
•

:

Social cohesiveness:

regionalism is defined in terms o f such factors o f social

cohesion as ethnicity, race, language, religion, culture, history, consciousness and
a common heritage
•

Economic cohesiveness: Economic factors such as trade patterns and economic
complementarities are crucial in the definition o f regional integration.

•

Political cohesiveness:

In defining regionalism under political cohesiveness,

factors like regime type and ideology are taken into consideration.
•

Organizational cohesiveness: Finally, regionalism is defined in terms of the
existence (or non-existence) o f formal regional institutions.

Having examined the views o f the early (both EU and non-EU focused) integration
theories, let us now turn our attention to some contemporary (mainly spanning the period
from the 1980s to the present) regional integration theories. These theories embrace either
the political economy or the characteristics approach to regional integration or a
combination o f both.

1.

Regionalization:
Regionalization refers to the growth o f societal integration within a region and to

the often undirected processes o f social and economic interaction204. This process of
regional integration formation is also referred to as informal integration or soft
regionalism. At the socio-political level, regionalization involves the development o f
complex social networks manifested through increasing flows o f people, the expansion o f
shared political attitudes and the creation o f a trans-national civil society205. At the
economic level, regionalization involves the development of trans-border growth triangles,
industrial corridors or increasingly dense networks linking industrial centres. An
important point to note about the process o f regionalization is that it is not necessarily
driven by conscious inter-regional state policy.
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2.

Regional awareness and identity
Regional awareness and identity refers to the shared perception o f belonging to a

particular community. This perception can rest on a set o f internal factors such as a
common culture, a common history or common religious traditions206. It can also be
defined against the external “other”, in which case it may primarily be understood in
terms o f a real or perceived external socio-economic and or political threat207. Some
common examples o f regional awareness and identity being defined in terms o f an
external ‘other’ include W estem-Europe’s self-image defined as against the Soviet Union
during the Cold War or Latin American nationalism as defined against US hegemony or
African nationalism as defined against European colonial and post-colonial domination.

3.

Regional inter-state cooperation
Inter-state cooperation involves the construction o f interstate or intergovernmental

agreements and regimes. The cooperation can either be formal or informal and does not
necessarily depend on high levels o f institutionalization. Regional inter-state cooperation
serves two main functions. First, it can be a means o f responding to external challenges
and co-ordinating regional positions in international institutions or negotiating forums.
Second, it can be developed to secure welfare gains, promote common values and solve
common problems, especially those arising as a result of increased levels o f regional
interdependence208. This process o f regional integration is highly statist and seeks to
make the state the focal point of any regional integration initiatives209.

4.

State-promoted regional integration
This process o f regional integration involves specific policy decisions by

governments designed to reduce or remove barriers to mutual exchange o f goods, services,
capital and people. This is the most popular form o f regional integration and an extensive
amount of literature has been written on this process210. Although economic issues are
only one aspect o f regional integration arrangements, state-promoted regional integration
is mainly concerned with economic integration. It is mainly evaluated on the basis o f
scope (the range o f issues involved), depth (the extent o f policy harmonization),
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institutionalization (the extent o f formal institutional building) and centralization (the
degree to which effective authority is centralized)211.

5.

Regional cohesion
Regional cohesion refers to the possibility o f the four processes identified above

coalescing, at some point, into a cohesive and consolidated regional unit212. Regional
cohesion can be understood in two senses. The first sense is when a region comes to play
a defining role in the relations between the states o f the region and the rest of the world
while the second is when the regional organization formed among states o f a region takes
over a central role in regional policy formulation across a range o f socio-economic and
ry 1 'S

political issues common to the integrating states

.

It is important to note that there are various models upon which the move towards
regional cohesion may be based. Here, I identify six possible models through which
regional cohesion might be attained are214. One model may be the gradual creation o f a
supranational regional integration arrangement based on deepening economic integration.
A second model may involve arriving at regional cohesion through the creation o f a series
o f overlapping and or strong inter-state arrangements or regimes. A third model may
draw from a complex mix of traditional inter-govemmentalism and supra-nationalism, a
•

factor that may be prominent in the case o f the EU

“7 J S

. A fourth model m ight involve

attaining regional cohesion through the development o f consociational constitutional
arrangements. A fifth model may have a ring o f the neo-medieval order where the
principles o f territoriality and sovereignty are replaced by a pattern o f over-lapping socio
economic and political identities and authorities in a cohesive regional unit. Sixth and
finally, regional cohesion might be modelled on a strong regional hegemon, which sets
the socio-economic and political agenda within its regional sphere o f influence and does
so with or without strong regional institutions216.

6.

Systemic theories and regional integration arrangements
Systemic theories emphasize the importance o f the broader political and economic

structures within which regional integration arrangements operate and the impact of
external pressures on a given regional integration arrangement217. These theories seek to
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understand the character of regionalism by looking at a regional integration arrangement
from “the outside-in” and within this perspective, analysing its place in the broader
international system

. Integration theorists identify the following two sets o f systemic

theories:

(a).

Neo-realism
Both classical realism and its more recent neo-realist variant stress the importance

o f external configurations o f power, the dynamics o f political power competition and the
constraining role o f the international political system as the main determinants of
understanding and defining the character o f regional integration arrangements219. Hence,
the neo-realists, for example, argue that the end o f the Cold W ar in the 1990s makes it
easier for us to understand the extent to which Europe shifted from the 1940s and the
early 1950s mindset o f the Cold War era ( an era that was based on intense ideological
competition between Eastern and Western Europe) to the active promotion o f regional
integration and cooperation across Europe, especially since the 1990s to the present

.

Further, the Neo-realists argue that underlying these initiatives o f regional
integration arrangement is not a concern for the socio-economic and political welfare o f
the participating states but rather, their desire to either become global economic and
political powers or their need to escape from real or imagined economic and political
domination by other external pow ers221 . Viewed from this perspective, regional
integration arrangements are products o f power-politics that are geared towards
responding to fears o f a dominant hegemon among weak nations-states (who then chose
to come together to leverage their power against the said hegemon)

or in response to

the demands o f a hegemon who wants to establish her sphere o f influence among a group
223
.
...
o f weak states . However, the neo-realists have been criticized by the structuralists for
what the latter call “the neo-realists mischaracterization o f the international system224”.

(b).

Structural interdependence
While agreeing with the neo-realist’s contention on the importance o f systemic

factors in understanding the character o f regional integration arrangements, structural
interdependence theorists argue that focusing on systemic factors alone offers a narrow
and simplistic view of regionalism225. According to structuralists, a systemic approach is
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narrow and simplistic because it neglects the competitive dynamics o f changes (that are
not always necessarily adversarial and state-centric) in the international system226. Hence,
structuralists contend that structural interdependence among states— intensified by the
current globalization trends towards ever deepening socio-economic and political
interdependence— offer a better theoretical understanding o f the character of regional
integration arrangements than that offered by the neo-realists

. As already noted above,

neo-realism and structuralism are concerned with “outside-in” factors in formulating
integration. Other theories, to which we next turn, focus on “the inside out” factors in
their analysis o f regional integration theory.

7. Regionalism

interdependence

theories

and

regional

integration

arrangements
In contrast to the ‘outside-in’ analysis adopted by systemic theories in explaining
the character o f regional integration arrangements, regionalism and interdependence
theories see a close link between regional actors (as opposed to global) and regional
interdependence as the basis o f integration

. The theoretical clusters in this school are:

neo-functionalism, neo-liberal institutionalism and constructivism. On one hand, neo
functionalism and neo-liberal institutionalism view regionalism as functional responses
by states to the problems created by regional interdependence

. These two theories

stress the critical role o f institutions in fostering and developing regional cohesion

. On

the other hand, constructivism lays greater emphasis on the relationship between material
interdependence and understandings o f identity and community within different regional
integration arrangements231. The following is a brief discussion o f these theories.

(a).

Neo-functionalism
This theory is based on the prediction that regional integration arrangements will

evolve to eventually become self-sustaining

. Neo-functionalists argue that high and

rising levels o f interdependence among integrating states will set in motion an ongoing
process o f cooperation that will move a regional integration arrangement from economic
integration among the integrating states to the political integration o f the integrating
states

. This theory gives supranational institutions a central role in advancing regional
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integration arrangements and argues that integration will take place through functional
spill over and political spill over234. Under functional spill over, partial small steps down
the integration road would create new problems that could then only be solved through
further integration

. Political spill over will occur when the supranational institutions in

place set in motion a self-reinforcing process o f institution building236.

(b)

Neo-liberal institutionalism
Neo-liberal institutionalism is based on three core conceptions. First, this theory

contends that increasing levels o f inter-dependence generate increased demand for
international cooperation

'y in

. Hence, the institutions in a regional integration arrangement

are viewed as purposively generated solutions to different kinds o f collective action
problems. Therefore, the norms, rules and institutions in a regional integration
arrangement are generated because they help states deal with common problems and
because they enhance their welfare

.

Second, neo-liberal institutionalism is heavily statist. It lays more emphasis on the states
as the vanguard between the national and the international239. In this regard, liberal
institutionalism shares a striking similarity with neo-realism. However, unlike classical
neo-realism, this theory does not view states as constant sites o f inter-state conflict. On
the contrary, liberal institutionalism contends that mutual inter-state cooperation is
possible240.
Third, neo-liberal institutionalism argues that in any regional integration
arrangement, institutions matter241.

Institutions are important because they have an

impact on the benefits that individual integrating states get and the ways in which they
define their interests242.

What is more, the importance o f institutions in regional

integration arrangements is reinforced by the fact that they provide vital information to
the integrating states, reduce costs o f operation, develop convergence o f expectations,
facilitate the productive use of issue-linkage strategies, discourage cheating or defection
and in a general sense, lengthen the shadow o f the future243.

(c)

Constructivism
Constructivists argue that regional integration arrangements are a result o f both

regional awareness and regional identity, forged on a shared sense o f belonging to a
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particular regional community244. Under this theory, the character o f regional integration
arrangements is constructed through three main ways. First, the regional integration
character is built on a sense o f a “we-ness” that is fostered on mutual sympathy, loyalty
and a shared identity. Second, regionalism is based on collectively held norms arising out
o f the compatibility o f the integrating states on major societal values such as capitalism or
liberal democracy. Third, the character o f regional integration is based on processes of
social communication that lead to an increase in the level o f transaction among the
integrating states.

8.

Domestic level -theories and regional integration arrangements
These theories focus on the role o f shared domestic attributes and characteristics

to explain the emergence o f regional integration arrangem ents245.

A number of

integration theorists have sought to explain the emergence o f regional integration
arrangements by defining the character o f regional integration arrangements in terms of
ethnicity, race, language, religion, culture, history and consciousness o f a common
heritage246. Domestic-level theories offer the theoretical framework within which these
theories are analyzed. Under these theories, the emergence o f regional integration
arrangements can be understood through three main theoretical explanations. These are:

(a)

Regionalism and state coherence
While a number o f regional integration theorists have argued that the role o f the

state is becoming increasingly diminished under the current era o f globalization, theorists
on regionalism and state coherence contend that the state is still a central component of
regional integration arrangements247. According to the regionalism and state coherence
theory, the apparent diminished role o f the state is largely due to lack o f legitimacy within
states, a situation that has been partly brought about by the end o f the Cold War248.
Hence, this theory holds that the possibility, and indeed the success, o f regional
integration arrangements is likely to depend on the internal coherence and viability o f the
state structures o f the integrating states249. In fact, the theorists in this school o f thought
argue that the absence o f viable states have made the process o f nation-building and
regional integration in most parts o f Africa and South Asia difficult, if not almost
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impossible250. On the contrary, the most successful regional integration arrangements (e.g.
the EU and NAFTA) have been possible in regions where state structures remain
relatively strong and where their legitimacy is not called into question by internal socio1

economic and political forces

.

(b) Regime type and democratization
Democracy and the democratization process have a fundamental role in both
shaping the character and prospects o f successful regional integration arrangements.
Regime type and democratization theorists argue that the wave o f democratic transitions
that have swept the world since the 1980s can be plausibly implicated in the current
phenomenal revival o f regionalism

. For example, according to these theorists, regional

integration arrangements in Latin America emerged against the background of a regionwide shift away from military regimes to more open democratic regimes253.
However, these theorists caution that while democracy and democratization are important
ingredients in regional integration arrangements, they are not always a necessary
condition. Hence, illiberal, and even violent, regimes in South East Asia, Latin America
and Africa have formed regional integration arrangements even when democracy and
democratization are not their forte 254 . Despite this fact, the regime type and
democratization theorists emphasize the link between democracy and regionalism and
argue that integrating states with a strong democratic culture are more likely do succeed
at regional integration than those with a weak or no democratic culture255.

(c)

Convergence theories
Convergence theorists argue that the convergence o f domestic policy-preferences

among the integrating states increases the chances for the formation o f successful regional
integration arrangements

. For Example, applied to the EU, convergence theory would

argue that the EU is not a grand project o f individual nation-states moving towards a
supranational entity but rather, the best means o f sheltering/protecting particular domestic
projects built around post World War II Keynesian economics, social welfare and
cooperative arrangements

. Furthermore, taken within the developing countries’ context,

convergence theorists argue that regional integration arrangements are a means o f
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pursuing policy-convergence issues anchored in neo-liberal market policies that stress
trade liberalization and export expansion258. In fact, according to convergence theorists,
regional integration arrangements are a conscious mechanism used by states to
consolidate market-policies through so-called “lock-in effects259”.
The foregoing discussion provides a general overview on the theoretical
perspective o f regionalism. The central truism that emerges from the theories outlined
above is that while all o f them provide an important analytical tool for understanding the
study of regional integration arrangements, taken in isolation, none o f them fully captures
the dynamism and complexity o f regionalism. Therefore, these theories are important to
the extent that they provide some insights into the emergence o f regional integration
arrangements in the international political system. In this study, the success o f regional
integration arrangements is analysed on the basis o f the integrating states’ capacity or
ability to play leading roles in the socio-economic and political development of their
respective states and regions based on different development indicators260. In conducting
this analysis, I make the assumption that based on these indicators, a general deduction
can be made on the role played by regional integration arrangements in promoting the
process of socio-economic and political development in different regions of the world.
This study lays special emphasis on the case of the Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa (COMESA) to analyse the role o f regionalism in Eastern and Southern
Africa’s development.
In attempting to establish the role o f COMESA in Africa’s development, I rely on
a comparative analysis o f COMESA, the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN. As
will become clear at the end o f my thesis, I am optimistic that though the gains made by
COMESA and other regional integration arrangements in Africa may currently be
negligible (as compared to the gains made by the other regional bodies in this study),
regionalism offers better prospects for Africa’s development than other theories and
paradigms o f development that have been attempted in the past261. However, before
embarking on this analysis, I first discuss the emergence o f regional integration
arrangements within the context o f the political economy o f the international system in
the next chapter.
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--Chapter Three--

(i) Regionalism and the Political Economy of the International System
Montchretien de Watteville coined the term ‘political economy’ in 1615 when he used it
to describe the science o f wealth acquisition common to the state as well as to the
family262. While the concept o f political economy presaged economics, it reflected this
discipline’s enduring pre-occupation with national territorial accumulation. Under
classical political economy, national territorial accumulation entails a process o f wealth
creation through the continuous self-expansion o f capital within the territorial bounds o f
the nation-state263. Since the establishment o f the nation-state under the Treaty of
Westphalia in 1648, the pursuit o f national territorial wealth accumulation— especially
under the mercantilist era—remained a significant part o f the international political
system. This chapter examines the evolution o f the international political system from the
age o f state-led mercantilism to the era o f globalization where the supremacy o f the state
in the international political economy system is increasingly being challenged by
supranational entities, key among them being regional integration arrangements.

The

emergence o f regional integration arrangements as an important strategy for socio
economic and political development, especially in this era o f globalization, is examined
within this evolving international political system.

(ii)

The Nation-State and the Era of Mercantilism.
Since its inception at the Treaty o f Westphalia in 1648, the nation-state has

remained the prominent socio-economic and political entity in the international political
system264. Conceived within the realist tradition, the nation state has been mainly
preoccupied with creating wealth within its boundaries and wielding sufficient political
power to ensure legitimacy within its boundaries and its survival within the broader
international political system265. The drive for national wealth creation and the need for
international political survival were the instrumental factors that led to the emergence o f
the mercantilist system266. Mercantilism is best described as the practice o f striving after
political power through economic means 267 . As a result o f mercantilist policies,
throughout the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, European nation-states— all
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competing against each other— sought to foster economic growth and consolidate their
political power both at home and abroad268.
The mercantilists thought o f wealth creation in competitive terms. According to
them, wealth was something that was taken by one nation from another and wealth
creation was therefore an inherently a competitive game that was more or less fashioned
along the ethos o f say, winning a race. Hence, for the mercantilists, international trade
was seen as a zero-sum game, with clear winners and losers269.

Under mercantilist

policies, the economy was intended to serve the power and glory o f the state.
Mercantilist policies shaped the international political economy o f this era in the context
o f the weak versus the strong, with different regions o f the world being forcefully drawn
into the mercantilist economy. It was because o f mercantilism that Commodore Perry
landed on the shores of Japan in 1854 to demand that Japan ‘opens itself up’ to outside
(read American) trade270. It was because o f mercantilism that the British waged the socalled opium wars on China in a bid to force the Chinese to open up their borders to
British trade and thereby off-set the unfavourable balance o f payments that had been
prevailing between China and Britain before the opium w ars271. It was because of
mercantilism that the most pernicious form o f wealth accumulation was developed: the
use of millions o f African slave labour to develop and build the wealth o f the new
world272. It was mercantilism that gave birth to imperialism, which in turn led to the
creation o f colonial spheres o f influence by European states eager to stamp their
economic and political might across the globe.

Finally, mercantilist policies partly

contributed to the violent confrontation between European powers in the first and second
world wars and the desire for a new, less confrontational form o f politics in the
international political system

273

.

At the end o f the World War II, the nationalist approach that had given
mercantilist policies the credibility as the basis o f the international socio-economic and
political system came under increasing attack from liberal institutionalism274. According
to liberal institutionalism, cooperation (not competition) among states should form the
basis o f the international socio-economic and political system. The post war liberalinstitutionalists attempted to build the basis o f this international cooperation at tw o levels.
At the economic level, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the
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Bretton Woods Institutions (the IMF and the World Bank) would form the basis o f
77^
international cooperation . At the political level, the different states o f the world were
•

•

• •

•

• •

•

•

•

•

called upon to mitigate their political conflict via the United Nations

77 ft

. However,

because o f a number o f different factors in the international political system, the vision
set out by liberal institutionalists— that international cooperation was paramount in the
international political system— did not fully materialize277. One o f these factors was the
outbreak o f W orld W ar Two and the re-emergence o f nationalist and statist-led politics
under the Eastern and the Western blocs, fought within the ideological context o f the
Cold War.
However, although liberal-institutionalism had been discredited after the outbreak
o f World W ar II, it did not necessarily bring an end to the concept o f cooperation in
international political system. In fact, it is important to note that the onset o f the Cold War
era and the rise o f a bi-polar international system provided an impetus to the emergence
o f the concept o f regional cooperation among states, especially in Western Europe278.
Similarly, with the end o f World War II came a steady decline o f European colonial
powers. The fall o f European colonial powers saw the newly independent post-colonial
states move to establish regional integration arrangements as one o f the ways through
which they could consolidate their socio-economic and political independence

77Q

. Let us

now briefly examine these two factors— the rise o f the cold war era and the fall o f
European colonialism— and how they contributed to the emergence o f regional
integration arrangements in the post World W ar II era.

(iii)

Regional Integration Arrangements: the Cold War Era and the end of
European Colonialism
Although regionalism became a dominant aspect o f the international political

system immediately after the end o f World W ar II and the beginning o f the Cold W ar era,
it is important to note that as a political concept, regionalism pre-dates the two. Hence,
despite being portrayed in the literature as a novel phenomenon in the international
political system, it is worth noting that regionalism has long historical roots which can be
traced back to the 19th century280. One o f the earliest manifestations o f regionalism
bearing the essential features o f contemporary regional integration arrangements was the
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bearing the essential features o f contemporary regional integration arrangements was the
901

German Zollverein

. A Customs Union formed in 1834 among eighteen small states, the

Zollverein functioned as an important catalyst for a united Germany later in the century282.
However, while empirical examples on regionalism abound throughout history,
contemporary literature on regionalism mainly focuses on the regional integration
arrangements formed in the post World War II era. The main reason for focusing on this
era is that the regional integration arrangements formed during this period have a much
closer connection with the current landscape o f the international political system

9 89

.

The concept o f regionalism as currently discussed in the literature began in the
1950s when the European Community (now the European Union), with the approval o f
the United States, emerged onto the international political landscape

984

. The main purpose

o f the European Economic Community— as expressed in the Schuman Declaration— was
to prevent another war in Europe by binding European states through economic ties285.
The United States o f America’s efforts to rehabilitate war-torn Europe by means of
measures such as the Marshall Plan, which was itself conditioned by concerns about the
growing influence o f the Soviet Union, provided a firm foundation for the establishment
98ft
of the European Community .
•

Since the formation o f the European Community in the 1950s, regionalism has
evolved within two distinct periods generally termed as “the First Regionalism” and “the
•

*

Second Regionalism”

287

.

*

•

•

The first regionalism phase picked up pace in the 1960s.

During this period, a number o f regional trading arrangements flourished across different
regions o f the world. Some o f these were the North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA—
not to be confused with “NAFTA”— the North American Free Trade Agreement), The
Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), the Lagos Plan o f Action (LPA) and
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)288.
During the first phase o f regionalism, regional integration among the different
integrating countries was mainly driven by politically-motivated strategic concerns289.
Hence, as mentioned above, it was politically-motivated strategic concerns that compelled
the US to play a major role in overseeing both the emergence and formation o f the
European Community. The US supported the emergency o f the European Economic
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Community (now the European Union) because it was America’s political strategic
consideration that a stronger Europe would counter-balance the rising influence o f the
Soviet Union in Central and Eastern Europe290. Based on the same logic o f containing a
powerful political adversary, most regional integration arrangements— the LAFTA, the
LPA and the ASEAN among others— in the post-colonial world were formed as a means
of maintaining internal solidarity against the ex-colonial Western powers291. For the
newly independent countries, regional integration arrangements provided one of the
strategic moves that they could pursue in their bid to break free from the political and
•

economic domination o f their ex-colonial masters

■)Q‘)

.

However, after being in operation for three decades and despite having set out
amidst much gusto and fanfare, most o f the regional integration initiatives under first
regionalism were in dire need o f a new direction and vision by the beginning o f the
1980s

. While most o f the post World War II regional integration arrangements had set

out to secure political security and advance socio-economic development in their
respective regions, these objectives—perhaps with the exception o f the European
Economic Community— had not been attained to any impressive degree by the end of the
1970s. Hence, most regional integration arrangements came to the sobering conclusion
that after three decades o f existence, they had not achieved their desired objectives.
Perhaps the question to ask at this juncture is this: Why did regional integration
arrangements (and especially those in the post-colonial states) under the first wave o f post
World War II regionalism fail to achieve their desired objectives?
The literature suggests that the futility o f the first regionalism stems mainly from
the format and rationale o f these initiatives294. While regional integration initiatives under
the first regionalism were heavily driven by politically motivated strategic issues such as
containing Soviet expansionism or breaking loose from the grip o f ex-colonial powers,
most o f them either neglected or out-rightly misunderstood the socio-economic aspects of
their objectives295. As a result, their economic significance was greatly limited by their in
ward looking orientation and the pursuit o f protectionist policies such as importsubstitution policies

^ 0 ft

. The end result was that while most o f these regional integration

initiatives were driven by political considerations, they lacked the economic muscle to
back their integration objectives

7Q7

.
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The failure o f the first wave o f regionalism paved the way for the rise o f the
second wave o f regionalism, which emerged in the late eighties and early nineties,
reaching its peak with the launch and completion o f the Uruguay Round o f the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations

. This second wave of

regionalism, which was unprecedented in its intensity, is represented by among other
regional integration arrangements: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Common Market o f the Southern
Cone (MERCOSUR), the African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) trading arrangement and the
African Economic Community (as envisaged in the Abuja Treaty o f 1991)2" . It has been
argued that globalization has played a significant role in propelling the phenomenal
growth o f second regionalism, particularly in the post-Cold W ar era. In the next section, I
examine how globalization has influenced the rise o f post-Cold War regional integration
arrangements.

(iv)

Regional Integration Arrangements and Globalization in the Post-Cold War
Era.
Globalization has become an important theme in the post Cold W ar analysis o f the

international political system300. The central contention o f the globalization metaphor is
that there is increasing interconnection and interdependence between the states and the
societies o f the international system301. The common images evoked by globalization are:
a global flow o f money, people, values and ideas. Due to this global flow, some scholars
have stated that the international system is witnessing the emergence o f a ‘borderless
world’ nay, the ‘end o f geography’302.
According to the proponents o f globalization, there are a number o f indicators to
support the view that we are living in an increasingly globalized world303. First, the
international political system is witnessing a dramatic increase in the density and depth o f
econom ic interdependence. Second, both the information technology and the information

revolution phenomena are playing an important role in globally diffusing knowledge,
technology and ideas. Third, the integrating and homogenizing influence o f market forces
continue to facilitate increased global flows o f values, knowledge, ideas and the ability o f
like-minded groups to organize across national boundaries304. The ability to organize at
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cross-national levels has created a trans-national civil society that includes both trans
national policy communities and trans-national social movements305. Fourth and finally,
the foregoing global developments have led to an unprecedented and growing
consciousness o f ‘global problem s’ (such as global environmental change) and fostered a
sense o f belonging to a single human community

. So, how does the emergence o f this

seemingly ubiquitous post-Cold War globalized world relate to the unprecedented
emergence o f regional integration arrangements in this era? It is to this question that I
now turn.
Although the relationship between regional integration arrangements and
globalization in the post Cold War era has generated a substantial amount o f literature

,

I limit my discussion to two central views that have emerged from the literature
concerning this relationship. The first view contends that post Cold War globalization has
worked against the emergence o f regional integration arrangements while the second
view claims that globalization has provided an avenue for both the emergence and the
entrenchment o f regional integration arrangements within the international political
■5AO

system

. I examine these two opposing views in turn, beginning with the view that post

Cold War globalization militates against the emergence o f regional integration
arrangements.
Two reasons have been advanced to explain how post Cold War globalization
militates against the emergence o f regional integration arrangements309. First, it has been
argued that increasing levels o f economic interdependence, together with the rise o f new
global issues— such as environmental degradation, growing numbers o f refugees and
complex humanitarian disasters among others— create a powerful demand for nonregionally based, issue specific international institutions designed to solve common
problems and manage the numerous new sources o f friction arising out o f global
interdependence310. Second, post Cold War globalization has only served to create more
room for the expansion and growth o f socio-economic and political interdependence and
cooperation among the OECD countries to the exclusion o f the other poorer regions o f the
world311.
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Hence, instead o f providing an environment for the emergence o f regional
integration arrangements in different regions o f the world, post Cold W ar globalization
has helped foster powerful elements o f Western cohesion, which are clearly inimical to
regional cohesion in other parts o f the w orld312. Reinforced by the Bretton Woods
institutions, the Group o f Seven (now Eight), transatlantic and transpacific security
systems, the OECD-led regionalism has given regional integration a decisively Western
outlook that has in turn constrained the emergence o f coherent regional integration
arrangements in other regions o f the w o rld 313 . While the foregoing views cast
globalization as being antithetical to regional integration arrangements, other views hold
that globalization is the engine-head propelling the worldwide emergence o f regional
integration arrangements. Let us now turn our attention the views that have been
advanced in support o f globalization as a vehicle for regional integration.
There are a number o f ways in which globalization m ay act as a stimulus to
regional integration arrangements314. Here, I analyse four. First, the ever-deepening
integrative activities generated by globalization in the socio-economic and political realm
create problems, which demand collective management, and regulation which goes
beyond the limited confines o f both the domestic affairs and the sovereign prerogatives o f
the state 315. This is a stimulus for regionalism since the demand for collective
management and regulation that emerges out o f the globalization process can only be
effectively mitigated by supranational institutions such as those created through regional
integration arrangements.
Second, some scholars have argued that the ‘global’ character o f many issues is
often exaggerated316. According to this scholars, while some issues— such as climate
change or loss o f biodiversity—may have a truly global character, their impact is likely to
be felt most directly in particular regions than others. In this case, the balance o f interests
and incentives is likely to reside in the region(s) that is/are most affected and hence,
^17
regional, as opposed to global policy responses may be more appropriate .
•

•

Third, regional integration arrangements offer the most viable level at which to
reconcile the integrative market and technological pressures towards globalization on one
hand and integration on the other hand318. The lacuna created by the reduction in the
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domestic regulatory role o f the state due to globalization has opened vital socio-economic
and political space that enables regional integration arrangements to act as the medium
through which the balance o f wealth and power among social groups within and across
regions can be reconstituted319. Viewed from this perspective, regional integration
•

•

•

arrangements are essentially about issues o f inequality and redistribution

l i b

.

Fourth, globalization may have acted as a powerful stimulus to regionalism
(especially economic regionalism) by altering and intensifying patterns o f economic
cooperation321. Changes in technology, in communications and in the operations o f the
global markets (all associated with globalization) have had a profound impact on how
governments define their economic development and political autonomy in this era o f
globalization

. For example, globalization has put pressure on states and compelled

them to harmonize their economic policies in a bid to attract both foreign investment and
the much needed new technology.
Additionally, the nature o f competition under globalization has forced states and
corporate actors to form larger units, both for economic efficiency and for the
augmentation o f the necessary political power needed to bargain effectively over the rules
and institutions that govern the world economy 323 . Hence, regional integration
arrangements have become a necessary part o f the effort o f states to cope with a pervasive
globalization dragon that threatens to curtail their economic and political well-being. If
regional integration arrangements are the medium through which corporate and state
actors have sought to constrain the vagaries o f globalization, the multi-lateral trading
system is the medium through which the operations o f regional integration arrangements
are constrained. I examine regional integration arrangements and the multilateral trading
system next.

(v)

Regional Integration Arrangements and the Multilateral Trading System
As a result o f the impressive gains made under the second regionalism, a new

debate has emerged in the development literature; which o f the two global trading
systems— Regionalism vs. Multilateralism— is a better system in the promotion o f socio
economic and political global prosperity? Traditionally, the desirability o f regional
integration has been discussed against the backdrop o f multilateralism. Within this
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integration has been discussed against the backdrop o f multilateralism. Within this
paradigm, a simple welfare analysis that weighs the “trade creation” and the “trade
diversion” effects o f regional integration has been used to measure the desirability o f
regionalism with respect to the multilateral trading system324.
However, some new-generation political economists have criticized the “trade
creation” vs. “trade diversion” approach as being too narrowly focussed on the static
aspects o f economic welfare

. As such, these political economists argue that the trade-

creation versus trade-diversion approach is incapable o f capturing other socio-economic
and political concerns that are necessary if the diffusion o f the global benefits o f regional
integration is to occur

. Consequently, debate as to the desirability o f regional

integration has now been broadened to include other aspects beyond trade creation and
trade diversion. The broadened debate seeks to find out, for example, whether regional
integration arrangements are building blocks or stumbling blocks to broader global
community welfare goals such as raising the standards o f living o f the poor and
promoting sustainable development

.

Therefore, while regional integration arrangements have, for example, led to
tremendous increases in global trade volumes, debate rages on as to how effective they
are in dispersing the benefits o f global trade, and hence promoting global prosperity. Two
diametrically views have emerged from this debate

. On one hand, we have the view

that regional integration arrangements are stumbling blocks to global prosperity due to
their inability to allow global socio-economic and political benefits to percolate into their
exclusive regional domains

. On the other hand, we have the view that regional

integration arrangements are building blocks for global socio-economic and political
prosperity due to the fact that they provide a basis for global multilateralism330. We shall
examine these views in turn.

(a) Regional Integration as a stumbling block to global prosperity:
The view that regional integration arrangements are a stumbling block to global
prosperity is examined within the following arguments:
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•

External dynamics: regionalism as a stumbling block to global prosperity
The view that regionalism is a stumbling block to global prosperity is based on the

claim that regional integration arrangements cause a reduction in the aggregate global
welfare

. But how does regionalism bring about the reduction in aggregate global

welfare? It does so mainly through competition. For example, at the economic level,
regional integration arrangements compete with both non-member states and other
regional integration arrangements in their bid to shift terms o f trade in their favour332.
Raising tariffs against non-member states and other blocs is one o f the common modes
through which competition is manifested. As a result o f high tariffs, global welfare is
diminished because trading products o f members within a given regional integration
arrangement are protected irrespective o f whether they are o f the same quality or are
produced under the same levels o f efficiency as those o f non-member counterparts333.
Another distinguishing feature o f regional integration arrangements as stumbling
blocks to global prosperity is their propensity to pursue mercantilist policies334. As
already noted above, under the mercantilist mind-set, some regional integration
arrangements seek to increase their trade surplus by importing less from non-member
states while striving to export more to them335. Although this concept clearly violates the
liberal idea o f free trade that is supposedly one o f the main trade principles o f
regionalism336, it nonetheless survives among most regional integration arrangements,
especially the more

economically established ones like the EU, NAFTA

and

0-37

MERCOSUR

. Additionally, the mercantilist behaviour is exhibited in the form o f

policy options reflecting the political reality o f protectionism— such as the notorious
•3 - 3 0

Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) within the European Union

•

.

Internal dynamics: regionalism as a stumbling block to global prosperity.
Another reason why regionalism is seen as a stumbling block to global prosperity

stems from the fact that regional integration arrangements provide abundant opportunities
for local interest groups to manipulate both their design and operation339. Under regional
integration arrangements, producers o f trade sensitive products can, for example use the
sensitivity o f their industry to serve their own economic interests to the detriment o f the
broader global economic interests340. What is more, once they are entrenched, it very
difficult to break the interests o f regional interest groups for the good o f global welfare.

57

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Hence in NAFTA for instance, due to the deep-seated power o f interest groups,
conventional trade barriers such as quotas in the agricultural sector have been phased out
only through a tortuous and highly tedious process341.
Furthermore, even when these conventional trade barriers are finally broken down,
a host o f new non-trade barriers such as the complicated “rules o f origin” are invented in
their stead. The rules o f origin are designed to safeguard so-called “originating goods”
with preferential treatment vis-a-vis “non-originating goods”, namely, goods imported
from non-member countries342. As Sungjoo notes, the complex, almost labyrinthine,
character o f such rules negatively affects the flow o f international commerce by
discriminating against non-members343. For example, under the NAFTA regime, arcane
and idiosyncratic rules o f origin still abound for specific products such as automobiles
and textiles344.
These rules have had a definite negative impact on the flow o f automobiles and
textile products from other non-NAFTA members, hence reducing the aggregate benefits
that are supposed to accrue from global commerce345. Therefore, although preferential
rules of origin may help in boosting intra-regional trade (hence resulting in trade creation),
to a certain extent, they generally block global trade flows (hence resulting in trade
diversion) from non-member countries. When this is the case the trade-creation vs. trade
diversion dynamics are such that any advantages achieved through regionalism are offset
by the corresponding disadvantages346.

•

The “selfish hegemon” and the reduction of global prosperity role

Some scholars highlight the dominant role of hegemony in the formation and operation of
regional trading arrangements and argue that the hegemonic powers normally usurp the
benefits from intra-regional trade in a disproportionate manner347. Empirical confirmation
of the “selfish hegemon” thesis exists in the trade talks on intellectual property rights
between the US and Mexico

T4R

. Under NAFTA, the US coerced Mexico into accepting a

“one-on-one” bargain on intellectual property protection. So satisfied was the US over
this easy trade concession with Mexico that it recommended it as an example worth
emulating by other regional trades349. What the US failed to take into account when
making the recommendation is the fact that it could not have gotten such a concession
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from Canada, another NAFTA member who, though occupying the middle rung o f
NAFTA’s pecking order, is capable o f resisting such coercive trade negotiations350.
Another manifestation o f the selfish hegemon thesis can be found in the so-called
“hub-and-spoke” forms o f regionalism. Under this type o f regionalism, trade is
characterized by bi-lateral trade arrangements between an economically superior central
“hub” and economically inferior peripheral “spokes”. In this kind o f regionalism, the hub
country/region is likely to benefit disproportionately from the spoke(s) country or
countries/region(s). This is so because while the hub country/countries has/have duty free
access to a variety o f spoke countries/region markets resulting from bilateral
arrangements, the spoke countries/region do not enjoy similar gains351. The only option
left for the spoke countries/regions is that they are forced to sign bilateral trading
arrangements among themselves, thus forming a marginal “rim” o f trade partners352.
However, even more telling is that while the spoke countries are struggling to
remain afloat in global commerce by such desperate measures as forming a trading rim,
the hub country tends to prevail both in its own market as well as in the markets o f the
spoke countries due the advantages o f the economies o f scale353. Already blessed with a
secure and well-established industrial manufacturing base, the hub country proceeds to
reap the full benefits of its expanded export markets in the spoke countries with the
contentment of knowing that the latter lack the economic wherewithal to break into its
domestic market354.
While this picture already looks grim, the reality is that problems associated with
the “hub-and-spoke” regionalism are likely to more serious in future. This is considering
the fact that the greatest increase in trade regionalism notified to the W orld Trade
Organization (WTO) so far is in the form o f bilateral trade arrangements, normally
between the developed (the hub) and the developing (the spoke) countries355. Under this
arrangement, powerful regional integration arrangements like NAFTA and the EU could
potentially exploit smaller and weaker trading partners, particularly those in the
developing countries. COMESA’s relationship with the EU has raised real concerns about
the possibility o f the emergency of a “hub-spoke” relationship that will see the EU
effectively dominate COMESA at both socio-economic and political levels owing to the
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examine the arguments in favour o f regional integration arrangements as building blocks
to global prosperity.

(b) Regional integration arrangements as building blocks for global prosperity
Two main arguments have been advanced in favour o f regional integration
arrangements as building blocks to global prosperity357. These are the “laboratory effect”
argument and the “lock-in effect” argument.

•

The “laboratory effect” argument for regional integration.
The laboratory effect argument provides one o f the most powerful arguments for

regional integration arrangements. The laboratory effect holds that regional integration
arrangements are popular due to the fact that the negotiation and process for membership
in a regional trading arrangement is much faster than that for membership in the WTO

ICO

.

Another advantage o f the regional integration arrangements is that once agreements are
adopted and implemented, the experience gained and the lessons learnt through trial and
error serve as a knowledge base for further improvement and or adjustment for a given
regional integration arrangement359.

•

The “lock-in effect” argument for regional integration
Some scholars argue that regional integration often leads to the “locking-in” of

previous liberalization and reform efforts in a manner that prevents backsliding among
the member countries o f a regional trading arrangement360. This lock-in effect can be
particularly attractive to governments o f developing countries where reform efforts are
normally stymied by deep-rooted anti-reform local powers361. The lock-in effect enables
these governments to stave off opposition to regional integration since all they have to do
to resist making local concessions is to argue that their hands are tied by broader regional
commitments362. For example, in this context, it would be expected that individual
member countries cannot reverse any socio-economic and political reforms made by
COMESA at the regional level363.
Despite the fact that the debate on the effectiveness o f regional integration
arrangements as a viable strategy for socio-economic and political development in the
post-Cold W ar remains heated and contentious (as can be seen from the foregoing views
and sentiments), there can be no denying the fact that generally speaking, the socio-
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Despite the fact that the debate on the effectiveness o f regional integration
arrangements as a viable strategy for socio-economic and political development in the
post-Cold War remains heated and contentious (as can be seen from the foregoing views
and sentiments), there can be no denying the fact that generally speaking, the socio
economic and political benefits o f the second regionalism have been very impressive364.
As already noted above, it can be argued that the success o f second regionalism (in
contrast to the failures o f first regionalism) is largely due to its commitment to both the
political as well as to the socio-economic concerns o f the integrating countries365. What is
more, the end o f the Cold War and the subsequent emergence o f globalisation as a
generally accepted trend in international development have laid a solid foundation for
regional integration, especially given the fact that the world is no longer divided into two
dangerously-opposed ideological camps.

Since its emergence in the 1980s and its

subsequent proliferation in the post-Cold War, second regionalism has become an
important aspect o f socio-economic development and political cooperation in different
regions o f the world.
However, despite the apparent gains o f second phase o f regionalism, the literature
is mixed as to whether regional integration arrangements are the appropriate vehicles
through which the expected socio-economic and political gains from globalization can be
extensively dispersed to a majority o f the global population. So far, the gains o f second
phase o f regionalism have been uneven— with some regions like Europe, North America
and to a certain extent, Latin America and Asia reaping impressive gains while others like
Sub-Saharan Africa, getting negligible, if any, returns. While a number o f factors have
been advanced to explain the reason behind these regional disparities, in the next chapter,
I adopt a comparative analysis approach and discuss some o f these factors within the
socio-economic and political context o f the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ASEAN and
COMESA. The main task in this chapter will be to establish, based on a number of
selected development indicators, general socio-economic and political patterns and trends
in the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN before making a comparison between
these regional integration arrangements and COMESA and before finally drawing general
conclusions on COMESA’s role in the development o f Eastern and Southern Africa.
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--Chapter Four—
(i)

Regionalism

and Development:

An

Overview

of the EU, NAFTA,

MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA.
In this chapter, I discuss the role o f regionalism in development. I begin this section by
presenting a general overview o f the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA
within three main contexts: First, I look at the founding objectives o f these regional
integration arrangements, then second, I examine their institutional structures and
operations and third and finally, I analyse their contribution to the socio-economic and
political development o f their respective regions. The analysis highlights the development
achievements and limitations and or challenges o f these regional bodies. As can be
expected, all these regional integration arrangements have contributed differently to the
development needs o f their respective regions and all o f them face unique challenges that
reflect the complex dynamics o f development both within their respective regions and at
the international level.
Additionally, it can be seen that the level and degree o f socio-economic and
political development (as measured through such development indicators as intra-regional
trade, regional infrastructure and the degree o f citizen involvement) greatly varies across
these regional integration arrangements but generally, it can be concluded that all o f them
have brought about some positive socio-economic and political development within their
respective regions. It is against this backdrop that I make a comparative analysis between
COMESA and the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN before examining both its
challenges and prospects for Eastern and Southern Africa’s development in the next
chapter o f this thesis. But before doing so, I first embark on the main focus o f this chapter
as already laid out above.

(ii) a. The EU: Founding Objectives
On 9 M ay 1950, Robert Schuman took up an idea originally conceived by Jean Monnet
and proposed the setting up o f a European Coal and Steel Community (the ECSC)366.
Following the establishment o f the ECSC, European countries that had once fought each
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other decided to pool the production o f coal and steel under a shared authority—the 'High
Authority'

. Through the ECSC and in a practical and symbolic way, the raw materials

o f war were being turned into instruments o f reconciliation and peace

. The

establishment o f the ECSC set in motion a series o f European integration activities that
culminated into the EU as we know it today. Since the Schuman Declaration, and owing
to a series o f integration initiatives thereafter, the EU’s objectives can be broadly
identified as follows369:

■ The Establishment of Peace in Europe
The idea o f a united Europe was once just a dream in the minds o f philosophers and
visionaries. Victor Hugo, for example, imagined a peaceful ‘United States o f Europe’
inspired by humanistic ideals

T 7 fl

•

. However, two terrible wars that ravaged the continent

during the first half o f the 20th century seemed to have shattered the dream o f building a
peaceful ‘United States o f Europe’. But from the rubble o f W orld Weir II, a new kind o f
hope emerged. People who had resisted totalitarianism during the war were determined to
put an end to international hatred and rivalry in Europe and to build a lasting peace
between former enemies371. As a result o f this new determination, between 1945 and
1950, a handful o f European statesmen including Konrad Adenauer, Winston Churchill,
Alcide de Gasperi and Robert Schuman set about persuading their peoples to enter a new
era 372 .
These leaders were determined to establish a new order in Western Europe based
on the shared interests o f both the European peoples and their nations373. The new order
would be founded upon treaties guaranteeing the rule o f law and equality between all
countries in Europe374. The first manifestations o f this order came into play in 1950 with
the Establishment o f the European Coal and Steel Community (the ECSC). It was the
start o f more than half a century o f peaceful co-operation between the member states o f
the European Communities. Under the Maastricht Treaty o f 1992, the European
Community institutions were strengthened and given broader responsibilities and the
European Union (the EU) as we know it today was bom

T7S
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European integration activities provided a forum for Western Europe to both
secure peace for itself and assure itself o f peace, especially during the tumultuous Cold
W ar era376. W ith the end o f the Cold War, the peace agenda remained dominant and the
EU played an instrumental role in the unification o f Germany after the fall o f the Berlin
wall in 1989. When the Soviet empire eventually fell apart in 1991, the countries o f
Central and Eastern Europe that had for decades lived under the authoritarian yoke o f the
Warsaw Pact decided to seek a new world order and peace within the family o f
democratic European nations under the EU377. So far, the EU has succeeded in forging a
sense o f peaceful co-existence in Europe for over half a century.

■ Promotion of Safety and Security in Europe
Although the EU has so far done a good job in promoting peace in Europe, it
remains alive to the fact that the new demands o f the 21st century still require Europe to
deal with issues o f safety and security. Hence, ensuring the safety and security o f its 25
member states is one o f the key objectives o f the EU. In order to achieve this objective,
the EU works closely with the regions just next to its borders— North Africa, the Balkans,
the Caucasus and the Middle East— and those beyond378. The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) has so far continued to provide the institutional structure within
which Europe’s peace and security is assured379. Additionally, the EU is committed to
developing some form o f continental security arrangement through the European Security
and Defence Policy (ESDP)380.

■ Promotion of European Economic and Social Solidarity
The promotion o f European economic and social solidarity is another important
objective o f the EU. The EU countries account for an ever smaller percentage o f the
world's population381. This means that they must therefore continue pulling together if
they are to ensure sustained econom ic growth for effective com petition with the other

major economies on the world stage382. In this era o f globalization, the EU recognizes that
no individual EU country is strong enough to go it alone, especially on economic
matters383. In order to achieve economies o f scale and in order to find new customers,
European businesses need to operate in a bigger market than just their home country
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market384. To this end, the EU has opened up the single European market— removing the
old obstacles to trade and cutting away the red tape— to boost intra-European trade and to
strengthen the EU economic position in the international political system (see figures 1
and 2 on page 75 below).
While the EU is committed to promoting economic success in Europe, it is equally
committed to the idea o f counterbalancing the negative consequences o f economic
competition through a Europe-wide solidarity that is expressed in practical help for
ordinary people385. For example, through the structural funds (managed by the European
Commission), the EU encourages and backs up the efforts o f national and regional
authorities aimed at closing the gap between different levels o f development in different
parts o f the EU386. Also, both the EU budget and the money raised by the European
Investment Bank are used to improve the member-states transport infrastructure (for
example, by extending the network o f motorways and high-speed railways), thus
providing better access to outlying regions and boosting intra-EU trade

007

.

However, the extent to which the EU satisfies the foregoing objectives, and
therefore the socio-economic and political development needs o f this region, largely
depends on how the EU is organized. So, how does the EU ’s organizational structure look
and how does this structure help in the promotion o f socio-economic and political
development within the EU? The response to this question follows in the next section.

(ii) b. The EU: Institutional Structures and Operations
■ The European Council
The European Council is the EU's highest-level policymaking body. It brings together the
presidents and prime ministers o f all the EU countries plus the President o f the European
Commission388. The President o f the European Parliament also addresses every European
Council meeting389. The European Council dates back to 1974, when the EU's political
leaders (the "Heads o f State or Government"), began holding regular meetings390. The
-3Q1

Single European Act (SEA) o f 1986 made this practice official

. The growing

importance o f the European Council is further reflected by the Treaty o f Maastricht
(1992), which made the European Council the official initiator o f the Union's major
policies392.
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Following the Maastricht Treaty, the European Council was given the
responsibility to settle difficult issues on which ministers (meeting in the Council o f the
European Union) fail to agree on393. The European Council now meets, in principle, four
times a year394. The President or Prime Minister o f the country currently presiding over
the Council o f the European Union chairs it395. Some Member States would like the
European Council to become the “Government o f Europe”, with one o f its members being
the EU’s representative on the world stage396. But this is a contentious issue that raises a
number o f questions. For Example, would the European Council choose this person or
would it automatically be the President o f the European Commission397? Disagreement
over this question continues. In the meantime, the EU ’s representative on the world stage
is the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (a post created
by the Treaty o f Amsterdam), who is also Secretary-General o f the Council398.

■ The Council of the European Union
The Council o f the European Union is the EU's main decision-making
institution399. It was formerly known as the 'Council o f Ministers', and for short it is
simply called 'the Council'400. Each EU country in turn presides over the Council for a
six-month period401. One minister attends every Council meeting from each o f the
member states. The ministerial attendance o f the Council meeting depends on which topic
is on the agenda402. For example, if the topic on the agenda is about agriculture, then the
Ministers o f Agriculture from the respective EU member states would attend the said
Council meeting403. If the agenda topic is on foreign policy, then it will be attended by
the Foreign Affairs Minister from each country and so on. There are nine different
Council "configurations", covering all the different policy areas404. The Council's work as
a whole is planned and co-ordinated by the General Affairs and External Relations
Council405.
The preparatory work for Council meetings is done by the Permanent
Representatives Committee (Coreper), made up o f the member states' ambassadors to the
EU, assisted by officials from the national ministries while the Council's administrative
work is handled by its General Secretariat, based in Brussels406. The Council and the
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European Parliament share legislative power as well as responsibility for the budget. The
Council also concludes international agreements that have been negotiated by the
European Commission407. According to the EU treaties, the Council has to take its
decisions either unanimously or by a majority or "qualified majority" vote408. However,
on important questions, such as amending the treaties, launching a new common policy or
allowing a new country to join the Union, the Council has to agree unanimously409.
In most other cases, qualified majority voting is required. Qualified majority
voting stipulates that a decision cannot be taken unless a specified minimum number o f
votes are cast in its favour410. The number o f votes each EU country can cast roughly
reflects the size o f its population and is as follows411:
•

Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom: 29 each

•

Spain and Poland: 27 each

•

Netherlands: 13

•

Belgium, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary and Portugal: 12 each

•

Austria and Sweden: 10 each

•

Denmark, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovakia and Finland: 7 each

•

Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg and Slovenia: 4 each

•

Malta: 3

From the numbers above, the total vote is 321. Out o f these votes, a minimum o f 232
votes (i.e. 72.3%) is required to reach a qualified majority412. In addition, the following
two conditions must be met. First, a majority o f member states (in some cases two thirds)
must approve the decision, and second, any member state can ask for confirmation, in
which case the votes cast in favour must represent at least 62% o f the EU's total
population413.

■ The European Parliament
The European Parliament is the elected body that represents the EU's citizens and
takes part in the EU ’s legislative process414. Since 1979, Members o f the European
Parliament (the MEPs) have been directly elected by universal suffrage every five years.
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732 MEPs were elected at the June 2004 elections to represent the 25 EU countries in the
EU parliament. Parliament normally holds its plenary session in Strasbourg and any
additional sessions in Brussels. It has 17 committees that do the preparatory work for its
plenary sessions and a number o f political groups that mostly meet in Brussels.
Parliament and the Council share legislative powers, and they do so using three
different procedures (in addition to simple consultation). First, there is the "cooperation
procedure", introduced by the Single European Act o f 1986. Under this procedure,
Parliament gives its opinion on draft directives and regulations proposed by the European
Commission, which can amend its proposal to take account o f Parliament's opinion.
Second, there is the "assent procedure", also introduced in 1986. Through this procedure,
Parliament must give its assent to international agreements negotiated by the Commission,
to any proposed enlargement o f the European Union and to a number o f other matters
including any changes in election rules. Third, there is the "co-decision procedure",
introduced by the Maastricht Treaty o f 1992. This procedure puts the EU Parliament on
an equal footing with the Council when legislating on a whole series o f important issues
including the free movement o f people, the internal market, education, research, the
environment, Trans-European Networks, health, culture and consumer protection.
Parliament has the power to throw out proposed legislation in these fields if an absolute
majority o f MEPs vote against the Council's "common position”. However, the matter can
be put before a conciliation committee.
The European Parliament and the Council o f the European Union also share equal
responsibility for adopting the EU budget. The European Commission proposes a draft
budget, which is then debated by Parliament and the Council. Parliament can reject the
proposed budget, and it has already done so on several occasions. When this happens, the
entire budget procedure has to be re-started. Parliament has made full use o f its budgetary
powers to influence EU policymaking. However, most o f the EU's spending on
agriculture is beyond Parliament's control.
Parliament is an important driving force in the EU politics. It is the EU's primary
debating chamber, a place where the political and national viewpoints o f all the member
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states meet and mix with the intention o f developing a common position. Since its
establishment, the EU Parliament continues to play a role in shaping the outcome o f the
EU ’s legislative processes. For example, Parliament played a key role in drawing up the
EU Charter o f Fundamental Rights (proclaimed in December 2000) and in setting up the
European Convention following the Laeken European Council in December 2001.
Lastly, the EU Parliament is the body that exercises democratic control over the
Union. It has the power to dismiss (this requires a two thirds majority) the Commission
by adopting a motion o f censure. It checks that EU policies are being properly managed
and implemented— for example by examining the reports it receives from the Court o f
Auditors and by putting oral and written questions to the Commission and Council. The
sitting President o f the European Council also reports to Parliament on the decisions
taken by the EU's political leaders.

■ The European Commission
The European Commission is one o f the EU's key institutions415. The Commission
has 25 members— one per EU country. It is required to act with complete political
independence and since its job is to uphold the interests o f the EU as a whole, it is
required not to take instructions from any member state government. As "Guardian o f the
Treaties", the Commission has to ensure that the regulations and directives adopted by the
Council and Parliament are being put into effect. If these regulations and directives are
not being adopted as required, the Commission can take the offending party to the Court
o f Justice to oblige it to comply with EU law.
The Commission is also the only institution that has the right to propose new EU
legislation, and it can take action at any stage to help bring about an agreement both
within the Council and between the Council and Parliament. In addition, as the EU's
executive arm, the Commission carries out the decisions taken by the Council in relation
to the Common Agricultural Policy, for example. The Commission is also largely
responsible for managing the EU's common policies, such as research, development aid
and regional policy among others. It also manages the budget for these policies.
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The Commission is answerable to Parliament and if Parliament passes a motion o f
censure against it, the entire Commission has to resign. It was when faced with just such a
motion o f censure that President Jacques Santer tendered the collective resignation o f his
Commission on 16 March 1999, allowing Romano Prodi to become President o f the
Commission for the period 1999-2004. The Commission is assisted by a civil service
made up o f 36 "Directorates-General" (DGs) and services, based mainly in Brussels and
Luxembourg. Unlike the secretariats o f traditional international organisations, the
Commission has its own financial resources and can thus act independently on the
implementation o f its policy options.

■ The Court of Justice
The Court o f Justice is located in Luxembourg and is made up o f one Judge from
each EU country, assisted by eight Advocates-General416. The Judges are appointed by
joint agreement o f the governments o f the member states. Each is appointed for a term o f
six years, after which they may be reappointed for one or two further periods o f three
years. The Judges make their decisions based on the principle o f impartiality and the
Court's job is to ensure that EU law is complied with, and that the treaties are correctly
interpreted and applied.
The Court o f Justice can find any EU member state guilty o f failing to fulfil its
obligations under the treaties. Also, it can check whether EU laws have been properly
enacted and it can find the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission guilty o f
failing to act as required. What is more, the Court o f Justice is the only institution that can,
at the request o f the national courts, give a ruling on the interpretation o f the treaties and
on the validity and interpretation o f EU law. When questions concerning the
interpretation o f the EU law are brought before the court in one o f the member states, that
court may— and indeed sometimes must— ask the Court o f Justice for its ruling. This
system ensures that EU law is interpreted and applied consistently throughout the
European Union.
Finally, the EU Treaties explicitly allow the Court to check whether EU legislation
respects the fundamental rights o f EU citizens. The Court can give rulings on questions o f
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the EU citizens’ personal freedom and security. It is within this context, for example, that
“the Court o f First Instance” (set up in 1989 and consisting o f one judge from each EU
country) is responsible for giving rulings on certain kinds o f cases, particularly actions
brought by firms or private individuals against EU institutions and disputes between the
institutions and their employees.

■ The Court of Auditors
The Court o f Auditors was set up in 1977417. It has one member from each EU
country and this member is appointed for a term o f six years by agreement between the
member states and after consultation with the European Parliament. The Court o f
Auditors ensures that all the European Union's revenue has been received and all its
expenditure incurred in a lawful and regular manner. It has the right to audit the accounts
o f any organisation that is handling EU funds and, where appropriate, to refer matters to
the Court o f Justice.

■ The Committee of the Regions
The Committee o f the regions (CoR), set up under the Treaty o f the European Union,
consists o f representatives o f regional and local governments418. These representatives are
proposed by the member states and appointed by the Council for a four-year term. Under
the Treaty, the Council and Commission must consult the CoR on matters o f relevance to
the regions, and the Committee may also adopt opinions on its own initiative.

■ The European Investment Bank
The European Investment Bank (EIB) is based in Luxembourg. It finances projects
to help make the EU's less developed regions and small businesses more competitive419.

■ The European Central Bank
The European Central Bank (ECB) is based in Frankfurt. It is responsible for
managing the euro and the EU's monetary policy420. The EU pursues its socio-economic
and political development agenda within the foregoing institutional infrastructure. Our
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next question is: Given this extensive infrastructure, how has the EU so far performed in
its quest to promote the socio-economic and political development o f its member states?
Let us find out.

(ii) c. The EU and Europe’s Socio-Economic and Political Development
As can be clearly seen from the foregoing, the EU has an extensive institutional
infrastructure within which it pursues Europe’s socio-economic and political development
agenda. Within this infrastructure, the EU has adopted a broad-based approach to
development that goes beyond the narrow confines o f economic growth concerns to
encompass the social as well as the political well being o f the EU citizens. The scope o f
this thesis does not allow me to present an exhaustive account o f the EU ’s extensive
socio-economic and political development commitment. However, here, I limit m yself to
identifying four main areas in which the EU has made some progress in meeting the
development needs o f the citizens o f this region.
First, at the socio-economic level, the EU has attempted to bring about a sense o f
“being European and European belongingness” through educational and training
programmes such as Erasmus (which promotes student mobility), Cornett (technological
education and training) and Lingua, which encourages people to learn foreign
languages421. Additionally, the EU has set for itself a target o f having 10% o f its students
spend one year in another European country taking a higher education course422. To this
end, the EU has committed funds to such programmes as Socrates, Leonardo da Vinci and
other youth programmes to encourage young Europeans to cast their nets wider when
exploring educational opportunities in the EU.
Second, the EU has been able to bring about economic prosperity to the citizens o f
this region through the establishment o f a single European market423. Under the single
market, businesses, professions and trade unions have all moved ahead swiftly, adapting
their strategies to the new rules o f a much wider European market424. The benefits o f the
single European market have spread within the EU as a wider range o f goods and services
have become available through increased intra-EU trading activities (see figures 1 and 2
below).
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Figure a: Growth in intra EU trade from 1990 to 2001
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Figure b: Intra EU trade in 2001
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Source: The figures above have been adapted from Eurostat, the statistical division of the EU.

Third, through the Lisbon Strategy, the EU has adopted a comprehensive program
aimed at achieving the following425: the promotion o f a knowledge-based economy within
the EU; the protection o f Europe’s social safety-net programs, especially in terms o f
raising enough resources to take care o f the EU ’s aging population while saving enough
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for future generations; raising the employment rate from an average o f 61% in 2000 to
70% by 2010 and increasing the percentage o f women in the work force from 51% to
60% over the same period o f time426. So far, the EU seems to be on the right track in so
far as achieving some o f the Lisbon strategy goals is concerned427.
Fourth and finally, at the political level, the EU has been active in the promotion
of the citizens’ rights within this region. To this end, the EU established the Charter o f
Fundamental Rights o f the European Union

. This Charter was solemnly proclaimed in

Nice in December 2000 and further underpinned by the Treaty o f Amsterdam429. This
treaty introduces a procedure for suspending the EU membership rights o f any country
that violates EU citizens' fundamental rights430. Also, the Treaty extends the principle o f
non-discrimination so that it not only covers nationality but also gender, race, religion,
age and sexual orientation431.
However, despite having made tremendous progress in promoting socio-economic
and political development among the member states, the EU still has some obstacles and
limitations that it must overcome. First, the recent rejection o f the EU Constitution by
both France and Denmark is a clear indication that the idea o f a united, single-document
governed Europe is still far from being achieved432. While the promoters o f a European
Constitution make the case that such a document will be less complex (as opposed to the
current treaty regime contained in some 80,000 pages) and therefore likely to promote an
efficient form o f governance in the EU, the resounding defeat o f the EU ’s Constitutional
referendum at hands o f the Danes and the French is a clear indication that the issue o f a
centrally-governed EU (under one constitutional document), is not yet popular with the
nationals o f the EU member-states433.
Another area o f concern for the EU is that despite spending a lot o f resources to
promote the idea o f a strong, united and popularly supported EU, available statistics
indicate that the EU has not really succeeded (though the pre-2004 EU-candidate
countries showed a higher EU affinity than the 15 EU member-states as figures 2 and 3
below show) in forging a strong European identity. As a result, the EU has oftentimes
been criticized by its critics for being an overblown bureaucratic, nay technocratic,
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institution that is far removed from the needs o f the European people. To the critics, the
EU ’s extensive institutions, especially the non-elected ones, serve no real purpose in the
task o f building a strong and united Europe and are therefore a clear manifestation o f the
democratic deficit within this regional integration arrangement434. What is more, the
recent sharp divisions among the EU countries on whether to join or not to join, the USled invasion o f Iraq is a clear indication that European cohesion, especially in matters that
require the adoption o f a common foreign policy, is far from near cohesive.

Figure c: European Identity in the pre-2004 Candidate States
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Source: Adapted from the Euro barometer (Thumbs-Up means “proud to be European” and vice
versa).
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Figure d: European Identity in the EU+15 member states
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versa).

Finally, at the international level, the EU has often been accused o f trying to use
its immense socio-economic and political power to protect its base through such unfair
trade practices like the Common Agricultural Policy435. Additionally, the EU has been
portrayed as an economic giant out to bully and manipulate other weaker nations and or
regional integration arrangements to do its bidding, especially within the context o f
multilateral organizations such as the World Trade Organization436.

(iii) a. NAFTA: Founding Objectives
NAFTA is a comprehensive trade agreement between the US, Canada and Mexico.
The agreement establishing NAFTA was signed on 17th December 1992 and came into
force on 1st January 1994437. The 1994 NAFTA agreement broadened and superseded the
1989 Free Trade Area agreement between the US and Canada 438. Prior to the
establishment o f NAFTA, the US was strongly committed to the promotion o f a global
GATT-driven multi-lateral trading system439. However, a number o f reasons have been
advanced to explain why the US has increasingly abandoned its commitment to the post
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World W ar II multi-lateral trading system (a system in which it was the principal architect)
especially since the mid 1980s. Here, I identify two.
First, it has been argued that the slow, long and time-consuming multilateral 1986
Uruguay GATT round o f negotiations made the US increasingly impatient since its desire
to revamp a sluggish economy via international trade was not being realized as fast as it
would have wished440. Eager to recover from the global recession o f the 1980s and
impatient with the pace at which the rest o f the World, especially the major economies o f
the world, was opening up to market neo-liberalism, the US opted to start trade
negotiations with its immediate neighbours (in this case, Canada and Mexico)441. These
negotiations were seen as part o f the U S’ bid to spur its sluggish economy through the use
o f its hegemon status to increase international trade with its natural trading partners (in
this case its regional neighbours)442. Hence, in pursuit o f this goal, the US and Canada
established a Free Trade Area in October 1987. Later, this trade area was transformed into
the North America Free Trade Agreement in 1989 when Mexico joined the US and
Canada to pursue a regional economic agenda443. Therefore, while the US had been
committed to the multi-lateral trading system for the better part o f the Cold W ar era, by
the beginning o f the 1980s, it became clear that this system was not responding
favourably to its international trade expectations444.
A second view holds that the US abandoned its commitment to the multi-lateral
trading system when it became clear that it could no longer hold its lead as the economic
super-power in the World445. Given the increased levels o f competition from Japan and
the European Union in the mid 1980s and the rising economic threat from China and
India, especially since the early 1990s, the US had no option but to adopt a regional
strategy so as to stave o ff the threats posed by these emerging economies to its traditional
global economic dominance446. Hence, according to some analysts, the establishment o f
NAFTA was a case o f the US ‘circling the wagons’ and retreating into a secure and less
threatening regional sphere in order to consolidate whatever gains accrued from such an
arrangement. Additionally, the formation o f NAFTA was seen as a new strategy through
which the US could re-invent, if not re-energize, its waning global economic position447.
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Whichever o f the two positions outlined above one decides to adopt as the main
impetus for the U S’ new found affinity for regionalism, it is important to note that in this
era o f globalization, the US, just like other nation-states in the world—both strong and
weak—has opted to adopt regionalism as one o f the means through which to confront the
many challenges that a globalizing world has thrown at the hitherto existing Cold War
international political system. The US, Mexico and Canada have established NAFTA as
the institution through which to respond to the challenges o f globalization both within the
North American region and at the global level. So what objectives has NAFTA set for
itself in order to make North America a competitive regional integration arrangement
capable o f securing the socio-economic and political needs o f the peoples o f this region in
the globalizing post Cold War era? The following are NAFTA’s objectives as spelt out in
Article 204 o f the NAFTA Treaty448:

(a) Eliminate barriers to trade in and facilitate cross-border movement o f goods and
services between the territories o f the parties.

(b) Promote Conditions o f fair competition in the Free Trade Area
(c) Increase substantially investment opportunities in the territories o f the parties
(d) Provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement o f intellectual property
rights in each party’s territory

(e) Create effective procedures for the implementation and application o f the
agreement for the joint administration and for the resolution o f disputes
(f) Establish a framework for further tri-lateral, regional and multi-lateral cooperation
to expand and enhance the benefits o f the agreement
In order to accomplish the above objectives, NAFTA has established a number o f
institutional structures. Let us next examine these institutions.

(iii) b. NAFTA: Institutional Structures and Operations
■ The NAFTA Free Trade Commission (the FTC)
This is the body charged with fulfilling NAFTA’s objectives. The NAFTA Free
Trade Commission is composed o f Cabinet-level representatives and is required to meet
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at least once a year in locations rotating among the three member states449. The FTC
supervises the implementation o f the agreement and resolves any disputes that may arise
on its interpretation and application.

■ The NAFTA Secretariat
The NAFTA Secretariat is composed o f three national sections: the Canadian, the
Mexican and the United States o f America section450. It has three main functions. First, it
supports the FTC and any o f the working group(s) or committee(s) that the FTC may
establish. Second, the Secretariat acts as the administrative assistant for NAFTA’s dispute
settlement panels and other related committees. Third and finally, the Secretariat acts— in
a limited capacity though— as a depository for any investment related disputes.

■ Dispute Settlement Panels
The dispute settlement panels provide a mechanism through which the disputes
that have not been resolved by the NAFTA member states at the FTC level could be
resolved451.

■ The Committee on Standard-Related Measures (the CSRM)
This is a committee o f the Free Trade Commission. The CSRM ’s mandate is to
monitor the implementation and administration o f NAFTA’s environmental objectives452.
This committee reports annually to the FTC and operates under five sub-committees
namely:

(i)

The Land Transportation Standards Sub-committee ( the LTSS): The task o f
this committee is to standardize the member-states land transport related
measures on bus, truck, rail operations and the transportation o f dangerous
goods

(«)

The Telecommunications standards sub-committee

(iii)

The Labelling o f Textile and Apparel Goods sub-committee

(iv)

The Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS): This
committee facilitates technical cooperation for the enhancement o f food safety
and holds consultations on sanitary and phytosanitary measures among the
NAFTA member states. Additionally, this committee deals with the following
two issues: The promotion o f harmonization o f standards and consistency in
the application o f appropriate levels o f protection for human health and
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environmental standards among NAFTA states; and the issue o f trade irritants:
the SPS attempts to mitigate on trade dispute issues before they reach the
panel.

(v)

The Commission for Environmental Cooperation (the CEC): The North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (the NAAEC, or simply
the CEC) addresses environmental concerns among the NAFTA member
states.

The CEC is composed o f the following three-fold structure: A

Ministerial-level Council, a Secretariat for technical, administrative and
operational support and a 15-Member multi-stake holder Joint Public
Advisory Committee (JPAC).
NAFTA has been in existence for a decade now. How has it performed in terms o f
achieving its objectives and what role has it played in meeting the socio-economic and
political needs o f this region? The next section addresses this question.

(iii) c. NAFTA and North America’s Socio-Economic and Political Development
Unlike the EU which adopts a central, continent-wide institution-driven approach
towards meeting the socio-economic and political development needs o f its memberstates, NAFTA tends to focus more on the economic dimension o f regional integration
while leaving other social and political development concerns to individual member states.
Therefore, while jointly computed NAFTA data on development indicators such as life
expectancy, access to health and education may not be readily available, data computed
on these indicators from the statistics o f individual member states held by the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) indicates that the NAFTA member-states
(with the exception o f Mexico) enjoy one o f the highest standards o f living in the world453.
However, these high standards o f living do not necessarily form the basis for
drawing a simple causal relationship between NAFTA and social development in North
America. This is mainly because NAFTA member states have pursued different and
autonomous social development agendas and the gains made in, for example, raising the
life expectancy, maintaining high levels o f access to education and health in this region
are a reflection o f national policy options and not concerted regional efforts. Having made
the foregoing claim however, it is equally important to note that ten years o f NAFTA’s
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existence in North America have not led to a drastic decline in the social development
standards o f this region. Therefore, while one cannot directly attribute North America’s
high standards o f living to NAFTA, one cannot claim that the existence o f NAFTA has
led a dramatic decline in North America’s standards o f living. It is within this context that
I make the following argument: since a significant portion o f the US, Canadian and
Mexican economic activities are now conducted under NAFTA (see table 1 below),
overall, it is logical to postulate that NAFTA has positively contributed to the socio
economic (and by extension to the political) well-being o f this region454. I will shortly
elaborate on this assertion.
As already mentioned above, economic integration remains NAFTA’s main point
o f focus. However, even within this economic dimension, unlike the EU that has opted
for deep economic integration, NAFTA has opted for shallow economic integration
among the member states, choosing to operate under a free trade area and showing no
immediate plans to expand beyond the free trade area regime. In fact, Jordan Strasburger
succinctly captures N AFTA’s economic dimension as follows:
...the objectives o f the agreement as envisioned by its progenitors did not include
creating a “Common Market”. A “Common Market” involves questions of
political and economic national sovereignty by actually consolidating governing
bodies, policies, and procedures under a single unified system. The countries party
to NAFTA never intended to give up any portion o f their independent sovereignty
regarding trade policies and procedures. NAFTA was simply designed to (1)
reduce or completely eliminate economic barriers and promote economic
integration among the United States, Mexico and Canada; (2) promote the
development o f key legal frameworks needed to improve security for investments
and thereby enhance investment; and (3) facilitate the free flow o f goods and
services by increasing the importance o f trade and identifying trade opportunities
for members o f the three countries455.
So, within this decidedly economically-oriented framework, how has NAFTA faired in so
far as promoting development in North America is concerned? While the literature on
NAFTA’s economic achievements is mixed, existing statistical evidence indicates that
intra-NAFTA trade has intensified over the years456. Canada, the US and Mexico have
become significant trading partners and as can be from table 1 below, intra-NAFTA
export trade (at 56%) is higher than extra-NAFTA export trade with the EU ( at 14.6 %),
Asia ( at 17.4 %) and the Rest o f the World ( at 12.0%). In terms o f imports (see table 1
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below), NAFTA member states have equally become more dependent on each other with
intra-NAFTA imports being 38.1 % while extra-NAFTA import trade stands at 17.6%
with the EU, 31.5% with Asia and 12.8% with the rest o f the world.

Table 1
NAFTA’s International Trade Outlook in 2001 (Shares of Exports and Imports in
Percentage Form)

Exporter
NAFTA
EU
ASIA

Destination
NAFTA
56.0
10.9
26.3

Destination
EU
14.6
61.0
14.7

Destination
ASIA
17.4
7.2
48.1

Destination
ROW
12.0
20.9
10.9

Importer
NAFTA
EU
ASIA

NAFTA
38.1
8.1
13.7

EU
17.6
58.9
12.1

ASIA
31.5
12.0
56.3

ROW
12.8
21.0
18.0

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, in NAFTA 2004 Report, p. 8.

Similarly, over the last ten years, trade among the NAFTA member states has
grown tremendously. For example, since the implementation o f NAFTA in 1994, total
merchandise trade between the US and Canada has grown by over 120% and close to
140% in goods and services457. Currently, trade between the US and Canada stands at US
$ 1.08 billion a day458. On the other hand, trade between the US and Mexico has grown at
an annual rate o f 11% jumping from US $ 81.5 billion in 1993 to US $ 235.5 billion in
2000459. Trade between the US and Mexico now stands at US $638 billion460.
At the political level, though NAFTA does not have established institutions to
pursue its political agenda, it has none the less managed to make some political mileage
within the synergies created under its economic integration framework461. Apart from
capitalizing on the economic integration synergies to develop a common political agenda,
the September 11 terrorist attack on the US provided another important reason for
political cooperation among the NAFTA member states. The post September 11
cooperation is forged within the context o f bilateral relations between the US and Canada
and the US and Mexico and is based on the principle o f “Secure But Open Borders”462.
As a result o f this cooperation, the US and Canada are currently working on the “Smart
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Borders Accord” while the US and Mexico are pursuing the “Border Partnership Action
Plan”463.
NAFTA’s socio-economic and political development record in the North
American region is however not without challenge. Since its inception in 1994, NAFTA
has generated a lot o f debate in so far as its efficacy as the appropriate institution for
North America socio-economic and political development is concerned.

Some o f the

main limitations that NAFTA suffers include:

(i) A Weak Institutional Architecture
Although the literature is mixed on the need for deepening NAFTA’s institutional
architecture, some critics argue that NAFTA’s institutions are either under-developed or
insufficient and therefore incapable o f effectively meeting the socio-economic and
political demands o f North America, especially in this era o f globalization464. For
example, these critics point out that though the Secretariat is supposed to be NAFTA’s
backbone, it is weak and ineffective due to the fact that each NAFTA member state runs
an independent Secretariat. As a result, NAFTA has been characterized by the
following465:
•

Skewed terms o f trade in selected areas

•

Differential subsidization, especially in agriculture, among member-states

•

Lack o f sufficient country data, and therefore, lack o f detailed NAFTA data
analysis

•

Lack o f up to date market structure evolution

•

Increasing incidents o f trade disputes

(ii) Business Sovereignty over People Sovereignty
One o f the biggest criticisms o f NAFTA has been its overwhelming focus on
economics and its apparent neglect o f other socio-political concerns in the region466. For
example, critics argue that while the economic benefits o f NAFTA has been impressively
huge, they have only benefited big-business to the detriment o f small-businesses and the
North American labour market (especially the Canadian and American labour markets)
has suffered inordinately as a result o f NAFTA. Critics further contend that NAFTA has
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led to the loss o f jobs from the high cost Canadian and US labour markets to the low cost
Mexican labour market467. What is more, since NAFTA does not have a social safety net
mechanism for those who are affected by the negative consequences arising out o f its
regional economic agenda, this burden has been shifted to individual member-states
where it has not been adequately addressed468. Therefore, while NAFTA has made
business sovereign, and in fact made it easier for businesses to relocate their capital
within the region, it has taken away peoples’ sovereignty in this region in the sense that
its limited institutional infrastructure has denied them a chance to actively shape its policy
directions, especially those that have a direct impact on their socio-economic and political
well-being.

(iii) NAFTA and the US: A Selfish Hegemon at Work
Given its huge economic and political might within NAFTA, the US has at times
been portrayed as a selfish hegemon out to compel Canada and Mexico to do its socio
economic and political bidding. For example, critics accuse the US o f giving concessions
mostly on those trade issues that only advance its economic interests most and not those
o f the other member-states469. Additionally, the US has tended to promote a hub versus
spoke kind o f regionalism in North America where, although it is under a tri-partite
agreement with Canada and Mexico under NAFTA, it seems to prefer a bilateral, as
opposed to a regional approach while dealing with the two member states470.
Therefore, while NAFTA has certainly made impressive gains on the economic
front, the interpretation o f the benefits o f these gains is mixed, with some arguing that the
gains have been good for North America in general while others contending that these
gains have only benefited North America’s big business conglomerates, especially those
in the US471. Hence, if NAFTA intends to play a more proactive role in promoting socio
economic and political development in North America, it must come up with mechanisms
to limit its current shortcomings at both the socio-economic and political levels. Some o f
these mechanisms include establishing a central Secretariat and creating an institutional
base that is capable o f actively involving the citizens o f this region in NAFTA’s
integration activities.
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(iv) a. MERCOSUR: Founding Objectives
The Latin American region was once ruled only under two metropoli located in
the Iberian Peninsula472. Over time, and owing to a number o f internal and external
political forces, Latin America was divided into the 19 states that currently make up the
region473. However, although the fragmentation o f Latin America seems to have gone on
unabated, it is important to note that the political leaders o f this region have always
sought to stem the region’s fragmentation by taking measures aimed at restoring its
original unity. Simon Bolivar made the first attempts at restoring Latin American unity
when he called two Pan-American Congresses (the first one in 1819 and the second one
in 1826) to discuss the issue o f the restoration o f Latin American unity474. These
Congresses failed to reverse Latin American’s fragmentation.
However, the failures o f these two congresses to bring about unity in the early and
mid nineteenth century did not extinguish the desire for unity in Latin America. On the
contrary, this desire was rekindled again in the 1960s, but unlike the earlier attempts that
had sought continent-wide unity, the 20th century Latin American unity initiatives opted
for a regional integration approach as a means through which to attain continent-wide
unity475.

Some o f the key regional integration arrangements that were established

towards attaining this goal include476: the Central American Common Market (the CACM)
established in 1960; the Andean Pact and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) both
established in 1969 and the Common Market o f the Southern Cone ( MERCOSUR—the
focus o f this section) established in 1991477. The following are MERCOSUR’s memberstates: Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. While the socio-economic and political
gains o f the CACM, the Andean Pact and the CARICOM have generally been lacklustre,
MERCOSUR stands out for having made the most impressive gains in this region.
However, as will be shown shortly, while MERCOSUR has set for itself concise
and fairly attainable objectives and despite making some fairly impressive gains, it still
has a number o f socio-economic and political obstacles that it must overcome in order to
consolidate its gains and thus continue playing an important role as the vehicle for
development in Latin America. But before making an assessment o f MERCOSUR’s gains
and challenges, we need to start by looking at its objectives. The following are
MERCOSUR’s objectives as set out in the 1991 Treaty o f Asuncion478:
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(a) Promote the free movement o f goods, services and factors o f production between
the members states through, inter alia, the elimination o f customs duties and the
non-tariff restrictions on the movement o f goods and any other equivalent
measures.

(b) Establish a Common External Tariff (CET) and adopt a common trade policy in
relation to third states or groups o f states and coordinate positions in regional and
international economic and commercial forums.

(c) Coordinate macro-economic and sectoral policies between the member states in
the areas o f foreign trade, agriculture, industry, fiscal and monetary matters,
foreign exchange and capital, services, customs, transport and communications
and any other areas that may be agreed upon in order to ensure proper competition
between the member states.

(d) Secure the commitment from member states to harmonize their legislation in the
relevant areas in order to strengthen the integration process
MERCOSUR has established an institutional infrastructure to achieve the above set
objectives. The next section offers a brief discussion o f M ERCOSUR’s institutional
structures and operations.

(iv) b. MERCOSUR: Institutional Structures and Operations

■ The Council of the Common Market (the CCM)
This is the highest policy-making organ o f MERCOSUR479. It is charged with the
responsibility o f providing political leadership for the integration process and for making
decisions to ensure the achievement o f the objectives defined in the 1991 Treaty o f
Asuncion. The CCM is made up o f Ministers’ for Foreign Affairs and Ministers’ o f the
Economy o f member states or their equivalents.
The Presidency o f the CCM rotates among the member-states in alphabetical order for
periods o f six months. The CCM meets whenever deemed appropriate but at least once
every six months, and the meetings are normally graced with the participation o f the
Presidents o f member states. The meetings are co-ordinated by Ministers for Foreign
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Affairs and other Ministers or Ministerial authorities may be invited. The rulings o f the
CCM take the form o f Decisions and are binding upon member states.

■ The Common Market Group (the CMG)
This is the executive organ o f MERCOSUR480. It consists o f four members and
four alternates from each country appointed by their respective governments. The CMG
must include representatives o f ministries for Foreign Affairs, ministries o f the Economy
or their equivalents and the Central Banks o f the member-states. The CMG is co
ordinated by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs. It may call representatives o f the member
states governments or other MERCOSUR organs if and where these are needed to help
meet or further MERCOSUR’s objectives. The CMG holds extra-ordinary meetings as
often as necessary and in accordance with its terms and rules o f procedure. Its rulings take
the form o f Resolutions, which are binding upon member-states.

■ The MERCOSUR Trade Commission (the MTC)

Together with the Common Market Group, the MTC monitors the application o f
the common trade policy instruments agreed upon by the MERCOSUR member states481.
The MTC is made up o f four members and four alternates from the member-states and is
co-ordinated by MERCOSUR’s respective Ministries o f Foreign Affairs. It meets at least
once a month or whenever it is requested to meet by the Common Market Group or any
member-state.
The MTC is responsible for considering complaints referred to it by its National
Sections and originated by member-states or individuals, whether natural or legal persons,
relating to the situations provided for in Articles 1 to 25 o f the Brasilia Protocol, if and
when they fall within its sphere o f competence
The decisions o f the MTC take the form o f Directives or Proposals which are binding
upon the member-states.
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■ The Joint Parliamentary Commission ( the JPC)
The JPC represents the parliaments o f MERCOSUR member states, in accordance
with their internal procedures482. It consists o f equal members o f parliament representing
the member states. The members o f the JPC are appointed by the respective national
parliaments. The JPC ’s duties include: speeding up the internal procedures in member
states to ensure prompt entry into force o f decisions taken by MERCOSUR and working
to harmonize legislation in order to advance the integration process. The JPC makes
recommendations to the Council through the Common Market Group.

■ The Economic-Social Consultative Forum (the ESCF)
The ESCF represents economic and social sectors within M ERCOSUR483. It
consists o f equal numbers o f representatives from each member state. The ESCF plays a
consultative role on social and economic matters in MERCOSUR. Its views are expressed
in the form o f recommendations to the Common Market Group.

■ The MERCOSUR Administrative Secretariat
The Administrative Secretariat is based in the City o f M ontevideo484. It is
responsible for providing services to the other MERCOSUR organs and among other
things, does the following: serves as the official archive for MERCOSUR documentation;
publishes and circulates decisions adopted within the framework o f MERCOSUR;
organizes the logistical functions o f the meetings o f all the MERCOSUR organs; informs
member-states about measures being taken by individual members states to incorporate
MERCOSUR’s decisions into their legal systems and finally, draws up MERCOSUR
budget and ensures its proper implementation. A Director who is a national o f one o f the
member-states heads the Secretariat. The Director is chosen by the Common Market
Group on a rotating basis and holds office for a term o f two years and may not be re
elected at the end o f term.

(iv) c. MERCOSUR and Latin America’s Socio-Economic and Political Development
As already noted above, compared to other regional integration arrangements in
Latin America and indeed those in Asia and Africa, MERCOSUR has made impressive
88

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

gains, which have in turn meant higher socio-economic and political returns for its
Aar

member states

. However, unlike the EU, MERCOSUR does not have an elaborate,

region-wide institutional mechanism to distribute both the burdens and benefits o f
integration. Nonetheless, this regional integration arrangement has continued to see
increased socio-economic and political benefits to its member-states486. At the socio
economic level, intra-MERCOSUR trade has continued to improve as the member-states
turn more and more to each for trade. For example, as can be seen from graph 1 below, in
1990 and only one year before its formal establishment, intra-country trade among the
states that would later make up MERCOSUR stood at only 9%. However, after eight
years o f existence, intra-MERCOSUR trade rose from 9% in 1990 to an impressive 25%
AQH

in 1998

(see graph 2 below). Also, with the exception o f the automotive sector, the

MERCOSUR member countries have eliminated quantitative trade barriers and are
currently in the process o f eliminating non-tariff barriers

400

. Similarly, under

MERCOSUR’s social dimension, this regional integration arrangement has broadened its
internal agenda to cover such areas as education, labour, culture, environment, justice and
consumer protection489. Recently, at a meeting held in Asuncion in June 18-19th2005,
MERCOSUR approved an accord on defending human rights and launched a US $ 100
million regional cooperation fund to help fight poverty490.

Graph 1: MERCOSUR’s Destination of Exports (1990)
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Source: Adapted from Echandi (2001): p 384.
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Graph 2: MERCOSUR’s Destination of Exports (1998)
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Source: Adapted from Echandi (2001): p 384.

At the political level, in 1998, MERCOSUR adopted a democratic clause as part
o f the region’s treaty acqu is491. Under MERCOSUR, nation-states that were once
hallmarks o f repressive military dictatorships are slowly parting with this unenviable
political culture and embracing a democratic culture, which without a doubt has created
an environment within which sustainable development can occur492. MERCOSUR has
been fairly successful in shunning a return to military dictatorships in Latin America. For
example, in 1996, MERCOSUR’s commitment to a democratic political culture saw other
member states engage in concerted diplomatic action that prevented Paraguay from
slipping back into military authoritarianism493.
What is more, MERCOSUR has given the member-states the necessary political
clout that has led to increased visibility in international multilateral institutions like the
WTO as well as increased bargaining power among other well-established regional
integration arrangements like the EU and NAFTA494. Generally speaking, MERCOSUR’s
success at both the socio-economic and political levels can be attributed to the fact that
this regional integration initiative has elected to focus on a concise and achievable

regional agenda as opposed to pursuing grand and unattainable, but lofty objectives, a
mistake that led to the downfall o f earlier regional integration arrangements in Latin
America and as we shall find out in this thesis, one that still continues to impede
successful regionalism in Africa.

But despite its many socio-economic and political
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achievements, MERCOSUR’s is still confronted by a number o f limitations in so far as
pursuing its socio-economic and political mandate is concerned. Here, I identify and
briefly examine three such limitations.
First, at the socio-economic level, although the 1991 Treaty o f Asuncion states
that economic integration should include services and factors o f production, it makes no
operational provisions on how this is supposed to be attained495. Hence, as Malamud
notes, measures to promote the free circulation o f services, capital and workers have
either been scarce or ineffective496. Also, although MERCOSUR claims that it has a
social dimension to its integration agenda, so far, the Consultative Social and Economic
Forum lacks real power and is barely accessible to the citizens497. What is more, in terms
o f striking regional economic deals, unions and businesses prefer to lobby top ranking
officials at home on matters that are o f interest to them and not lower-ranking envoys in
Montevideo498.
Second, even though MERCOSUR has seen tremendous increases in intra
member trade, this has not been accompanied by preferential treatment o f the citizens o f
the member-states. As a result, the concept o f intra-regional citizen remains weak499.
Therefore, although free movement o f people is part o f MERCOSUR’s objectives, so far,
this objective remains but an idea. Consequently, the MERCOSUR flag remains a less
meaningful insignia that is largely limited to the diplomatic arena o f the member states.
Third and finally, at the political level, since all decision-making, disputesettlement and implementation capacities are in the hands o f member countries,
MERCOSUR still remains heavy on diplomatic operations and light on juridical
procedures. Therefore, even in those areas with agreed upon regional rules, there is a
discordance o f implementation due to dissimilar national implementation capacities500.
Additionally, MERCOSUR has not made much progress at the political level, especially
when it comes to the issue o f enlargement. Hence, although a number o f Latin American
countries have expressed their intention to join; this is not happening, particularly given
the fact that MERCOSUR lacks clear application procedures501.
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Therefore, while MERCOSUR has so far made some good progress in
contributing to the promotion o f socio-economic and political development among its
member states, it must strive to overcome the above-mentioned limitations so as to
enhance its capacity and so as to continue playing an important socio-economic and
political development role for its members in particular and the Latin American region in
general. For example, at the socio-economic level, the ESCF should be strengthened and
given a more mainstream role in shaping M ERCOSUR’s social policy agenda. At the
political level, MERCOSUR must develop a strategy for its expansion, including putting
in place a clear application procedure.

(v) a. ASEAN: Founding Objectives
Like most other post-World II and Cold War era regional integration
arrangements, the Association o f Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in
the 1960s. On 8 August 1967, five South East Asian countries, namely, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand met in Bangkok and out o f this meeting,
ASEAN was bom

. Brunei Darussalam joined on 8 January 1984, Vietnam on 28 July

1995, Laos and Myanmar on 23 July 1997, and Cambodia on 30 April 1999503.
Generally speaking, although ASEAN has been in operation for almost four
decades now, the member states o f this regional integration arrangement and other South
East Asian countries in general never really embraced regional integration as a strategy
for their development, especially at the socio-economic economic level504. As is the case
with most parts o f the third world, South East Asia’s 1960’s regionalism was more an
affirmation o f political autonomy (from the just vanquished colonial era) by South East
Asian nations that was based on political-autonomy affirming rhetoric and not a means
through which sustainable development in the region was to be attained505. Hence, despite
the public declarations o f leaders in this region about their commitment to regionalism,
none o f them gave regionalism serious attention as an avenue for development, especially
in the formative years o f independence.
However, as Choi notes, the development and apparent success o f regional
integration arrangements in other regions o f the world, especially in Europe (the EU) and
North America (NAFTA) have forced many countries in East and South East Asia to
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consider establishing more institutionalized regional integration frameworks 506 .
Additionally, the post Cold War era globalization forces and the Asian financial crisis o f
1997 have made the countries in this region more amenable to the idea o f regional
integration arrangements as a strategy for stable and sustainable socio-economic and
political development 507. It is within the context o f this renewed interest in regionalism in
East and South East Asia that I examine ASEAN and its role and or contribution towards
meeting South East Asia’s socio-economic and political development. I embark on this
task by first giving the following outline o f ASEAN’s objectives508:

(a) To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in
the region through the framework for elevating functional cooperation to a higher
plane

(b) To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the
rule o f law in the relationship among countries in the region and adherence to the
principles o f the United Nations Charter

(c) To promote political cooperation and regional security cooperation, through the
ASEAN Regional Forum, based on the principles o f self-confidence, self-reliance,
mutual respect, cooperation, and solidarity among the member states

(v) b. ASEAN: Institutional Structures and Operations
-

the ASEAN SUMMIT
This is the highest-decision making body in ASEAN509. It is made up o f the

Heads o f State and or Government o f the member states. The Summit holds its meetings
annually, and whenever decided, the Summit is preceded by a Joint Ministerial Meeting
o f the Foreign and Economic Ministers.

■ The ASEAN Standing Committee
This Committee is under the Chairmanship o f the Foreign M inister o f the countryin-chair and is mandated to coordinate the work o f the Association in between the annual
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (the AM M )510. The ASEAN Chair and Vice Chair are
elected based on alphabetical rotation o f all ASEAN Member Countries.
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The ASEAN Secretariat
The ASEAN Secretariat is headed by the Secretary-General51\ Its mandate is to
initiate, advise, coordinate, and implement ASEAN activities. The operational budget o f
the ASEAN Secretariat is prepared annually and funded through equal contribution o f all
ASEAN M ember Countries.

■ Committees in Third Countries
These Committees are composed o f Ambassadors o f all ASEAN Member
Countries based in the capitals o f the ASEAN Dialogue Partners and other
• ^ 1 9

countries

•

•

. ASEAN has 11 Dialogue Partners, namely Australia, Canada, China,

European Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, Republic o f Korea, the Russian Federation,
the United States and the United Nations Development Programme.

■ ASEAN’s Specialized Agencies
Apart from the above institutions, ASEAN is supported by several specialized
Agencies based in different ASEAN capitals513. Some o f these agencies are: ASEAN
University Network, ASEAN-EC Management Centre, ASEAN Centre for Energy,
ASEAN Agricultural Development Planning Centre, ASEAN Earthquake Information
Centre, ASEAN Poultry Research and Training Centre, ASEAN Regional Centre for
Biodiversity Conservation, ASEAN Rural Youth Development Centre, ASEAN
Specialized Meteorological Center, ASEAN Tourism Information Centre, and ASEAN
Timber Technology Centre.
From the foregoing, it can be seen that compared to NAFTA and MERCOSUR,
ASEAN has a fairly extensive institutional structure. But has ASEAN effectively
employed this extensive institutional infrastructure both to attain its objectives and to
enhance socio-economic and political development in South East Asia? Let us find out.

(v) c. ASEAN and South East Asia’s Socio-Economic and Political Development
At the socio-economic development level, ASEAN’s focus has been in the
following sectors514: trade, investment, industry, services, finance, agriculture, forestry,
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energy, transportation and communication, intellectual property, small and medium
enterprises, and tourism. Within these sectors, ASEAN has made some commendable
progress. For example, after establishing the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and
within three year o f AFTA operation, exports among ASEAN countries grew from
US$43.26 billion in 1993 to almost US$80 billion in 1996, an average yearly growth rate
o f 28.3 percent515. In the process, the share o f intra-regional trade from ASEAN’s total
trade rose from 20 percent to almost 25 percent over the same period516.
Additionally, as can be seen from figure 1 below and based on the 2004
provisional estimates, ASEAN has substantially cut down intra-regional tariffs and
therefore, virtually established a Free Trade Area in the region. Intra-regional tariff has
gone down by more than 90 percent to fall within the 0-5 percent tariff range for the
products in the Common External Preferential Trade Inclusion List (IL). In addition to
trade and investment liberalization, ASEAN has sought to promote economic
development through the development o f a regional transport, telecommunications and
energy infrastructure

ci

7

.

Figure 1: Percentage of Tariff Lines at 0-5percent in the
Tentative 2004 CEPT Package

ASEAIM-6 ___________ CLMV___________ Total ASEAN
■ Q-Spercent

■ >5percent

□ Other

At the transportation services level, the Trans-ASEAN Transportation Network,
consisting o f major inter-state highway and railway networks, principal ports and sea-
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lanes for maritime traffic, inland waterway transport, and major civil aviation links has
been established518. Through this network, ASEAN seeks both to improve and expand the
national and regional infrastructure. At the telecommunication services level, ASEAN is
promoting

both

the

interoperability

and

interconnectivity

of

the

national

telecommunications equipment and services519. Finally at the energy services level,
ASEAN is building Trans-national energy networks, which consist o f the ASEAN Power
Grid and the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline Projects520.
ASEAN’s development focus goes beyond economic growth concerns to embrace
other social development sectors like health and education

1

. For example, on health

matters, ASEAN member states have opted for a regional approach, especially on such
cross-border contagions like SARS and other regionally pandemic infections such as
HIV/AIDS 522 . Hence, during the SARS health crisis, ASEAN leaders decided to
undertake coordinated measures to contain the SARS outbreak that included

: the

exchanging o f information; the appointing o f a focal/contact point in every country;
carrying out joint SARS research and training programmes and standardizing pre
departure screening for international travelers.
On combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on
Health Development (SOMHD) is in the forefront fighting to make anti-retroviral drugs
accessible to HIV/AIDS patients in the region524. Based on the recommendations o f the
SOMHD meetings, ASEAN member-states have agreed to compile baseline data on the
extent o f unmet demands for Anti-Retroviral (ARV) drugs, patent laws, prices o f ARVs,
local capacity for production and administrative requirements for importing generics so
that joint action plan could be prepared on options to increase access through such
strategies as joint negotiation and bulk purchasing

. W hat is more, the SOMHD

continues to exchange views on the WTO Doha Declaration on the Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects o f Intellectual Property Right (TRIPS) and public health526. To this end,
the SOMHD has endorsed the project proposal on: “Intellectual Property Law Review
and Capacity Building on Intellectual Property Rights Related to Public Health in the
ASEAN Region”, which aims to address the issue o f access to drugs

.

On the education front, ASEAN has attempted to popularize itself among its
member states through the ASEAN Committee on Education (ASCOE)528. ASCOE held
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its first meeting in September 2002 in Cambodia with a re-focused mission to promote
ASEAN awareness in primary and secondary schools529. At the tertiary level o f
education,

the ASEAN University Network

(the AUN)

collaborative studies and research programs among its

continues to promote
17-member educational

institutions 530. The AUN has, among other things, conducted activities such as
developing an ASEAN Studies Programme; Student and Faculty Exchange Programme;
Scholarships for Graduate Students at ASEAN Countries; Information Networking
ST1
among ASEAN Universities; and Collaborative Research .
Under the AUN, the University o f Malaya launched a M aster’s Degree
Programme in ASEAN Studies in June 2003 and now offers MA degrees in this field

.

Similarly, the AUN has facilitated faculty exchange through the ASEAN Distinguished
Professors Program and continues to organize conferences, workshops and seminars for
scholars within the ASEAN member states to both exchange views and to develop
possible policy actions that will further help ASEAN achieve its objectives and meet its
socio-economic and political development demands533.
In so far as political development is concerned, ASEAN has relied more on the
diplomatic channels among the member states than a juridical regional structure to pursue
both its regional and international political agenda534. Through diplomatic channels,
ASEAN has made major strides in building cooperative ties with states in the AsiaPacific region

. What is more, ASEAN has intensified its cooperation with other East

Asian countries, especially with

its major FDI contributors (i.e. China, Japan, and the

Republic o f South Korea) through holding annual dialogues with the leaders o f these
countries536. ASEAN also continues to foster political cooperation with its other Dialogue
Partners who include Australia, Canada, the European Union, India, New Zealand, the
Russian Federation, the United States o f America, and the United Nations Development
Programme537. Additionally, ASEAN has continued to maintain high visibility in the
international political arena as most o f its member states participate actively in the
activities o f the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Asia-Europe Meeting
(ASEM), and the East Asia-Latin America Forum (EALAF) and the WTO negotiations538.
Like the other regional integration arrangements discussed above, ASEAN suffers
a number o f limitations that have impeded its full socio-economic and political
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development potential. I will examine these limitations within two main contexts. First, at
the socio-economic level, despite having a seemingly ambitious agenda, ASEAN has not
shown firm material commitment to the realization o f this agenda. Second, although
ASEAN seems to have made tremendous progress in liberalizing the economy and
attracting substantial levels o f FDI, it has not made similar strides in facilitating the free
movement o f people within the region and from its current institutional layout, such plans
C IA

do not seem to be a priority issue

. But why should the free movement o f people be a

priority issue for ASEAN? The free movement o f people in ASEAN should be a priority
because o f two main reasons. First, free movement o f people will make it easy for labour
to freely circulate within the region and second, having established a Free Trade Area,
such movement will make it possible for the gains and loses o f the FT A to be fairly
distributed in the ASEAN region. This will lessen the short-term pangs o f integration in
the areas most hit by regionalism, for example through job loss, as the affected people
will move to those areas that have either gained or not adversely suffered from integration.
Finally, at the political level, ASEAN is still a predominantly top-heavy institution
that accords little room for citizens democratic input into its day to day operations. What
is more, owing to its firm commitment to non-interference in the internal affairs o f the
member-states, ASEAN has not been very effective in promoting a democratic culture in
South-East Asia. On the contrary, some o f the ASEAN member states, like Myanmar,
carry the unenviable reputation o f being among some o f the most repressive political
regimes in the world540.
So far, I have presented a general overview o f the role o f regional integration
arrangements in the socio-economic and political development pursuits in North America,
Europe, Latin America and South East Asia. In my discussion, I have focused on the EU,
NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN and highlighted the roles that these regional bodies
have played in securing the socio-economic and political development needs within their
respective regions. While I take note o f the gains made by these regional integration
arrangements in so far as the attainment o f their development objectives is concerned, I
equally note their limitations and point out some o f the challenges they must seek to
overcome in order to continue playing key roles in meeting development needs within
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their respective regions. In the remaining section o f this thesis, I turn m y attention to the
role o f regionalism in meeting Africa’s socio-economic and political development needs.
I begin m y discussion by first providing a general overview o f regionalism in Africa.
Then second, I focus on COMESA and discuss its role in the socio-economic and
political development o f Eastern and Southern Africa.

Then in the final chapter o f this

thesis, I examine COMESA within a comparative context and analyze both its present
challenges and future prospects in promoting socio-economic and political development
in Southern and Eastern Africa.

(vi) a. Regionalism and Africa’s Development: an Overview
As is the case with the other post-colonial regions o f world (mainly Latin America
and South East Asia), the rise o f regional integration arrangements in Africa in the 1960s
was mainly in keeping with the spirit o f the national liberation movements that had, to
large extent, contributed to the demise o f the colonial era in the continent541. Hence, the
main driving force behind the original idea o f regionalism in Africa was the desire by the
newly independent African states to break away from the colonial era through creating
geographic entities that were both economically independent and politically united542. To
this end, three Pan-African Conferences (the first held in April 1957, the second held in
June 1960 and the third held in May 1963) were unequivocal in their advocacy o f freeing
Africa in an all round sense— i.e. socially, economically and politically543.
Two views emerged out o f these Pan-African conferences. On one hand, was the
view held by some African leaders, like Kwame Nkrumah, who argued that immediate
continental unity through a Pan-African approach that would install a “United States o f
Africa” was the only way o f securing a strong united front against other dominant
political actors in the international system544. On the other hand, other African leaders,
like Julius Nyerere, called for a gradual unification o f Africa through a regional
integration approach545. Eventually, the latter views prevailed. Therefore, at the launch of
the Organization o f African Unity (the OAU) at Addis Ababa in M ay 1963, African states
incorporated regionalism as the modus operandi for socio-economic and political
development and the avenue through which eventual continental unity could be
attained546.
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The experiment for the eventual, African-wide socio-economic and political unity
and development via regionalism was designed to take place at sub regional levels in
West Africa, Eastern and Southern Africa, Central Africa and North Africa.

Some o f the

regional integration arrangements formed to fulfill this vision for African unity via
regionalism include547: ECOWAS, ECCAS, PTA and SADCC and AMU. W ith these
regional integration arrangements, the newly independent African states hoped to embark
on the process o f regional socio-economic and political development that would
eventually lead to a continent-wide approach to African development

. However, like

other regional integration arrangements in other parts o f the world, A frica’s regionalism
had not brought about the expected socio-economic and political development gains by
the 1980s. W hy was this so?
A number o f factors have been advanced to explain why, after two decades o f
operation, regional integration arrangements in Africa had not made much progress in
attaining their set development objectives549. Here, I identify three. First, like other
regional integration arrangements in other regions o f the world, Africa’s pre-1980
regional integration arrangements were caught up in pursuing a political agenda and
insufficient attention was paid to the socio-economic dimension o f regionalism. Hence,
although one o f the founding principles o f regionalism had been the desire to secure full
political autonomy by breaking away from the grip o f the ex-colonial powers, the reality
was different from the rhetoric, especially given the fact that most member states in
Africa’s regional integration arrangements continued to exhibit patterns that reinforced
their strong links to their ex-colonial powers550. This was particularly the case in the
French speaking West and Central African states where France played a strong under
writing role for a number o f regional integration arrangements, key among them being
UDEAC and CEAO. The regional integration arrangements in French West Africa and
French Central Africa were seen as necessary counterweights to regional integration
initiatives like ECOWAS that were seen as being predominantly Anglophone oriented551.
Hence, regionalism was emerging as a source o f regional disunity and therefore acting
contrary to the anticipated eventual emergence o f African unity

.

Second, and still at the political level, divergent political ideologies among the
member-states o f the different regional integration arrangements proved anti-thetical to
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successful regionalism in Africa. For example, it has been argued that the ideological
difference between Kenya (under a capitalist ideology) and Tanzania (under a socialist
ideology) partly contributed to the break-up o f the East African Community in 197 7553.
What is more, the politics o f the Cold W ar era and the protection accorded to client states
(like Zaire— now the DRC— during the ruinous three-decade Mobutu regime and
Ethiopia under Mengistu) by the super-powers led to the emergence o f some o f the most
brutal dictatorships in Africa554. The leaders o f these super-power propped dictatorships
cared less about the socio-economic and political well being o f their citizens. Expecting
that such regimes would muster the necessary political will needed for successful
regionalism when they did not even care about promoting the socio-economic and
political well-being o f their individual states is, simply put, expecting too much.
Third, at the socio-economic level, most integrating member-states pursued
import- substitution industrialization strategies that were inimical to the growth o f
complementarities since they promoted competition both for the acquisition o f similar
capital input goods and for the export o f similar primary products to the same external
market niche 555. Furthermore, owing to their narrow resource base, most newly
independent African states heavily relied (and most still continue to rely on) on tariff
revenues as one o f the main components o f government revenue and since implementing
regional integration schemes required, among other things, tariff reduction, most states
found this a difficult policy to im plement556. What is more, owing to their highly
repressive character, most member states excluded their citizens from active involvement
in the respective regional integration arrangements and therefore limited both the spirit o f
individual initiative and enterprise that are important catalysts for the emergence o f strong
regional economies557.
So, by the beginning o f the 1980s, there was a need to re-evaluate and if possible,
re-engineer regional integration arrangements in Africa. This need was captured in the
Lagos Plan o f Action (the LPA) o f 1980558. The LPA laid out a new vision for
regionalism in Africa that was supposed to steer African regionalism from the pre-1980s
failures559. However, a combination o f poorly implemented internal development policies
and the Cold War era politics continued to militate against post 1980 African regionalism.
The end o f the Cold W ar era in the 1990s and the subsequent demands for socio-
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economic and political reforms in most African states led to the re-birth o f regionalism
under the Abuja Treaty o f 1991 that established a regional integration approach and
vision for the emergence o f the African Economic Community by 2025560. Given the
changed circumstances in the international political arena (key among them being the end
o f the Cold War) and the internal socio-economic and political reforms taking place in
Africa, it is my opinion that the Abuja Treaty stands a better chance o f making
regionalism a more meaningful strategy for Africa’s development. I focus on a
comparative analysis o f COMESA to examine the renewed possibilities for regionalism
as a development strategy. However, before embarking on this comparative analysis, I
first present a general overview o f COMESA (based on the same approach adopted for
the other regional integration bodies above) in terms o f its founding objectives, its
institutional structures and operations and its socio-economic and political development
achievements and limitations within the identified institutional structures and operations.
(vi) b. CO M ESA : Founding Objectives
W ith 20 member-states, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA) is one o f the largest regional integration arrangements in A frica561.
COMESA covers the Eastern and the Southern half o f the African continent, stretching
from Egypt to the north o f the continent to Zimbabwe to the South. COMESA was
founded in 1993 as a successor to the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern
Africa (PTA), which was established in 198 1562. It formally succeeded the PTA on 8
December 1994 upon ratification o f the COMESA Treaty by 11 signatory states563. The
establishment o f COMESA was a fulfilment o f the requirements o f the PTA Treaty,
which provided for the transformation o f the PTA into a common market ten years after
the entry into force o f the PTA Treaty564. The following are some o f the key objectives o f
COMESA as outlined in its founding treaty565:
(a) To attain sustainable growth o f the member states by promoting a
more balanced and harmonious development o f its production and
marketing structures;
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(b) To promote joint development in all fields o f economic activity and
the joint adoption o f macro-economic policies and programmes to
raise the standard o f living o f its peoples and to foster closer relations
among its members states;

(c) To cooperate in the creation o f an enabling environment for foreign,
cross-border and domestic investment and in the joint promotion o f
research and adaptation o f science and technology for development;

(d) To cooperate in the promotion o f peace, security, and stability among
the member states in order to enhance the economic development in
the region;

(e) To cooperate in strengthening the relations between the common
market and the rest o f the world and in the adoption o f common
positions in international fora; and

(f) To contribute towards the establishment, progress, and the realisation
o f the objectives o f the African Economic Community
COMESA has established an institutional structure within which it hopes to attain the
above set objectives. I briefly discuss this institutional structure and its operations next.

(vi) c. COMESA: Institutional Structures and Operations

■ The COMESA Authority (the Authority)
The Authority is the supreme policy organ o f COMESA, comprising o f Heads o f
State or Government o f member countries566. It is responsible for the general policy,
direction and control o f the performance o f the executive functions o f the COMESA and
the achievements o f its aims and objectives. The inaugural meeting o f the Authority took
place in Lilongwe, Malawi in December 1994. The Authority’s decisions are reached
through a general consensus, mostly during its annual summit meetings. The Head o f
State/Government o f the country that hosts the annual summit assumes the Chairmanship
o f Authority for the year. The most recent summit o f the Authority took place on 12-13

th
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June 2005 in Kigali, Rwanda. Therefore, the current Chairman o f the COMESA
Authority is Mr. Paul Kagame, the President o f Rwanda.

■ The Council of Ministers (the Council)
Each member state appoints a minister to participate in the Council o f Ministers

.

The Council monitors COMESA’s activities, including the supervision o f the Secretariat.
It makes COMESA’s policy recommendations and suggests the policy directions o f the
organization. The Council meets once a year. It reports to the Authority.

■ The Secretariat and the Secretary-General
The COMESA Secretariat is headed by a Secretary-General who is appointed by
the Authority to serve for a term o f five years and is eligible for reappointment for a
further term o f five years568. He/She is the Chief Executive Officer o f COMESA and its
representative in the exercise o f its legal personality. The Secretary-General is not
expected to seek or receive instructions from any Member State or from any other
authority external to COMESA in the performance o f his/her duties. Additionally, the
Secretary-General is required to refrain from any actions, which may adversely reflect on
his or her position as an international official. On their part, Member States are required
to respect the international character o f the responsibilities o f the Secretary-General and
the other staff at the Secretariat and are therefore expected not to unduly seek to influence
the Secretariat while it is discharging its responsibilities.
The duties o f the Secretary-General include, but are not limited to, the following:
submitting reports (in consultation with the Intergovernmental Committee) on the
activities o f COMESA to the Authority and Council; ensuring that the objectives set out
in the COMESA Treaty are attained and to this end, either on his/her or own initiative or
on the basis o f a complaint, investigate a presumed breach o f the provisions o f the
COMESA Treaty and report to the Council in accordance with an investigative procedure
to be determined by the Council;

presenting the budget o f COMESA to the

Intergovernmental Committee administering COMESA finances; and finally, promoting
the adoption o f joint positions by the Member States in multilateral negotiations with
third countries or international organisations.
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■ The Committee of Governors of Central Banks
This committee advises the Authority and the Council o f Ministers on monetary
and financial matters569. It is responsible for the development o f programmes and action
plans in the field o f finance and monetary co-operation and is made up o f Governors
General o f the Central Banks o f COMESA member states.

■ The Intergovernmental Committee
The committee consists o f Permanent or Principal Secretaries designated by each
member state and is responsible for the development o f programmes and action plans in
all fields o f co-operation except in the finance and monetary sector570.

■ Technical Committees
There are 12 technical committees, which are responsible for the preparation and
monitoring o f comprehensive implementation programmes and, also, responsible for
making recommendations to the

Intergovernmental Committee 571 . These

are:

Administrative and Budgetary Matters; Agriculture; Comprehensive Information Systems;
Energy; Finance and Monetary Affairs; Industry; Labour, Human Resources and Social
Affairs; Legal Affairs; Natural Resources, Environment, Tourism and Wildlife; Trade and
Customs and lastly, Transport and Communications.
Apart from the above noted institutions, COMESA has the following institutions,
which are also referred to either as the COMESA independent institutions or the
COMESA family o f institutions:

■ The COMESA Court of Justice
The court was established under the COMESA Treaty and became fully
operational in September 1998572. It is currently located in Lusaka, Zambia and is
composed o f seven judges, headed by a president o f the COMESA Court o f Justice. The
principal functions o f the Court include: examining and arbitrating in disputes relating to
arbitrary commercial practises that are contrary to the ratified protocols among COMESA
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member states; and interpreting the provisions o f the COMESA Treaty to ensure that
member states implement and respect its decisions. A host agreement was signed in
Khartoum on 26 January 2004 according to which the capital o f Sudan will be the
permanent seat o f the COMESA Court. This agreement followed a decision on the need
to have a permanent location for the Court at the 8th COMESA Summit held in Sudan on
March 2003. Currently, the Court is in the process o f relocating to Khartoum.

■ The Eastern and Southern Africa Trade and Development Bank (PTA Bank)
The Bank has a capital base o f US$500 million and its principal function is to
provide investment and trade financing to the business community in the COMESA
region573. By September 2002, the Bank had approved a total o f ten projects amounting to
US$29.5 million, including one equity investment in the Africa Trade Insurance Agency,
bringing the total cumulative portfolio to US$225.4 million. This compares favourably
with the Banks eight projects amounting to US$27.4 million for the same period in the
year 2001. The Bank's operational activities are spread out over most o f the COMESA
member States. Up to 30th September 2002, the Bank approved a total o f US$46.9 million
in trade finance facilities bringing the total cumulative trade finance activities to US$830
million, up from US$783 million as at 31st December 2001.
In order to further improve on its performance better, the Bank has designed and
commenced the implementation o f a number o f other initiatives aimed at enhancing its
operational capacity, the most important o f which are:
(i)

The Third Corporate Plan (FYCORP-III), covering the period
from 2003-2007. This plan seeks to promote large-scale
corporate investment within COMESA. Additionally, through
this plan, the Bank intends to transform itself into a world
class financial institution delivering quality services and
contributing significantly to the economic growth and
prosperity o f COMESA members.
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(ii)

The Bank's decision to adopt the US dollar as its sole
reporting

currency

in

order to

be

easily

understood

internationally.
(iii)

The Bank’s campaign to persuade those countries that are
members o f COMESA but have not joined the Bank to do so
expeditiously.

■ The PTA Reinsurance Company (the ZEP-RE)
The ZEP-RE was established in 1993574. Since then, it has been experiencing
steady growth and its current share capital stands at US$27 million. In 2002, the company
underwrote approximately US$14.5 million compared to US$11.75 million under-written
in 2001. By the end o f the year 2002, the ZEP-RE was operating in thirty-eight countries
both within and outside COMESA.

■ The Leather and Leather Products Institute (the LLPI)
The mission o f LLPI is to contribute to the strengthening o f the leather industry in
the COMESA region while working as a centre o f excellence in leather and leather
products through the following two approaches

cnc

: First, improving leather processing

and manufacturing technology by developing human resources to meet this role; and
second, addressing leather problems related to market capacity utilisation, input,
technology, pollution, and standardisation. The leather market in Africa has a good
potential to expand and develop, especially given the fact that Africa accounts for more
than 19.5 % o f the global livestock population, o f which the COMESA region accounts
for more than half. In 2002, the LLPI prepared eight projects for different countries and
with the assistance o f the COMESA Secretariat, secured funds to finance them.

■ The COMESA Clearing House (the Clearing House)
The Clearing House is intended to address regional trade impediments, key among
them being limited amounts o f convertible currency in the COMESA region576. Together
with the Secretariat, the Clearing House has established a cross-border payment and
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settlement system called the Regional Payments and Settlement System (REPSS). Under
this system, once the exporter has shipped goods, the funds transfer are made in the
importer’s local currency and converted into the exporter’s currency, at an agreed rate (by
the exporter’s central bank) for the credit o f the exporter’s commercial bank. This
transaction is normally done at least on a same-day basis, which drastically reduces crossborder transaction costs and hence makes regional producers more competitive.
Additionally, the Clearing House has set up a Trust Fund for ensuring timely completion
o f daily settlements in the event o f an inability o f some participants to settle. What is
more, since 2002, the REPSS has been using a multilateral netting system that converts
all payments in local currencies to a “Settlement Currency” (US dollars or Euro) based on
a fixed daily rate o f transfer between countries, with imbalances in the settlement
currency being realigned or settled on a daily basis.

■ The COMESA Bankers' Association (the Bankers’ Association)
The COMESA Bankers' Association acts as a forum for the exchange o f
information on banking practices in the region, and carries out activities meant to improve
them577. In the year 2001-2002, the Bankers’ Association conducted a total o f seven
seminars on issues such as bank fraud prevention, information technology, credit risk
assessment, credit risk management, marketing and money laundering.
As can be seen from the foregoing, COMESA has a fairly extensive institutional
structure and a brief glimpse o f its institutions reveals that most o f them seem to be
making some progress in fulfilling their mandates. But to what extent have COMESA’s
institutions and their operations translated into some tangible socio-economic and
political development gains for the Eastern and Southern African region? This question
informs the discussion in the next section.

(vi) d. COMESA and the Socio-Economic and Political Development of Eastern and
Southern Africa.
On the economic front, the main approach being taken by COMESA in its bid to
achieve the levels o f economic growth necessary to enhance economic development in
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Eastern and Southern Africa is market integration through the removal o f barriers to trade
and investment. Under this approach, COMESA intends to consolidate its economic base
and increase prospects for the member-states’ economic development through the
following five stages578:
i. The first stage is the Preferential Trade Area (PTA), during which
parties in the economic integration process offer each other
preferences relating to market access for the goods produced in
their territories.
ii. The second stage is the Free Trade Area (FTA), during which the
integrating parties' trade is conducted on a duty-free and quota-free
basis. Trade within a PTA or an FTA is dependent on agreed Rules
o f Origin.
iii. The third stage o f integration is the Customs Union (CU), during
which two or more customs territories come together to form a
single customs territory. Trade within the territory is conducted on
a duty-free and quota-free basis for all products obtained or
produced within the territory. The territory also imposes a
Common External Tariff (CET) on products imported from outside
its borders.
iv. The fourth stage is the Common Market, which can be summed up
as a Customs Union plus the free movement o f the factors o f
production, namely labour and capital. At this stage, the cardinal
issues include visas, work and residence permits, especially for
skilled

labour,

businesspersons

and

investors.

Normally,

a

Common Market simplifies these issues in that enhances the free
movement o f the factors o f production. For example, in a properly
functioning Common Market, the distinction between local
(national) and foreign businesspersons or investors o f the
constituent member states ceases to exist.
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v. The fifth and final stage is the Economic Union (EU), which
incorporates all the features o f the Common Market plus common
monetary and fiscal policies and the adoption o f a single currency
issued by a common monetary authority. During this stage,
economic policy in all areas is co-ordinated and any policy
disarticulation arising from any o f the member-states’ national
policy/policies is not permitted. Also, during this stage, a common
legislative body is established.
From the stages above, it is obvious that the “Common Market” component o f the
COMESA acronym is purely nominal and conceptually non-descriptive. Properly
conceptualized and properly defined, COMESA is at the Preferential and the Free Trade
Areas stage o f its five-stage economic development projection. Currently, and following
the latest Authority meeting in Kigali, Rwanda on June 2005, COMESA has embarked on
the process o f establishing a Customs Union579. So, the question here should be: What
economic development gains has COMESA made as a PTA/FTA? Let us find out.
Since its establishment in 1993, COMESA has made some impressive strides in
the promotion o f economic development in the region580. These gains can be analyzed
within two broad categories: the trade category and the infrastructure category. First at the
trade level, COMESA has continued to register increased trade volumes among its
member states. For example, the total value o f intra-COMESA trade rose from US$
26,131 million in 1996 to US$ 4.5 billion in 2002581. What is more, COMESA FTA has
adopted an outward-looking liberalisation strategy that has seen increased regional trade
liberalisation measures taken among the member states. As a result, COMESA’s intraFTA trade rose from US$ 2.1 billion in 2002 to US$ 2.6 billion in 2003, a growth rate o f
24%582. Over the same period, intra-COMESA trade rose from US$ 4.5 billion to US$
4.8 billion, an increase o f 7%583.
Second, at the infrastructure level, COMESA has taken concrete steps to reduce
infrastructural impediments to regional economic growth. Some o f the steps taken
include584: improving transport and communications in the COMESA region; establishing
strong institutions to mobilise financial resources in order to provide investor confidence
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in the region and strengthening business links in the region through trade promotion and
trade facilitation activities. In the transport and communications sector, COMESA has
taken the following measures aimed at reducing regional impediments to economic
development585:

(a) Surface Transport Facilitation
Transport facilitation is one area in which COMESA has made notable progress.
In road transport, the measures taken to improve this sector include the COMESA
Carriers Licence, the Harmonised Axle Load Limits and Road Transit Charges and the
Third Party Vehicle Insurance Scheme (or the Yellow Card Scheme) 586 . When
implemented together, these combined infrastructural changes have reduced transport
costs in the COMESA region by an estimated 25 percent

. In the case o f rail transport,

COMESA is working closely with railways in the region to improve efficiency. In this
regard COMESA has assisted the railways in the region adopt an information technologybased management system known as the Advance Cargo Information System (ACIS) that
coo

facilitates the tracking o f cargo

.

(b) Air Transport Facilitation
In accordance with COMESA's vision to attain higher levels o f economic
development in the region, air transport liberalisation has become one o f its top
priorities589. The main objective o f air transport liberalisation is to foster greater regional
co-operation through the provision o f better quality and competitively priced air transport
services. Already, COMESA countries implementing the air liberalisation programme
have experienced increased frequencies in commercial flights between member countries,
cheaper fares, entry o f new airlines and a wider choice o f routings with better
connections590. In addition to intra-regional air liberalisation, COMESA, in collaboration
with the East African Community (EAC), the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) has developed competition
regulations to ensure an orderly transition to open skies and the development o f a vibrant
civil aviation industry within the region591.
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(c) Information and Communications Technology
Recognising

that

a

reliable,

efficient

and

cost-effective

regional

telecommunications network will greatly facilitate economic integration in the region,
COMESA is currently promoting the establishment o f a regional telecommunications
network that is viewed as part o f the solution the telecommunications problems in the
region

. This regional telecommunications network will be built and managed by the

COMESA Telecommunications Company (COMTEL), which is a private limited
company launched by COMESA 593. A strategic partner will hold 30 percent o f
COMTEL’s equity, participating National Telecommunications Operators will own 25%
o f the equity while private sector investors will own the remaining 45%594. The estimated
total investment is US$300 million. The COMTEL project is on course and in March
2004, three companies submitted their bid to the COMTEL Interim Board Meeting595.
Work on the project is expected to resume soon596.
COMESA is also undertaking work in the e-readiness sub-sector aimed at
assisting its member states to put in place the infrastructure needed to promote electronic
commerce, and thus ensuring that they not only take advantage the e-commerce benefits,
but also ensure that they are not further disadvantaged by being left behind as the new
business technology moves forward elsewhere in the w orld597 . At the institutional
infrastructure level, COMESA has established specialised institutions that are dedicated
to supporting and facilitating regional economic development integration. Some o f these
include598:
>

The Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank (PTA Bank)
with a capital base o f US$500 million. The Bank provides investment and trade
financing to the private sector within COMESA and the East and Southern Africa
region.

> PTA Reinsurance Company (ZEP-RE), with a capital base o f US$27 million, and
doing business in twenty African States. The main goal o f ZEP-RE is to foster
economic growth and development in the region through trade in insurance and
reinsurance business
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>

The African Trade Insurance Agency (ATI) with a capacity to underwrite business
up to US$360 million. ATI is supported by the World Bank and the private sector,
including Lloyds o f London and Gating Namur o f Germany and is a unique
institution providing insurance cover for trade into and within the COMESA
region.

> Leather and Leather Products Institute (LLPI) is a technical institution that
focuses on leather processing and manufacturing.
> The Clearing House is developing a cross-border payment and settlement system
which will meet the needs o f traders, industrialists and investors in the newlyliberalised environment.
Finally, COMESA has sought to promote economic development in Eastern and
Southern Africa through both promoting and facilitating intra-regional trade and intraregional business contacts. COMESA’s trade and business promotions have already
created opportunities for cross-border investment, franchise and agency arrangements and
joint venture operations599. For example, Egyptian business persons have sought to work
with Malawian cotton growers and processors in a joint venture operation to access the
US market for textiles under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)600;
Mauritian manufacturers are operating in Madagascar in the textile sector and other
sectors as w ell601; While Zimbabwean farmers and agro-processors are investing in
Zambia in order to maximise their benefits under the COMESA FTA602. Such crossborder investment is, in turn, promoting the transfer o f technology and skills that
contribute directly to the economic development o f the region603.
At the social level, COMESA is committed to developing a joint strategy against
such regional health challenges, as the HIV/AID pandemic, that are a threat both to the
economic gains so far attained and to the vast economic potential that is yet to be
exploited in this region604. Hence, at the 2004 COMESA Authority meeting, the memberstates resolved to jointly lobby against pharmaceutical companies invoking Intellectual
Property Rights (IPR) regulations as a justification for denying the production o f the
urgently needed Anti-Retro-Viral generic drugs for millions o f HIV/AIDS patients within
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the COMESA region605.

Similarly, COMESA has spurred the growth and development

o f active regional civil society organizations such as SEATINI, MWENGO and CUTSARC, which are predominantly concerned with lobbying COMESA and other regional
(e.g. SADC) and multilateral (e.g. WTO) bodies to incorporate a socially and politically
inclusive dimension in their development agenda606.
Finally, at the political level, COMESA has acted on the synergies emanating
from the regular interaction o f its leaders to develop a broad and fairly successful regional
•

•

« •

(\(W

and international political agenda

•

.

.

.

. COMESA is fully aware o f the fact that civil strife,

political instabilities and cross-border disputes in the region have seriously affected the
ability o f some o f its member states to develop their individual economies as well as their
capacity to participate and take full advantage o f regional integration arrangement under
COMESA608. As a result, COMESA has taken a political approach to addressing the civil
strife between and within some o f its member states because without peace, security and
stability, satisfactory levels o f socio-economic and political development in the region
cannot be attained609. To this end, a meeting o f the Intergovernmental Committee held in
November 1999 in Lusaka, Zambia, explored ways to involve COMESA more directly in
efforts to secure peace in the sub-region and rebuild war-torn economies610.
A follow-up meeting held in March 2000 at the same venue ended years o f
COMESA’s ad hoc peace initiatives and laid the groundwork for a more institutionalized
approach to realizing the peace and security objective enshrined in the COMESA Treaty.
At this meeting, member states established a permanent, three-tier COMESA Peace and
Security Programme structure to address the widespread and persistent armed conflicts
between and within some member states611. This structure is composed o f Heads o f State
and/or Government; Ministers o f Foreign Affairs; and a Committee on Peace and
Security612.
What is more, unlike other past initiatives, the Peace and Security Programme is
unique in that it includes the private sector and civil society organisations who have been
given an advisory role613. The Ministers o f Foreign Affairs have so far held two meetings
on Peace and Security614. At the first meeting held in Lusaka from 27-28 April 2001, the
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Ministers agreed to step up efforts to control the proliferation o f small and light weapons,
step up the campaign against landmines and the stockpiling, use and or sale o f arms. At
the second meeting held in Addis Ababa on 22 M ay 2002, the Ministers o f Foreign
Affairs resolved to liaise with their respective governments to strengthen the role o f the
member-states Parliaments and Parliamentarians in the promotion o f a culture o f peace
and security in the region615.
The COMESA Secretariat is responsible for the implementation o f the COMESA
Peace and Security Programme, which falls under its Legal Affairs Department. As o f
March 2003, COMESA had carried or was in the process o f carrying out the following
peace and security activities616:
>

Capacity building for regional parliamentarians and senators in conflict prevention
and management skills: As at March 2003, COMESA had trained 70
parliamentarians drawn from the parliaments o f each member-state. Ultimately,
COMESA’s aim is to strengthen parliaments in the region as institutions o f
conflict management, armed with a pool o f trained conflict managers capable o f
addressing regional conflicts at the grassroots (read constituency) level;

> Developing criteria and rules o f procedure for the role o f the private sector and
civil society organisations in the programme on peace and security;
>

Seeking financial assistance from developed countries for the elimination o f
landmines and rehabilitation o f victims; and

> Adopting the Nairobi Declaration o f March 15th 2000 on the control o f illicit
proliferation o f small arms and light weapons as one o f the main means to control
a key root cause o f conflicts in the region617.
In collaboration with other regional integration arrangements, COMESA has made
some major breakthroughs in resolving political conflict in the Eastern and Southern
Africa region618. For example, in Sudan, the Sudanese Government signed a peace
agreement with the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army in 2004, bringing an end to a
two-decade civil war that had pitted northern Sudan against southern Sudan619. In Uganda,
the Ugandan Government and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) are, for the first time in
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18 years, talking directly with one another620. This is a positive step that is likely to lead
to a peaceful resolution between the Ugandan Government and the rebels and hence,
promote the much-needed peace in Uganda. In Burundi, several rebel groups signed a
peace agreement and are now working with the government to draw up a new constitution
for the country

. Finally, Somalia, that epitome o f Hobbesian politics, is slowly but

surely rebuilding its statehood again after years o f being a stateless political jungle622.
Internationally, COMESA has continued to build its profile through both bilateral and
multi-lateral cooperation initiatives with regional integration arrangements, multi-lateral
organizations and individual countries both within and outside the African continent.
The following are some o f the COMESA’s international cooperative activities623:

■ COMESA and the African Development Bank:

The Secretariat actively

participates in meetings convened by the African Development Bank to prepare
action plans for medium and long-term projects to be funded by the Bank.
Normally, the action plans cover the development o f physical infrastructure in
aviation, roads, railways, ports, telecommunications and energy.

■ COMESA and the Economic Commission of Africa: COMESA has continued
to receive technical support from the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)624
in, for example, identifying the investment opportunities for different COMESA
member States.

■ COMESA and NEPAD: Within the framework o f NEPAD and the African
Union, COMESA is developing closer and more cooperative links with other
regional organisations in Africa. For example, COMESA has good working
relationships with the East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC).
Additionally, COMESA has signed co-operation agreements with IGAD and the
Economic Community o f Western African States (ECOWAS) and will soon sign
an agreement with the IOC. At a meeting o f the COMESA Council o f Ministers
held in January 1997, it was agreed that COMESA and SADC should co-exist and
cooperate. Consequently, COMESA and SADC are in the process o f establishing
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a framework that will lead to complementarity and co-operation in their
activities625.

■ COMESA and the Commonwealth: COMESA receives technical and financial
assistance from the Commonwealth Secretariat and, through this assistance,
COMESA has undertaken a study on enhancing trade and production o f quality
pharmaceutical products in the COMESA region.

■ COMESA and the EU: The EU is COMESA's major donor and COMESA
continues to implement a number o f programmes with funding coming from the
European Development Fund, mainly in trade policy and trade facilitation areas.
Also, in 2003, the EU allocated Euro 223 million to COMESA and its sister
regional organisations o f EAC, IOC and IGAD to implement a 5 year regional
programme in three main focal sectors o f Economic Integration; Management o f
Natural Resources and Transport and Communication.

■ COMESA and USAID and other Agencies and Countries: COMESA
continues to work closely with the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) in a number o f areas, including in the implementation o f
the AGOA. In addition, COMESA maintains its associations with the Corporate
Council on Africa, the African Capacity Building Foundation, and the French and
British Governments.
Finally, one o f COMESA’s major challenges remains how to more effectively
integrate into the global economy on equitable terms. COMESA is actively working to
overcome this challenge by increasingly playing a strategic role in articulating its
negotiating positions on WTO issues that range from agriculture to TRIPS. For example,
COMESA member states, in collaboration with other developing countries and as part o f
the African group, played a significant role in ensuring that the Doha round o f
development issues was not trumped by the so-called Singapore issues at the 2003
Cancun WTO Ministerial meeting626. COMESA is also co-ordinating negotiations for the
Economic Partnership Agreements between the European Union, its largest co-operating
partner, and the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP States) at the regional level627. As
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can be seen from the foregoing, COMESA has made some gains in promoting socio
economic and political development in Eastern and Southern Africa and overall, seems to
be on the right trajectory in so far as making more socio-economic and political gains in
the future is concerned. However, despite making these gains, COMESA’s performance
at promoting development in Eastern and Southern Africa has been less than optimal due
to a number o f socio-economic and political reasons. I shall now briefly examine some o f
these reasons.
At the socio-economic level, COMESA is confronted by a myriad o f problems.
First, although intra-COMESA trade has grown since COMESA was established,
COMESA member-states still predominantly rely on external parties as their most
important trading partner(s) and not other COMESA member-states (see table 2 below).
This extroverted nature o f the COMESA economy has been mainly attributed to lack o f
complementarities among COMESA member-states, most o f whom are producers and
exporters o f similar primary products 628 . Second, COMESA has not acquired the
necessary economic growth to effectively tackle the social dimension o f development as,
for example spelt out in the Millennium Development Goals (the MDG)629. In order to
meet the Millennium Development Goals, COMESA needs an estimated growth rate o f at
least 7% per annum so as to generate sufficient capital formation and the levels o f
employment needed to make the MDG a reality630. This growth rate translates to a
minimum investment o f 25% o f the regions Gross Domestic Product (GDP)631.
However, the current domestic savings to GDP is about 11%, and the total
regional investment to GDP ratio is 18%, with Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
accounting for 7% o f GDP

. Therefore, COMESA needs to increase investment by at

least 7% if it must acquire the necessary economic wherewithal to implement the
Millennium Development Goals. Third, although COMESA is committed to increasing
the intra-regional flow o f the factors o f production (capital and labour), so far, the
achievements in this area remain lacklustre. In fact, on the issue o f free movement o f
people within the COMESA region, only three countries (out o f 20) have ratified the
protocol on the free movement o f people within COMESA633.
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Table 2: the Structure of trade among COMESA Member States

COUNTRY

Intra-COMESA Exports

Intra-COMESA Imports

(As % of Total Exports)

(As % of Total Imports)

1. Angola

0.04

1.78

2. Burundi

5.97

18.22

3. Djibouti

6.63

23.42

4. Egypt

1.11

0.89

5. Eritrea

11.77

1.32

6. Ethiopia

13.67

2.94

7. Kenya

43.77

1.78

8. Comoros

3.07

11.11

9. Madagascar

3.33

7.04

10. Maurituis

6.59

2.30

11. Malawi

10.38

15.35

12. Rwanda

79.16

19.23

13. Seychelles

0.63

3.46

14. Sudan

8.92

4.83

15. Swaziland

6.03

0.28

16. Uganda

11.30

21.85

17. Zambia

12.11

12.26

18. Zimbabwe

10.46

2.93

Source: COMESA Secretariat, 2002 Discussion Paper on “Economic Partnership Agreements”.

At the political level, COMESA has not done enough to ensure an active
involvement o f the citizens o f this region in popular development as spelt out in its
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objectives634. What is more, although it has made some gains (as can be deduced from the
role of some COMESA member states in Cancun) in bringing the economic issues o f the
region to international attention, the COMESA member-states are still politically invisible
internationally and or incapable o f effectively lobbying for COMESA’s agenda
internationally635. So what chance does COMESA stand in its endeavour to promote
development in Eastern and Southern Africa? While COMESA has made some gains and
suffered some obvious limitations, a comparative analysis o f COMESA versus other
regional integration arrangements in this thesis will help set out COMESA gains and
limitations in sharp relief and also help in formulating recommendations that are likely to
help make COMESA an effective tool for Eastern and Southern Africa’s development.
This is the main task in next chapter o f this thesis.
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—Chapter Five—
(i)

COMESA and Development in Eastern and Southern Africa: A Comparative
View

In this chapter, I discuss COMESA’s role in Eastern and Southern Africa’s development
by conducting a comparative analysis o f COMESA within the EU, NAFTA,
MERCOSUR and ASEAN contexts. While each o f these regional bodies is committed to
the task o f promoting socio-economic and political development in their respective
regions, all o f them have accomplished this task to varying degrees o f success. Here, I
adopt a comparative analysis in order to accomplish two main tasks: First, to determine
why some o f these regional integration arrangements have been more successful at the
task o f promoting development within their regions than others and subsequently point
out some o f the lessons that COMESA can learn, especially from the more successful
regional integration arrangements; and second, based on this analysis and other general
discussions in this thesis, to point out some internal and external challenges that
COMESA must overcome so as to play a more effective socio-economic and political
development role in Eastern and Southern Africa. But before embarking on these tasks, a
brief discussion on how a comparative analysis o f these regional integration arrangements
will contribute to accomplishment o f these two tasks is necessary.
A comparative analysis o f the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ASEAN and
COMESA is crucial in helping us establish a link between regionalism and development
based on the following four reasons636: First, a comparative analysis o f these regional
bodies is important since it helps in expanding the descriptive knowledge o f these
organizations in a manner that makes it possible to develop detailed information about
relatively unknown aspects o f their individual and systemic behaviour. From this
information, it is possible to determine which individual and systemic behaviours are
likely to promote regional developmentalism and which ones are not.

Second, a

comparative approach plays a leading role in helping both to identify and to explain the
fundamental trends and patterns o f political behaviour across the regional bodies under
comparison in this study. Useful theoretical generalizations, for example on such
questions as what aspects o f political behaviour are important for successful regionalism,
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are drawn from these trends and patterns o f political behaviour. Third, a comparative
study o f the regional integration arrangements identified in this thesis is necessary in that
it provides the background for making evaluative judgements on what is valid or good in
one or more regional integration arrangements and therefore worth replicating in others.
Fourth and finally, through accurate description, valid explanations and acceptable
evaluations o f the data provided, the outcome o f this comparative analysis forms the
foundation for making recommendations for successful regionalism in Eastern and
Southern Africa. For example, the outcome o f this comparative study leads me to call for
a reform to those aspects o f regional integrations arrangement— e.g. poor political
leadership in the COMESA region— that are a clear hindrance to developmental
regionalism in this region o f the world.
In this thesis, I conduct the comparative analysis o f the EU, NAFTA,
MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA at three levels: the descriptive level, the analytical
level and the conceptual level. First, at the descriptive level, though it is often difficult to
achieve accurate comparisons o f descriptive data, I have attempted to minimize this
problem by relying on data from credible and reliable sources such as the United Nations,
Transparency International, Freedom House and the Heritage Foundation. Similarly,
while I recognize that the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA are all
unique organizations faced with different challenges and opportunities, an analytical and
conceptual comparison o f these organizations (based on the information extracted from
the foregoing sources), reveals some interesting trends and patterns in so far as their
socio-economic and political configurations are concerned. As already noted above and
as will shortly be shown below, these trends and patterns are important in helping to
establish a link between regionalism and development and in providing the basis for
offering some general suggestions on how COMESA could become a more effective
vehicle for Eastern and Southern Africa’s development.
Second, at the analytical level, the comparison o f the regional integration
arrangements in this study is based on the assumption that for a regional integration
arrangement to be an effective paradigm o f development in its respective region, the
integrating countries must be committed to addressing the overall development needs o f
the people in their region at the social, economic and political levels

f\X l

. At the social level,
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successful, development-oriented regional integration arrangements continually seek to
broaden the social networks in their regions by, among other things, increasing their
capacity to address several development-enhancing factors such as promoting human
rights and showing a firm commitment to the provision o f health and education to peoples
in their region638. At the economic level, successful developmental regionalism normally
seeks to expand the productive capacity o f the integrating countries by, for example:
promoting good practices o f economic management through the elimination o f such vices
as corruption, boosting their economies o f scale through expanded economic activities
(key among them being increased volumes o f trade) and creating conducive environments
for the emergence o f complementarities639. Finally, at the political level, successful
regional integration arrangements are those that are committed to nurturing positive
political ethos such as the rule o f law, the promotion o f a democratic culture and the
establishment o f a stable political dispensation both within and among the integration
countries.
Third, at the conceptual level, I conduct the EU ’s, N AFTA’s, MERCOSUR’s,
ASEAN’s and COMESA’s comparison within the following benchmarks outlining some
o f the characteristics o f successful regional integration arrangements640:
> Proximity,

successful

regional

integration

arrangements

often

involve

geographically contiguous countries or countries within the same broad
geographic area.
> Level o f integration'. They often involve countries that exhibit high levels o f crossborder trade and investment, including intra-corporate transfers and inter
corporate alliances, before the negotiation o f the regional agreement. In effect, the
regional agreement is more likely to be the result of, rather than the precursor to,
closer economic relations.
> Similarity. Successful agreements are more likely to be found among countries
with similar levels o f economic development, legal structures, business cultures,
political institutions and cultural values.
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> Institutional maturity. Partners in such an agreement are likely to boast political
and economic institutions that have developed over time and are capable o f
adjusting to the demands o f a regional agreement.
> Stake: Partners in such an agreement are likely to have a high or similar stake in
the success o f the agreement and would face problems in the absence o f an
agreement.
>

Commitment: Successful agreements involve a significant commitment by the

parties to open, rules-based relationships.
> P ow er relationship: Disparities o f power—political and socio-economic— among
parties to the agreement are such that it is possible to provide for full reciprocity
and equality o f obligations, both de jure and de facto.
> Economic impacts: On the whole, successful agreements are more likely to be
trade creating than trade diverting. While there may be some trade diversion in the
early stages, the mature agreement leads to net growth in economic activity and
prosperity for the members rather than the redistribution o f trade and investment
patterns.
> Dynamism: Successful agreements grow and expand as the extent o f integration
among the parties deepens.
It should be noted that the above characteristics are only a general, if not ideal, guideline
and that none o f the regional integration arrangements identified in this study possesses
all o f these characteristics. However, having said this, it is important to note that those
regional integration arrangements, which possess a greater degree o f these characteristics,
tend to be more successful than those, which do not.
The comparative analysis in this section is based on a few select and measurable
development indicators data from the following categories: the socio-economic and
political category (see table 3 below); the public spending category (see table 4 below)
and the structure o f trade category (see table 5 below). Based on the content o f the data
provided in tables 3 to 5, a comparative analysis o f NAFTA, the EU, MERCOSUR,
ASEAN and COMESA reveals the following comparable attributes o f successful regional
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integration arrangements: similarity (this attribute must be qualified in terms o f positive
versus negative similarity, and depending on the direction o f measurement, a positively
higher—marked by a strong positive score— similarity level is the most desirable
attribute); institutional maturity; level o f integration and commitment. I will examine
these attributes in turn.
Table 3
Selected Socio-economic and Political Development Indicators in NAFTA, the EU MERCOSUR,
ASEAN and COMESA
INDICATOR

NAFTA

The EU

MERCOSUR

ASEAN

COMESA

GDP

US$ 24,733

US$ 22,823

US$ 7,773

US$ 7,389

US$ 3,143

87 percent

86.5 percent

85.6 percent

67.9 percent

53.2 percent

76.5 years

73.5 years

72 years

67.1 years

48.7 years

US$ 2,741

US$ 1527.8

US$ 752

US$ 287.1

127.3

5.3 percent

4.9 percent

4 percent

3.4 percent

5.1 percent

476

465.4

192.3

131.1

46.2

342.3

353.9

82.6

111.0

20.2

111.7

65.7

2

9.7

0.1

P. E.F

2.23

2.17

3.45

3.33

3.34

C.P.I

6.5

6.6

3.6

3.8

2.7

P.O.P.F

1.3

1.0

2.0

4.9

4.6

per

Capita
School
Enrolment
L.E.A.B

Health

Exp.

Per capita
Public Educ.
Expenditure
Telephone
lines/1000
Internet
users/1000
Patents
granted/mill.

The data above was extracted from the following sources: The Human Development Index, 2003
Report; The Heritage Foundation, 2005 Index of Economic Freedom Report; Transparency
International, 2005 Global Corruption Report and Freedom House, 2005 Freedom in the World
Report.

125

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Legend:
1.
L.E.A.B:
2.
P.E.F:
3.
C.P.I:
4.
P.O.P.F:
Notes:
•
•
•
•

Life Expectancy At Birth
Perceptions of Economic Freedom
Corruption Perception Index
Perception of Political Freedom

GDP Per Capita: The figures used here are for 2002
Public Health Expenditure: The figures here are in US$ PPP. They are a percentage of the 2001
GDP.
Public Expenditure on Education: Calculated as a percentage of the 1999-2001 GDP
The figures for telephone main lines per thousand, Internet users per thousand are for the year
2002 while the figures for patents granted to residents per million are for the year 2000.

The similarity attribute posits that successful regional integration arrangements
are likely to be found among countries with similar levels o f economic development,
business cultures, political institutions and cultural values. As can be seen from Table 3
above, positive similarity is strongest in NAFTA and the EU, fairly strong in
MERCOSUR and ASEAN and rather weak in COMESA in the following development
indicators: GDP per Capita, School Enrolment and Life Expectancy at Birth. On health
expenditure per capita, NAFTA and the EU have the highest positive similarity among
the member states; MERCOSUR has a fairly positive similarity among the member states
while ASEAN and COMESA have the lowest positive similarity among their member
states. However, all the regional integration arrangements tend to be fairly similar in their
public education expenditure, although the EU and NAFTA still have higher percentages
in this area. The level o f similarity in telephone lines/1000 and internet users/1000 is
positively high in the EU and NAFTA, fairly high in MERCOSUR and ASEAN and low
in COMESA. In patents granted per million, NAFTA (mainly because o f the US factor
and the small number o f member states) leads the pack while the EU, ASEAN,
MERCOSUR and COMESA follow in that order. All the regional integration
arrangements seem to be committed to a fairly similar business culture as is reflected in
their levels o f economic freedom.

The EU and NAFTA have the highest positive

similarity in the political culture o f their member states as is reflected in the political
freedoms enjoyed in their respective regions. In this regard, MERCOSUR has a fairly
high level o f positive similarity in its political culture while ASEAN and the COMESA
have rather low positive similarity levels in their political cultures. Finally, based on the

12 6

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

data in table 3, it can be deduced that the corruption scores are highest and positive in the
EU and NAFTA and low in MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA.

Table 4
Priorities in public spending in NAFTA, the EU, MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA

PRIORITY

NAFTA

The EU

MERCOSUR

ASEAN

COMESA

5.3

4.9

4.0

3.4

5.1

5.2

5.6

4.1

1.5

2.7

1.7

1.7

1.4

3.0

4.5

13.3*

8.4

7.5

3.7

1.5

0.4

0.9*

0.4*

AREA

EDUCATION
(as

% 1999-

2001 GDP

HEALTH
(as % of 2001
GDP)

MILITARY
(as % of 2002
GDP)
*
00
^6

DEBT SERV.
(as % of 2002
GDP)
1.7
R&D
(as % of 2002
GDP

Source: This data was computed from the Human Development Indicators 2003 Report
Note: The asterisk (*) on NAFTA scores points to the fact that this score is high due to Mexico’s highdebt servicing responsibilities while that on EU points to the fact that the score is higher due to the fact that
most of the new EU entrants have high debt-serving obligations. Under R&D, the asterisk indicates limited
data availability from ASEAN and COMESA respectively.

Table 4 above provides the social dimension commitment in terms o f public spending in
some selected priority areas. From the data in table 4, it can be deduced that NAFTA and
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COMESA place the highest priority in spending on education; the EU and MERCOSUR
place a high priority in the education expenditure while ASEAN’s expenditure in
education is lower than that o f all the other regional integration arrangements. The EU
and NAFTA have the highest expenditure in health, followed by MERCOSUR,
COMESA and ASEAN in that order. COMESA and ASEAN have the highest military
expenditure, followed by NAFTA, the EU and MERCOSUR. The EU spends the highest
amount in debt serving. However, it should be noted that most o f this expenditure is
incurred by the recent (2004) EU entrants. MERCOSUR spends the second highest
amount in debt-servicing. It is then followed by NAFTA, where the debt servicing mainly
falls within the Mexican jurisdiction. COMESA spends the lowest amount in debt
servicing. However, the COMESA figures need to be qualified as they are not a reflection
o f the least debt burden, but rather, the inability o f most COMESA member states to meet
their debt repayment obligations641. Finally, in terms o f expenditure in research and
development, NAFTA and the EU have the highest expenditure, followed by ASEAN
with COMESA and MERCOSUR tied.
Finally, Table 5 below provides the economic dimension o f the regional
integration arrangements in this study. From this table, it can be seen that the EU and
ASEAN are the leading exporters o f goods and services, followed by COMESA, NAFTA
and MERCOSUR. COMESA and MERCOSUR are the leading exporters o f primary
products followed by ASEAN, NAFTA and the EU in that order. The EU and NAFTA
are the leading exporters o f manufactured products, followed by ASEAN, MERCOSUR
and COMESA. Lastly, ASEAN is the leading exporter o f high-tech products, followed by
NAFTA, the EU, MERCOSUR and COMESA in that order.
While I do not intend to draw simple causal relationships between the data above
and developmental regionalism, it is nonetheless possible to establish general patterns and
trends from these data. For example, the EU and NAFTA, which are generally regarded
as successful regional integration arrangements, tend to consistently score high in the
social, economic and political dimensions o f development as per the above selected
categories. At the social level, the EU and NAFTA’s expenditures in health and research
and development are higher than those o f the other regional bodies. As can be seen from
the data, the dividends from these higher social expenditures include high levels o f life
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expectancy and high levels o f innovation, which in turn provides an important ingredient
for successful regionalism. For example, as a result o f research and development, the EU
and NAFTA produces high value, manufactured products, and this means higher
economic returns for these regions.

Table 5
The Structure of Trade (as % of 2002 GDP exports) in NAFTA, the EU, MERCOSUR, ASEAN and
COMESA

TRADE

NAFTA

the EU

MERCOSUR

ASEAN

COMESA

27

55.0

24.3

64.

29.3

20

19.5

64.3

21

71.8

76

78.5

34.3

47.3

24.7

22.3

13.0

8.0

39

3.5

ITEM
Goods and
Services
Primary
Exports
Manufactured
Exports
High Tech.
Exports
Source: Human Development Indicators 2003 Report.

At the economic level, the EU and NAFTA have higher levels o f GDP per capita
compared to MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA. These higher levels o f GDP mean
that the citizens o f these regional integration arrangements are fairly wealthy and
therefore capable o f participating in the market mechanism both as producers and
consumers o f good and services642. Owing to their higher incomes, the citizens o f
NAFTA and EU are more likely—compared those o f MERCOSUR, ASEAN and
COMESA— to have some disposable income, which they can in turn invest and therefore
help to increase both the agglomeration effects and the economic complementarities o f
their respective regions643.
At the political level, the data indicate that the citizens in the EU and NAFTA
enjoy a higher degree o f political freedom compared to those in MERCOSUR, ASEAN
and COMESA. Political freedom is an essential component o f development since it
ensures that the citizen’s input in the development policies that directly affect their
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overall well-being is not ignored by political decrees or directives644.

Additionally,

political freedom ensures that the political leaders are held accountable and that their
decisions, to the greatest extent possible, reflect the wishes o f the citizens645.
Therefore, from the foregoing, it can be said, and with a reasonable degree o f
accuracy that the EU and NAFTA are fairly successful regional integration arrangements
because they possess a good number o f the features and characteristics that make for
successful regional integration arrangements. And as can be seen from the data, the other
regional integration arrangements have made varying degrees o f progress in developing
these features and characteristics. For example, COMESA’s expenditure on education as
a percentage o f the GDP is one o f the highest among all the other regional integration
arrangements. Similarly, in terms o f levels o f economic freedom, all the regional
integration arrangements in this study have fairly similar levels o f economic freedom.
MERCOSUR, another regional integration arrangement that is seen to be fairly successful,
especially among third world regional integration arrangements, scores impressively in
terms o f GDP per capita, school enrolment and health expenditure. ASEAN has done well
the exports o f goods and services, especially in the manufacturing and high-tech sector.
However, apart from the information derived from the data above, other factors
can be attributed to the varying degrees o f regional integration success. These factors
include a combination o f internal and external factors that have made some regional
integration arrangements more successful than others. For example, the EU has grown
into a formidable regional integration arrangement because at its formative stages, the US
was fully committed to the idea o f a united Western Europe, mainly as a means to wadeoff perceived Soviet expansionism646. Hence, in order to ensure the success o f the idea of
a united Europe, capable o f resisting the lure and or coercion o f the USSR, the US
substantially contributed to this idea through the Marshall Plan and through encouraging
the emergence o f regionalism in Western Europe647.
Similarly, the lessening rivalry between France and W est Germany, fostered
through the creation o f strong economic ties, was instrumental in launching the idea o f
regionalism in Western Europe onto a more hopeful path for growth648. Finally, the strong
position held by the EU in such multi-lateral organizations as the WTO, the UN, the IMF
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and the World Bank and in its bilateral relations with a number o f developed and
developing countries has given the EU the necessary leverage to bargain for favourable
economic policies at the international level 649. These policies have significantly
contributed to the EU’s success650.
As the de facto power in NAFTA and the biggest economy in the world, the US
has continued to expand both NAFTA’s and its personal agenda regionally and
internationally. Like the EU, NAFTA, particularly through the US, continues to strike
favourable deals at the WTO level and at the level o f bilateral relations with other
countries and or regional integration arrangements651. In MERCOSUR, Brazil and
Argentina have taken the lead in championing the objectives o f their member states while
increased levels o f FDI have meant improved prospects for the emergence o f a successful
regional integration arrangement652. ASEAN has benefited greatly from Chinese and
Japanese capital while promoting such vital sectors as the high-tech industry653. Finally,
given its socio-economic and political climate, COMESA’s developmental regionalism
gains are not as negligible as they are normally portrayed in the literature654. However, for
COMESA to build on these gains and therefore transform itself into a more viable
institution for Eastern and Southern Africa’s development, it must overcome a number o f
challenges and act on those areas where its prospects for success are highest. I will now
examine COMESA’s challenges in so far as the development o f Eastern and Southern
Africa is concerned before making some general recommendations on the way forward
and drawing some conclusions on COMESA’s development prospects for the future.

(ii)

COMESA and Development in Eastern and Southern Africa: Challenges,
Recommendations and Prospects.
(a)

Challenges to COMESA’s Developmental Regionalism Efforts in Eastern
and Southern Africa.
While COMESA faces a number o f challenges in its efforts to promote socio

economic and political development in Eastern and Southern Africa, here I limit my
discussion to the following: institutional constraints; structural constraints; infrastructural
constraints and international constraints. COMESA’s institutional constraints are

131

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

reflected in a number o f ways. First, at the executive level, the implementation o f the
COMESA protocols is mainly left to the COMESA Authority and a few bureaucrats in
the member states655. This renders the COMESA Secretariat an ineffective body and
reduces its task to report writing and documentation. Second, because each member state
is supposed to independently enforce the COMESA protocols, there is poor coordination
in regional social, economic and political policy areas656. A third institutional constrain
can be attributed to COMESA’s sheer size and the multiplicity o f regional integration
arrangements within this regional body

. The common cliche holds that bigger is better.

However, bigger is not always better, especially when (as is the case with
COMESA) it is not backed up by sufficient capacity658. COMESA’s expansive size and
its limited capacity to effectively promote developmental regionalism in this vast region
o f the African continent is one o f the challenges that must be addressed before
COMESA’s efficacy as a regional development initiative can be bolstered. Additionally,
multiple memberships in different regional integration arrangements within and outside
COMESA further reduce its capacity for effective developmental regionalism659. Finally,
as can be seen from the data above, COMESA has not built effective political institutions
and is confronted by such bad-govemance practices as high levels o f corruption660. The
absence o f well-functioning political institutions among the COMESA member states is
not conducive to developmental regionalism because: it reduces the political will needed
to propel regional integration; increases the perception o f COMESA as a high risk region
and therefore discourages both local and international investment; and finally, it denies
regionalism the much needed input from the citizens o f this region and hence leads
politicians to pursue wrong priorities (e.g. massive military expenditures) at the expense
the high priority development areas like health and education.
Low levels o f economic complementarities among the member states form one o f
the main structural constraints in COMESA’s efforts to promote development in Eastern
and Southern Africa.

As already noted above, COMESA member states are mainly

producers and exporters o f primary products. COMESA’s exports are normally destined
for the same markets in Europe and North America and this has meant increased
competition (not cooperation) among the COMESA member states661. What is more, the
economic returns and profits from primary products have considerably declined over the
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years and as a result, the levels o f income in most COMESA countries are lower than that
in other regions o f the world. A limited capital base means that a substantial number o f
the COMESA citizens are excluded from actively participating in COMESA’s market
mechanism. As a result, there is a limited chance o f economic diversification and the
continued reliance on a few primary products for the international market662.
At the infrastructural level, COMESA’s constrains are manifested through an
under-developed regional transport and telecommunications network663. This constraint is
exacerbated in COMESA’s landlocked states like Uganda, Rwanda, Zambia, Sudan and
Malawi where entire regions are isolated from meaningful cross-border development. The
development o f an extensive transport and telecommunications network is a major
requirement for successful regional integration and COMESA must address this
challenge664.
Finally, COMESA’s efforts at promoting developmental regionalism are
constrained by the international environment, which seems to cater for large, wellestablished industrial and technology-driven regional integration arrangements like the
EU and NAFTA while further marginalizing the weaker, primary-product driven
integration arrangements like COMESA665. Additionally, owing to their socio-economic
and political largesse, the more successful regional integration arrangements like the EU
and NAFTA have erected unfavourable trade barriers in the agricultural sector666. This is
one area where COMESA possesses the so-called comparative advantage and therefore,
the impact and the effect o f these barriers has made COMESA even less competitive in
the emerging post-cold W ar global economy667. So the question is: what are some o f the
ways in which COMESA can overcome, nay, limit the foregoing challenges. I offer some
recommendations next.

(b)

Recommendations on Reducing COMESA’s Challenges to Successful
R egionalism in Eastern and Southern Africa:

The recommendations given here are in no way exhaustive. However, they
provide a general outline on some o f the measures that COMESA can undertake so as to
limit or overcome the negative impact o f the challenges identified and therefore bolster its
role in the socio-economic and political development o f Eastern and Southern Africa. So
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as to overcome the above challenges and so as to bolster its development role, COMESA
should:
>

Give the Secretariat more executive authority, especially in the implementation o f
those protocols that have already been ratified by the COMESA authority. This
will bring about a more coordinated approach to policy implementation within
COMESA.

> Rationalize and harmonize the process o f integration among the member states.
The first approach here will entail COMESA persuading those member states who
belong to other regional integration arrangements to quit their membership in
these regional bodies and therefore concentrate their efforts and resources to
building o f a stronger and more efficient regional integration arrangement based
on regional integration co-ordination centres: an Eastern Africa Coordination
Centre (to be based in Nairobi, Kenya); a Southern Africa Coordination Centre
( to be based in Harare, Zimbabwe) and a Northern Africa Coordination Centre
( to be based in Cairo, Egypt). These centres will act as the engine-heads o f
integration in COMESA and the focal points for COMESA-wide integration. The
centres should be under the overall co-ordination o f the COMESA Secretariat.
> Promote a culture o f good political governance and uphold the rule o f law. As
already noted above, incidents o f political instability and lack o f a strong, rulesbased legal environment have had a negative impact on regionalism in this region
o f the world.
> Encourage the emergence o f complementarities in the region through promoting a
broad auto-centric approach to development. While COMESA should continue
seeking external markets, it should first start by unleashing the latent potential o f
its under-utilized market by encouraging increased regional production for
increased regional consumption. To this end, and as already suggested above,
COMESA should focus on improving its regional infrastructure, especially its
transport and communication network so as to further boost regional trade and
improve its overall economic performance. Additionally, COMESA should invest
more in health and education as a means o f increasing its regional and
international competitiveness.
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> Finally, COMESA should continue liaising with other regional integration
arrangements and countries, especially those from the developing world to endure
that its socio-economic and political development agenda is not ignored at the
multi-lateral level.
In light o f the challenges above and the recommendations given thereof, what prospects
does COMESA have in so far as promoting socio-economic and political development in
Eastern and Southern Africa is concerned? I offer a brief response to this question next.

(c) COMESA: Prospects for Eastern and Southern Africa’s Development
Despite the challenges identified above, COMESA’s prospects for promoting
development in Eastern and Southern Africa look promising for a number o f reasons.
First, although COMESA’s socio-economic and political development gains look
minimal in comparison to the other regional integration arrangements, they are
nonetheless important gains, especially given COMESA’s level o f integration668. Second,
COMESA has laid out some important plans in terms o f developing its transport and
telecommunications sector. For example, in the transportation sector, COMESA has made
impressive progress in liberalizing its skies and harmonizing its road and rail cross-border
transportation procedures669.

In the telecommunication sector, COMESA is in the

process o f building and installing a regional telecommunication network dubbed
CO M TEL670. All these measures are likely to boost COMESA’s regional trading
activities and therefore lead to increased economic growth.
Third, since the end o f the Cold War, most COMESA states are breaking away
from the shackles o f repressive political regimes and embracing more democratic forms
o f governance. While this process is slow, and at times beset by retrogressive political
developments (such as the current case in M ugabe’s Zimbabwe and Kabila’s DRC),
overall, COMESA and Africa in general are moving away from the political horrors o f Idi
Amin, Mobutu SeSe Seko, Jean Bokassa, Mariam Mengistu that haunted Africa from the
1960s to the beginning o f the 1990s. New mechanisms o f moderating political conflict in
Africa, such as a re-vitalized African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD) are likely to ensure the non-emergence o f such despicable
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regimes671. Additionally, as already mentioned above, political stability and normalcy are
returning to Rwanda, Burundi and Sudan. The emerging political climate in COMESA is
generally tranquil and therefore likely to foster COMESA’s socio-economic and political
development pursuits.
What is more, at the international level, the development concerns o f some o f
COMESA’s member states are being taken into consideration through, for example, the
recent G8 debt cancellation for the least developed countries672. Overall, the African
agenda is being taken into account through such initiatives as Tony Blair’s Commission
for Africa and the United States o f America’s African Growth Opportunity Act

and the

EU ’s Everything But Arms (EBA) trade strategy674. Therefore, from the foregoing and as
I have attempted to show throughout this thesis and while some challenges and
limitations still exist, the contention that COMESA’s has good prospects for bringing
about socio-economic and political development in Eastern and Southern Africa
compared to other past development strategies is not far-fetched.

(iii)

Summary and Conclusion
In this thesis, I have examined the political economy o f regionalism by looking at

regionalism and its viability as a strategy for Africa’s socio-economic and political
development. I started my discussion with a theoretical analysis o f regionalism. Then
next, I examined different theories o f development and pointed out their inherent
limitations before presenting some reasons why regionalism is a better development
strategy for Africa than the other theoretical formulations on development.

In exploring

the viability o f regionalism as a development strategy for Africa, I conducted a
comparative analysis o f the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
versus the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN. It has been my contention that while
all these regional integration arrangements are confronted by unique challenges and
operate under different circumstances in their respective regions, a comparative analysis
o f these regional bodies exhibits certain trends and patterns that are closely related to their
perceived degree o f success as avenues for socio-economic and political development.
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For example, from the comparative analysis o f the regional integration
arrangements in this study, it was found that the regions committed to a more holistic
approach to development are the one that are, overall more successful. Hence, those
regions that have invested more in the socio-economic dimension o f development through
committing more funds to health, education, research and development and in
information telecommunications technology tend to have positive regional development
input factors such as healthy citizens, innovative citizens and high-income earning
citizens. The same trend is reflected in the political dimension o f development, with those
regional bodies boasting o f higher levels o f political freedoms and low levels o f malgovemance (i.e. low levels o f corruption) also being perceived as more successful. Going
by the select data used in the comparative analysis o f the regional integration
arrangements in this study, COMESA’s scores are comparatively lower than those o f the
other regional integration arrangements in most development categories except for
Education and economic freedom where the scores are more or less similar for all the
regional bodies.
While the scores from this comparative analysis have been useful in helping to
identify some o f the reasons for low regional integration success in COMESA, I have also
identified other institutional, structural, infrastructural and international environment
constrains to successful regionalism in this regional integration arrangement. Within this
context, I made some recommendations and based on a number o f reasons, argued that
COMESA’s has good prospects for bringing about socio-economic and political
development in Eastern and Southern Africa.
Yes! It is true that compared to the other regional integration arrangements in this
study, COMESA’s developmental regionalism gains look minimal. However, within its
present socio-economic and political capacity, COMESA has done fairly well. What is
more, COMESA has put in place mechanisms to improve its performance and if,
perchance, it takes the above recommendations into consideration, it is likely to improve
on its performance even more. However, the greatest hope for COMESA comes from the
fact that for the first time, COMESA (and indeed all the other regional integration
arrangements in Africa) has a real chance o f shaping its socio-economic and political
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outcome in an environment that encourages less adversarial regional and multi-lateral
cooperation. Before the end o f the Cold War, such an environment was not really
available and international politics, regional integration arrangements notwithstanding,
was mainly shaped by the geopolitical interests o f the US and the USSR. The Cold War
era is over. The people o f Africa and indeed the whole world are shaping their socio
economic and political fortunes under a different era— globalization. For many people
and for many states in the international system, regionalism has become one o f the main
ways through which such fortunes are being determined. For the people o f Eastern and
Southern Africa, COMESA provides an appropriate vehicle through which the journey o f
developmental regionalism in a globalizing world is being taken.
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